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Through its exploration the thesis highlights that although Somaliland is an unrecognised de 
facto state there is a legal system in Somaliland with which the international human rights 
system can engage which has both strengths and weaknesses. The thesis also considers what 
the debates are around the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland. Having established 
this, the thesis goes on to establish there is an inconsistent and contradictory approach to the 
international community’s engagement with Somaliland and the status it gives to the self-
determination Somaliland currently exercises. The inconsistent legal status of relations with 
Somaliland is then shown to impact the responsibility for human rights obligations authorities 
in Somaliland are considered to have and engagement the international human rights system 
has in Somaliland in relation to those responsibilities and obligations. The thesis concludes 
that an arrangement that allows a level of external self-determination and which is agreed by 
the parent state of Somalia is required for greater engagement between Somaliland and the 
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Introduction and Background 
1.1 Introduction  
In 1991 the northwest territory of Somalia declared independence as the Republic of 
Somaliland. Since the declaration of independence a government based in Hargeisa, the 
capital of Somaliland, has administered the territory without administrative control or input 
from the government of the Somali Republic in Mogadishu. Although the authorities in 
Hargeisa have administered the territory for 28 years no state or international organisation 
has recognised Somaliland as an independent state.  
Although there have been negotiations between the administrations in Hargeisa and 
Mogadishu no agreement has been reached regarding the administration of the territory of 
Somaliland. Political and academic debates regarding a settlement have considered the 
legality of Somaliland’s declaration as an independent state
1
 and the impact an agreement on 




1.2 Research Question 
This thesis considers the unexplored question of how constitutional arrangements for the 
exercise of self-determination by the peoples within the territory of Somaliland may impact 
Somaliland’s engagement with the international human rights system. This question is 
explored through an analysis of how self-determination is exercised in Somaliland and on 
what basis the international community engages with that exercise of self-determination in 
Somaliland more broadly as well as how the international human rights system engages in 
Somaliland. The term ‘engages or ‘engagement’ means broadly interaction between the 
international community or the international human rights system and authority resulting 
from the exercise of self-determination by peoples in Somaliland. 
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In answering the research question of how the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland 
may impact engagement with the international human rights system, the thesis identifies that 
there is a human rights system in Somaliland with which the international human rights 
system could engage if the peoples of Somaliland exercised a form of self-determination that 
was agreed with by the Somali Republic. This human rights system in Somaliland is a 
consequence of the political ‘stability’ in Somaliland which has resulted in an identifiably 
functioning authority. This idea of Somaliland stability and the functional authority that is 
engaged with in different capacities and could be engaged with in more official capacities if 
the basis of the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland were agreed, will be returned to 
throughout the thesis. The debates around self-determination in Somaliland are shown to 
focus on the two opposing positions of a sovereign Somaliland and federal Somalia as a 
result of Somalia’s recent history. This is shown to have resulted in an inconsistent approach 
from the international community to the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland due to 
the international community’s diplomatic concerns regarding the weakening of Somalia’s 
territorial integrity and broader political interests. The thesis will demonstrate that this 
inconsistent approach of the international community to engagement with Somaliland has had 
the impact of increasing uncertainty as to responsibility for international human rights in 
Somaliland. It is demonstrated that this in turn has resulted in engagement between the 
international human rights system and Somaliland that is not always consistent with 
Somaliland being a de jure part of Somalia. Consideration of the exercise of self-
determination by Somaliland beyond the views of a federal Somalia and a sovereign 
Somaliland to include a level of self-determination that enabled a degree of external self-
determination that took advantage of the stability of governance in Somaliland and which, 
was agreed by the government of the Somali Republic, as the recognised government of 
Somalia, may enable greater engagement between Somaliland and the international human 
rights system.  
1.3 Background 
In this section I provide the historical background to the formation of Somalia from the 
colonies of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, the Civil War in Somalia under the 
dictatorship of Mohammed Siad Barre and the declaration of Somaliland independence from 
Somalia. This historical background to Somaliland plays a part in understanding the social, 




and the exercise of Somaliland self-determination both within the Somali Republic and 
Somaliland and within the international community. The historical background is important 
to the unclear status of Somaliland’s exercise of self-determination
3
 as there are legal 
arguments for and against the recognition of the exercise of the self-determination of 
Somaliland and engagement with it. The historical background is also relevant to the 
differences in capacity of the governments in Somaliland and the Somali Republic and the 
issues that this raises in relation to the impact the exercise of self-determination by 
Somaliland could have on the protection of human rights in Somaliland. 
1.3.1 Formation of Somalia 
On 26 June 1960 the British protectorate British Somaliland gained independence as 
Somaliland.
4
 Notification of Somaliland’s independence was registered with the United 
Nations (‘UN’) and 35 members of the UN recognised Somaliland as a new state.
5
  
On 27 June 1960 the new Legislative Assembly of Somaliland passed the Union of 
Somaliland and Somalia Law
6
 but this was not signed by authorised southern representatives 
and remained without force.
7
 On 30 June 1960 the Somalian legislature, of the Italian 
administered UN trust territory of Somalia approved in principal a law of union similar to 
that of the Somaliland legislature.
8
 However, the merger was poorly prepared and the 
parliaments of the two states approved different acts of union.
9
 A consequence of the 
disparity was that the Somaliland legislature subsequently insisted that an agreed single act of 
union be presented to the joint legislatures for approval.
10
 Despite the potential lack of an 
agreed act of union the President of the Legislative Assembly proclaimed the independence 
of a unified Somalia from British and Italian Somali colonies on 1 July 1960 and formed the 
                                                          
3
 As discussed at chapter 4, 5 and 6. 
4
 International Crisis Group, ‘Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership’ (Africa Report No 110, 23 May 
2006) 4. 
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and the figure of 35 UN members; Knox Chitiyo and Anna Rader, ‘Somalia 2012 – Ending the Transition’ 
(2012) Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper 4/2012, 23 
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 Anthony J Carroll & B Rajagopal, ‘The Case For the Independent Statehood of Somaliland’ (1993) 8 
American University International Law Review 653, 660. 
7
 Brad Poore, ‘Somaliland: Shackled To A Failed State’ (2009) 45 Stanford Journal of International Law 117, 
124. 
8
 Carroll (n 6) 661. 
9
 International Crisis Group (n 4) 4. 
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 An attempt was made on 31 January 1961 to amend the issue of an 
absent act of union by passing a new act of union retroactive from 1 July 1961. However, the 
act repealing the Act of Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law was not effective in both of 
the former colonial territories that made up Somalia.
12
  
Some legal scholars claim the disparities in legislation and the fact that Italian administered 
Somalia was technically under UN trusteeship, means that the act of union was invalidated.
13
 
Therefore when considering Somaliland’s claims for international recognition there is an 
argument that such claims cannot simply be dismissed due to a legally enforceable single act 
of union between (British) Somaliland and (Italian) Somalia
14
 having been passed.
15
  This is 
relevant to concerns the international community has, particularly the African community, 
regarding the impact of the status given to and the basis of engagement with a Somaliland 
exercising external self-determination, may have on the principle of uti possidetis.
16
 This in 
turn further impacts any discussion of the likelihood of Somaliland’s recognition as a 
sovereign independent state. 
1.3.2 Civil War and Independence 
On 21 October 1969 Mohammad Siad Barre (“Siad Barre”) seized power in Somalia in a 
bloodless coup and established a dictatorship around a power base of the Mareehaan, Ogaden 
and Dhulbahante clans. This clan basis of the Siad Barre regime has had an impact on 
different Somali communities’ views of a centralised Somali government and in particular in 
Somaliland in which the Isaaq are the majority clan
17
 but who are a minority clan in Somalia 
as a whole. Somaliland is dominated by the Isaaq clan (one of the five or six large clan 
families in Somalia) which is itself divided into several sub-clans.
18
 There are also substantial 
groups of other clans in Somaliland, such as the Gadabuursi in the West and the Warsengheli 
and Dhulbahante in the East.
19
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The Isaaq were persecuted by the larger clan dominated central government of the Siad Barre 
regime with deliberate targeting and bombing.
20
 In response to the attacks the Isaaq clan 
established the Somaliland National Movement (“SNM”) in the early 1980s. The SNM 
entered into an all-out offensive against Siad Barre forces
21
 which ended in 1991 when the 
SNM captured all of the northern towns in Somalia.
22
  
The persecution of the Isaaq is a relevant consideration in assessing how the exercise of self-
determination by Somaliland may impact Somaliland’s engagement with the international 
human rights system is a relevant consideration. Simply assuming a central Mogadishu based 
Somali Republic government will be accepted as being responsible for protecting human 
rights in the whole of Somalia is unrealistic. The history of the persecution of the Isaaq also 
demonstrates that there is an emotional basis for Somaliland’s declaration of independence 
that needs to be considered when discussing the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland 
1.3.3 Somaliland independence 
The political stability of Somaliland since the civil war has been hard won through traditional 
mediation after post-independence and inter-Somaliland conflict, as a consequence the 
emotional consequences of history cannot be ignored when considering the legal impact of 
potential agreements to the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland. 
The Isaaq clan was not the only clan within Somaliland that opposed the Siad Barre regime 
and when the war against the Siad Barre forces ended inter-clan conflict did occur in 
Somaliland.
23
 After traditional leaders (“the Guurti”) met in 1991 through a series of 
reconciliation conferences, progress in achieving peace was made and this led to decisions 
being made in regard to reconciliation and independence. These decisions were upheld by the 
Committee of the SNM and the Republic of Somaliland declared independence on 18 May 
1991.
24
 As Peoples and populations are constantly moved throughout history
25
 no instrument 
has defined Peoples in relation to the right to self-determination.
26
 A rigid definition could 
                                                          
20
 International Crisis Group (n 4) 5. 
21
 Poore (n 7) 128-129; Shinn (n 5) 1. 
22
 International Crisis Group (n 4) 6. 
23
 Poore (n 7)129. 
24
 For details of conferences prior to independence see International Crisis Group (n 4) 6; Carroll (n 6) 655; 
Poore (n 7) 130.  
25
 Eugene Kamenca, ‘Human Rights: Peoples Rights’ in James Crawford (ed), The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon 
Press 1988) 133. 
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also mean some groups are excluded from the protection that the exercise of self-
determination allows.
27
 The peace and reconciliation prior to the declaration of independence 
mean the Peoples that claim the right to self-determination on which the claims to 
independence are therefore  the Peoples in the territory of Somaliland and not limited to the 
Isaaq clan which does satisfy some views that a Peoples require a common desire and are 
capable of creating a functional entity to provide it.
28
 
The land that the Somaliland authority claims makes up the territory of Somaliland is that of 
the former colony of British Somaliland.
29
 Puntland, which is a self-declared autonomous 
federal state of Somalia,
30
 disputes that the regions of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn should be part 
of Somaliland’s territory.
31
 Puntland claims that these regions do not want to be part of an 
independent Somaliland but want to remain part of a federal Somalia.
32
 As a consequence of 
this dispute there have been violent disputes between the Somaliland armed forces and 
militias supported by the Puntland regional government. 
Throughout the 1990s a number of other territories within Somalia declared independence or 
autonomy largely on the basis of clan but only Somaliland endured as a self-proclaimed 
independent state.
33
 However, the first 6 years after the declaration of Somaliland 
independence were marked by inter-clan strife with conflicts between clans and between pro-
Somaliland Government forces and groups opposed to the expansion of the new Somaliland 
government’s power throughout Somaliland’s territory.
34
  This conflict in Somaliland led to 
another series of conferences the consequence of which was a national referendum in 2001.
35
 
At the Arta Conference in 2000 the government of the Somali Republic was established as 
the Somalian Transitional Federal Government (“TFG”).
36
 The TFG system of representation 
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 Shinn (n 5) 3. 
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 Ibid 66. 
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rewarded communities that formed local or regional administrations. The intention was to 
expand participation and recognise and reward local governments in Somalia.  The 
unintended consequence of this was to encourage proliferation of regional political entities 
with their own power base which thereby increased instability.
37
 These self-proclaimed sub-
state administrations proliferated to the point that Somalia was “subject to 30 separate claims 
by ‘statelets’ and ‘regional presidencies”.
38
 Although governments of the Somali Republic 
have attempted to reach agreements with regional authorities, they have not settled on a clear 
inclusive strategy that accommodates regional administrations, which has led to some 
regional authorities to cut ties with the government of the Somali Republic unilaterally.
39
  
The Somaliland authority and Somaliland civil society groups boycotted the Arta Conference 
in 2000, the result of which was the issue of Somaliland entering into discussions to re-join a 
unified federal Somalia was not addressed.
40
 An illustration of the strength of feeling even in 
those early days is that some Somaliland delegates, who opposed Somaliland independence, 
did attend the Arta Conference and became members of the TFG, and as a result were unable 
to return safely to Somaliland.
41
 
The government of the Somali Republic and regional authorities in the Somali Republic 
which do not claim independence from a government of Somalia, dispute Somaliland’s claim 
of independence.
42
 Despite this, there have been regular talks between the government of the 
Somali Republic and the Somaliland authority
43
 to resolve the dispute but no agreements 
have resulted from these talks. 
The 28 years of governance by the Somaliland authority, separate from the governments of 
the Somali Republic and the resulting political stability of administrations in Somaliland 
compared to central and southern Somalia, has led to confirmation of a sense of separation 
and youth in Somaliland identifying as Somalilanders. This has resulted in a strong call for 
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39
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statehood which contrasts with the historic ‘Greater Somalia’ view that was the driving force 
for unification after decolonisation and is a view that plays a strong part in the Somaliland 
Somalia dispute now. This disparity in the ability of the governing administration to function, 
between the less stable recognised parent state of the Somali Republic and the more stable 
unrecognised administration of Somaliland authorities resulting from the exercise of self-
determination in Somaliland is what distinguishes Somaliland from other entities such as 
Wales or Catalonia where the parent state has a functioning administration that can exercise 
external self-determination in the international community and enable internal self-
determination in the sub-state entity. Somaliland is in a position where the exercise of self-
determination has enabled an authority of the sub-state can more effectively exercise external 
self-determination and engage with the international community than the parent state.  
1.3.4 Negotiations between Somalia and Somaliland  
Authorities in the Somali Republic have consistently opposed any formal dismantling of 
Somalia.
44
 The current government of the Somali Republic, the Federal Government of 
Somalia, is firmly wedded to a united Somalia as was its predecessor, the Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia (“TFG”) and as are the Islamist groups in the south.
45
  The 
Transitional Federal Government Charter stated that territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
the Somali Republic as per the 1960 union “shall be inviolable and indivisible”.
46
 Therefore 
any negotiation by the Transitional Federal Government regarding any form of secession by 
Somaliland would have been politically sensitive and as interim governments the 
administrations prior to the current government arguably had no legal authority to take such a 
decision. Governments of the Somali Republic have also had problems in negotiating as some 
unionist see dialogue with Somaliland as being tantamount to recognition which may have a 
knock-on effect of upsetting the delicate power sharing balance amongst southern groups.
47
 
Although attempts are still made to reach a settlement with the President of the Somali 
Republic announcing preparedness to enter into a dialogue with Somaliland in June 2019.
48
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The view of Somaliland separatists is also increasingly entrenched as the growing number of 
youth which now includes those of military age,
49
 have no memory of a united Somalia and 
identify themselves as Somalilanders and thus are unlikely to be persuaded to support 
reunification with Somalia,
50
 tthose that do remember unification associate it with war.
51
 As a 
consequence “Somaliland’s desire for international recognition generates so much pressure to 
be seen as successful that it stifles rigorous debate over the respective merits of independence 
vs. reunification with Somalia”.
52
Any Somaliland authority entering into negotiations with 
the Somali Republic must therefore be prepared for strong opposition and being labelled as a 
‘sell out’.
53
 However, the Somaliland authority has previously indicated a willingness to 
negotiate
54
 and to talk to the government of the Somali Republic such as in 2010-2011 when 
Somaliland Ministers were sent to Mogadishu to provide emergency aid
55
 after the near 
failure of two rainy seasons led to deepening drought.
56
 The Somaliland authority has 
continued to indicate a willingness to enter into a dialogue with the Government of the 
Somali Republic but always rejecting the federal Somalia basis.
57
 The respective political 
positions of Somaliland and the Somali Republic are expressed as legal restraints in their 
respective constitutions.
 58
 Whilst the Provisional Federal Constitution views Somaliland as a 
regional member state,
59
 the Somaliland Constitution considers Somaliland as an independent 
state.
60
 As such, the two constitutions and the different status they accord to Somaliland are 
incompatible. However, if Somaliland were to join the federal Somali Republic, the political 
structure set out in the Somaliland Constitution could be compatible with the Provisional 
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Federal Constitution as it does not specify how authority should be exercised within regional 
units and allows them autonomy to decide
61 





 Therefore, Somaliland could retain its presidency
64
 and political 
structures
65
 as expressed in its constitution. 
The status of the two parties in negotiations would be an issue in any negotiations.
66
 From 
Somaliland’s point of view “renegotiation of the 1960 merger between two sovereign equals 
would probably be the only admissible way of preserving some trace of union” as anything 
else would put Somaliland in a less favourable position than its de jure status as part of 
Somalia.
67
 Mogadishu see’s Somaliland as a breakaway secessionist state. These positions 
reflect the political and legal restraints on the situation as the same proportion of those in 
Somaliland seek independence as those in the Somali Republic reject it
68
 and any “integration 
of two largely incompatible systems” could destabilise both.
69
 
Any resolution regarding the external self-determination of Peoples in Somaliland would 
need to reach an agreement on separation of the national debt and border 
management.
70
These are contentious issues and alteration of the Somaliland borders would 
require a popular mandate under its constitution.
71
 The previous President of Somaliland 
stated that “the borders are not something that can be negotiated that is a matter of state 
security”.
72
 It would therefore appear that a Hargeisa government can no more secede 
sovereignty as a Mogadishu Government can accept independence.
 73
 However he did go on 
to say "[b]ut there is nothing to stop us holding talks with the elders and we are optimistic 
about these”.
74
 As many Somalilanders view dialogue with the Somali Republic purely as a 
requirement for international recognition Somaliland leaders are likely to “seek reasonable 
assurances of international recognition if unity proves unworkable”
 75
 in order to justify the 
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political risk of talks.
76
 The positions of the two Somali parties in any negotiations link back 
to the emotional consequences of the recent history of Somalia
77
 and demonstrate that 
discussions regarding the exercise of self-determination are impacted by more issues than 
strictly practical considerations. 
1.4 Research area and original contribution 
The focus of this thesis is on the impact the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland 
could have on engagement with the international human rights system? The focus is therefore 
limited to identifying how Peoples in Somaliland exercise self-determination and the impact 
this has on international engagement. Due to the issues that arise as a consequence of these 
two aspects of the research question, which will now be elaborated upon, the thesis does not 
analyse what the consequences that engagement with the international human rights system 
may be as this is a wide area of research that could be the focus of a thesis in its own right.  
1.4.1 Self-determination in Somaliland 
This thesis is placed within the literature on self-determination. As discussed above a People 
that exercises the right to self-determination has not been defined. The varying success of 
self-determination movements creating states has added to the confusion.
78
 However, the idea 
of a Peoples cannot be limited to a colonial context
79
 and does encompass aspects relevant to 
statehood regarding an identifiable population and territory, and factors regarding history
80
 
and a collective will which is being subordinated,
81
 which the People of Somaliland appear to 
satisfy. Much of the literature on self-determination focusses on an analysis of issues around 
when self-determination should be exercised and not the impact that exercising self-
determination may have. Kirgis considers the legitimacy of exercising different degrees of 
self-determination,
82
 McCorquodale considers what the appropriate framework is for 
determining claims concerning the right of self-  
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and Klabbers assesses what the right of self-determination is.
84
 There has also 
been analysis of self-determination in Somaliland but the discussions have again focussed on 
similar discussions of self-determination as a right in itself and how it applies to Somaliland 
such as consideration of self-determination as a right of Somaliland
85
 and the legality of 
Somaliland’s self-determination as a sovereign state.
86
 There has also been research on how 
different political models for the exercise of internal self-determination would fit into the 
cultural and political dynamics of Somalia and Somaliland.
87
 What the literature on 
Somaliland and self-determination, has not done is analysed the impact the exercise of self-
determination in Somaliland may have. More specifically the impact self-determination has 
on Somaliland’s international engagement and even more specifically the impact on 
engagement between the international human rights system and the human rights structures 
and systems in Somaliland.  
Somaliland independent statehood and being part of a federal Somalia are the two dominant 
sides of the debate regarding the relationship between Somaliland and the Somali Republic. 
Other arrangements for the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland other than 
independent statehood and Somaliland being part of a federal Somalia have been proposed 
but the debates relating to other models for the exercise of self-determination have focussed 
on how different constitutional models would provide stable government in  Somalia in view 
of the historical background of the Civil War.
88
 These discussions do not consider how the 
form the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland takes, may impact engagement with the 
international human rights system.  
1.4.2 Through its analysis of what impact the exercise of self-determination may have, the 
thesis assesses the unexplored next step beyond that of other literature on self-
determination and other analysis of self-determination in the context of Somaliland. This 
thesis therefore takes a new approach to the analysis of the right to self-determination by 
analysing self-determination as a means to an end through the assessment of what the 
subsequent impact of exercising self-determination maybe. This is different from the 
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assessment of self-determination as an end in itself in which the focus is on how self-
determination can be exercised in the most stable way or in the form most acceptable to 
relevant parties or actors with little assessment of what the exercise of self-determination 
may facilitate, such as engagement with the international human rights system. In doing 
this the thesis contributes to an assessment of wider aims that may result from exercising 
self-determination by Somaliland. The assessment of the purposes of exercising self-
determination rather than the means of attaining self-determination may broaden the 
options to achieving an agreed settlement in Somalia for the exercise of self-
determination in Somaliland beyond those of a federal Somalia or a sovereign Somaliland 




1.4.2 Developments in International governance and self-determination 
The premise of the relevance of the research question to self-determination can be seen in an 
observation by Weller:  
“[T]he increasing willingness to engage with self-determination issues [is] further 
evidence of the emergence of one international system of multi-level governance, 
where national and international constitutional law come into direct contact and 
become at times difficult to distinguish. In such a universal system of public law, the 
state is only one of many possible layers of public authority. Sovereign powers can be 
assigned at various levels, ranging from local municipalities to regions, federal 




Using this observation of an emerging ‘international system of multi-level governance’ where 
‘the state is only one of many possible layers of public authority’.
91
 Chapter three of this 
thesis will demonstrate that the reduction of the debate about the exercise of self-
determination in Somaliland to the two sides of a sovereign state of Somaliland and a sub-
state unit within a federal Somalia under the government of the Somali Republic 
unnecessarily restricts the parameters for negotiating an agreement in Somalia. As Weller 
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also inferred a broad spectrum for the exercise of self-determination, when he added that a 
manifestation of the process of developing a multi-level system of authority is the 
renegotiation of “the constitutional assignment of powers to the state”.
92
  
Kingsbury observed that a consequence of the relationship between the process of an 
emerging international legal system with many possible layers of public authority, 
governance and human rights is that;  
“the far-reaching argument that self-determination in [the] strong form of statehood or 
almost complete autonomy is essential as a general precondition for human rights 
does not establish which groups or territories are the units of self-determination for 
the purposes of human rights enhancement”.
93
   
The unclear status of the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland through the 
international community’s engagement there, discussed in chapter four and the effect this has 
on applicable human rights obligations and responsibility for them and engagement regarding 
those obligations as explored in chapter six demonstrates that ‘units of self-determination for 
the purposes of human rights enhancement’
94
 have not been established.  
Through consideration of the role of self-determination in the process of an emerging 
international system of multi-level governance described by Weller and the observation of 
Kingsbury, regarding the relationship between self-determination and human rights in the 
context of Somaliland, the thesis aims to contribute to the specific debate regarding how the 
exercise of self-determination, by Somaliland, may affect international engagement in 
relation to human rights in Somaliland. This is with the view that such a debate will 
contribute to wider discussions regarding the exercise of self-determination by territorial 
entities and international engagement.  
1.4.3 International Human Rights Law in Somaliland  
Assessing the impact of self-determination on the full spectrum of international engagement 
is too broad an area for an effective analysis of the international impact of self-determination. 
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International human rights is a suitable focus for assessing what impact the exercise of self-
determination by a territory may have because it has been recognised maintaining common 
international standards requires international engagement with internal affairs.
95
 The focus on 
engagement in relation to international human rights is because “[f]or the most part, 
international law operates amongst states: [but] in exceptional areas, such as human rights 
and commercial transactions, is it grudgingly accorded a transnational character”.
96
 The 
external self-determination aspect of international commercial transactions and trade have 
been explored and used by many sub-state entities such as Hong Kong, Taiwan. UK overseas 
territories but the transnational character of human rights less so. As a consequence of the 
international nature of human rights, McCorquodale has observed; 
“a State’s internal protection of the right to self-determination is now of international 
concern, which is consistent with the development of international human rights law 




The international concern for self-determination and human rights means the focus on the 
international human rights system on the basis that its purpose is to provide “a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and nations”.
98
 Therefore, the impact differences in 
the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland may have on Somaliland’s engagement with 
the international human rights system may increase Somaliland’s connection to “international 
co-operation….in promoting and encouraging respect for fundamental freedoms for all”.
99
 
However, this thesis does not assess whether increased engagement with the international 
human rights system improves human rights protection or not, because this could be and is, 
an area of research in its own right.
100
 This thesis is restricted to an analysis of how the 
exercise of self-determination could impact the ability of Somaliland to engage with the 
international human rights system and not the consequences of such engagement.  
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The research has been desk based doctrinal research. My analysis has considered primary 
sources from international and regional organisations, international statutes and case law and 
reports from international non-governmental organisations and non-governmental 
organisations, the media and other sources. 
1.6 Terms of Use  
Somaliland administration 
‘Somaliland’ is reference to the territory that declared independence in 1991 and claims to be 
the territory of the state of the Republic of Somaliland and is geographically within the same 
borders as the former colony of British Somaliland. In order to consistently maintain that the 
status of the government in Somaliland, which claims independence, is that of an 
unrecognised state, the central government of Somaliland is referred to throughout the thesis 
as the ‘Somaliland authority’ and the broader ‘Somaliland authorities’ when including the 
public authorities beyond the Somaliland authority, such as local authorities, within 
Somaliland that are not part of the structures of the Somali Republic. Continuing the 
territorial and political basis of the terms used, the ‘Somaliland legal system’ is reference to 
the legal structures within the territory of Somaliland and ‘Somaliland civil society’ is 
reference to the network of non-governmental organisations within the territory of 
Somaliland. Therefore, both terms are references to structures within the territory of 
Somaliland as administered by the Somaliland authority separate from the Somali Republic. 
Somali Republic Administration 
Reference to ‘Somalia’ is a geographical reference to the whole de jure territory that makes 
up the State of the Somali Republic. Thus, reference to ‘Somalia’ includes the territory of 
Somaliland, whereas, reference to the ‘Somali Republic’ is a reference to the territory of 
South, Central Somalia excluding Somaliland.  Although, the Somali Republic is referred to 
as ‘Somalia’ more frequently than it is the ‘Somali Republic’ in primary and secondary 
sources due to the frequency with which reference is made in this thesis to Somalia excluding 
Somaliland, it is considered the use of ‘the Somali Republic’ for such a reference is more 




of the de jure territory of the State of ‘Somalia’ is referred to throughout this thesis as the 
‘government of the Somali Republic’.  
Due to the different forms the government of the Somali Republic has taken since the civil 
war in Somalia and the declaration of independence by Somaliland, when discussing issues 
which are relevant to the different forms the government of the Somali Republic has taken 
the term ‘governments of the Somali Republic’ is used and is therefore not a reference to sub-
state administrations within the territory of the Somali Republic. Reference to issues or public 
structures within the Somali Republic such as the ‘legal system in the Somali Republic’ is 
therefore a reference to issues or public structures that are geographically limited to the 
Somali Republic and thus exclude Somaliland in their application or relevance whether or not 
they legally apply to Somaliland as a de jure part of Somalia under the government of the 
Somali Republic. 
Engagement 
‘Engagement’ is a broad term used throughout this thesis which can include interaction in 
Somaliland with the Somaliland authority or civil society organisations. Engagement can also 
include reference to Somaliland by international actors such as States or international 
organisations. Therefore, when ‘interaction’ or the issue of non-Somali organisations 
referencing Somaliland in documents is discussed, it is a discussion of a specific type of the 
‘engagement’ with which this thesis is concerned. ‘Direct engagement’ or ‘interaction’ is 
therefore a reference to interaction with ‘Somaliland authorities or civil society’ rather than a 
reference to organisations within Somalia which have de jure responsibility for Somaliland 
but no presence. 
Other Terms 
Reference to the ‘international community’ includes all international actors including States 
and international organisations regardless of the issues with which such actors are concerned. 
This in contrast to the ‘international human rights system’ which can be any actor in the 
international community engaging with the issue of international human rights although this 
thesis generally focuses on UN bodies due to their dominant role in the international human 
rights system. ‘International human rights’ includes international human rights ‘standards’ 
and ‘obligations’ under international law to maintain international human rights standards. To 




‘Somaliland legal system’ and those parts of Somaliland civil society that are concerned with 
human rights issues. 
‘Non-state actors’ include those that act separately from the state who perform acts of 
governance that were classically performed by the state.
101
 Although, minimum requirements 
for ‘de facto states’ have not been declared
102
 they are non-state actors, in that they are not 
accorded the status of ‘State’ under the rules of general international law”.
103
 However, de 
facto states are entities which do at least exercise some effective authority “over a territory 
and determinable population”.
104
 The terms non-state actors and de facto state are therefore 
used interchangeably if the issue being discussed is relevant more broadly.  
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The historical background to the formation of Somalia below contributes to an understanding 
of the reasons for the current exercise of self-determination by Somaliland and an 
understanding of the focus of the current debates on a federal Somalia and an independent 
Somaliland state. It also contributes to understanding some of the political issues around the 
approaches taken by the international community to engaging with the exercise of self-
determination in Somaliland which are discussed throughout the thesis.  
Chapter two discusses what the domestic legal system in Somaliland is, and what the role of 
international human rights is within it. This builds on the historical background in chapter 
one in establishing what issues impact Somaliland’s engagement with the international 
human rights system. The chapter demonstrates that there is a legal structure in place in 
Somaliland with which the international human rights system could engage. As such, the 
issues that impact the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland would impact 
engagement with the human rights system in Somaliland. This demonstrates the value of the 
research question because if there was not an identifiable human rights system in Somaliland 
then any impact of the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland on engagement with the 
international human rights system would be likely to be reduced. The chapter also 
demonstrates that there are problems with the Somaliland human rights system which are 
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separate from a lack of engagement with the international human rights system, as well as 
problems that may impact such engagement.  
As this thesis is placed within research on self-determination and its impact, chapter three 
focuses on the question of what the spectrum of self-determination is and aims to clarify the 
status of the self-determination which is claimed to be exercised in Somaliland ise. 
Classifications of constitutional arrangements are discussed in order to assess what exercise 
of self-determination maybe possible. This discussion, builds on the understanding gained 
from the historical background in chapter one and the legal structures in Somaliland in 
chapter two, in order to establish what the situation is regarding human rights and self-
determination in Somaliland, before moving on in later chapters to discuss what issues affect 
the exercise of self-determination and impact engagement with the international human rights 
system. 
Chapter three analyses how the independent statehood which the Somaliland authority claims 
Somaliland exercises, relates to self-determination and moves on to address what the current 
constitutional arrangement is in Somalia between the central Somali Republic government in 
Mogadishu and the Somaliland authority in Hargeisa.  
Chapter three then moves onto a discussion of the circumstances that may impact the way 
self-determination is exercised in Somaliland, to this end, the stability of the Somaliland 
authority’s governance in Somaliland is considered and how this impacts the likelihood of 
Somaliland achieving recognised statehood, including an analysis of the example of 
Puntland.
105
 By understanding how self-determination is exercised by Somaliland, an 
assessment can be made of the impact of exercising self-determination in subsequent 
chapters. 
Chapter four analyses the basis upon which the international community engages with 
Somaliland and the impact this has on the status of self-determination in Somaliland. The 
chapter demonstrates that the conduct of the international community has led to a lack of 
clarity as to the status of the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland. It highlights the 
importance of political self-interest to the different approaches taken to  self-determination in 
Somaliland by various actors within the international community. The contribution this 
makes to the research question is in demonstrating what is required of the exercise of self-
                                                          
105




determination in Somaliland in order for Somaliland’s international engagement to be 
impacted. To this end the chapter demonstrates the importance of the parent state’s 
agreement, in Somaliland’s case the Somali Republic’s agreement, to the exercise of self-
determination in Somaliland for Somaliland’s international engagement to be increased. 
In order to analyse how the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland may impact 
engagement with the international human rights system, the human rights obligations that 
apply in Somaliland and responsibility for them, need to be understood. The discussion in 
chapter five, therefore, includes an assessment of the obligations and responsibilities that can 
be inferred from the conduct of the Somaliland authority, the Somali Republic and the 
international community. The chapter demonstrates that the lack of consistency in the status 
given to Somaliland by the international community, as illustrated in chapter four and the 
absence of an agreement from the Somali Republic, as the parent state, as to the exercise of 
self-determination by Somaliland,
106
 has led to inconsistencies as to with whom it is 
considered responsibility for human rights in Somaliland rests. 
Chapter six brings together the status given to the exercise of self-determination in 
Somaliland and the human rights obligations and responsibilities as discussed in earlier 
chapters, in order to analyse what engagement there is between the international human rights 
system and Somaliland. This enables an assessment to be made of how changes in the 
exercise of self-determination in Somaliland may impact engagement with the international 
human rights system. The chapter demonstrates that the inconsistent approach to 
Somaliland’s self-determination by the international community and the lack of an agreement 
with the government of the Somali Republic as to the exercise of self-determination in 
Somaliland
107
 has led to an inconsistent approach to engagement between the international 
human rights system and Somaliland. 
The conclusion demonstrates that from the analysis in previous chapters the domestic legal 
system in Somaliland does have serious problems but there is a legal system which the 
international human rights system could engage with if the exercise of self-determination by 
Somaliland were agreed. The lack of an agreed exercise of self-determination by Somaliland 
arising from debate and negotiations on the issue which has focussed on the two opposing 
positions of a sovereign Somaliland and a federal Somalia, as a consequence of the recent 
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history of Somalia, has resulted in an inconsistent approach from the international community 
to the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland. This inconsistent approach has been 
reflected in an uncertainty regarding responsibility for international human rights in 
Somaliland. This in turn has resulted in engagement by the international human rights system 
with Somaliland that has inconsistencies.  
1.8 Conclusion 
The historical background to Somaliland’s declaration of independence discussed in this 
chapter is essential to understanding the emotional context in Somalia around the legal issues 
that are raised around the possible arrangements for the exercise of self-determination by 
Somaliland which the research question focuses on and which are explored in subsequent 
chapters of the thesis. Understanding the impact of this history on constitutional 
arrangements is therefore essential to understanding the impact of those constitutional 
arrangements for self-determination in Somaliland on engagement by the international human 
rights system in Somaliland. 
The history to the declaration of Somaliland’s independence demonstrates that there are 
sensitive issues to the political situation in Somalia and relations between the Somali 
Republic and Somaliland that are not just geographical but clan based and cultural and which 
are based on historic experiences within the living memory of Somalilanders. A consequence 
of these different issues is a focus of negotiations, regarding constitutional arrangements for 
the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland, on a federal Somalia or an independent state 
of Somaliland. Therefore, the analysis of the research question in this thesis of the potential 
impact of self-determination in Somaliland that goes beyond a discussion of these two 
dominant approaches may expand on the possible options which may be considered in 












Somaliland Domestic Legal System 
2.1 Introduction 
The prevalent legal system is based on the Italian-English systems with aspects of Sharia 
Law.
1
 Somaliland’s constitution allows for different legal systems, based on Sharia law, 
statutory civil law, and customary law called Xeer.
 2
 However “only a small number of judges 
have appropriate legal qualifications in these fields”
3
 as a consequence of this judges 
frequently resort to a combination of legal systems.
4
 The jurisdiction of different legal 
systems is unclear because Somaliland adopted a constitution that determines that laws shall 
be based on Islamic principle
 
in that ‘the laws of the nation shall be grounded on and shall not 
be contrary to Islamic Al-Shari’ah’.
5
 Islamic Law is not, however, applied by separate courts, 
but is integrated into customary law through either lower court judges who are frequently not 
familiar with statutory laws or the affirmation and enforcement of judgments under Xeer, 
which is Sharia based, by local courts.
 6
 A consequence of this is Sharia Law is both primary 
and subordinate to Xeer and statutory law as it is both “subsumed within customary law but 
respect for its principles are a central constitutional obligation”.
 7 
Reform has been suggested, 
with a Somaliland Presidential pledge to “strengthen the independence of the judiciary”
8
 and 
efforts by the Somaliland National Justice Strategy to harmonize Xeer, Sharia, statutory law 
and formal justice policy and dismantle Regional Security Committees.
9
 
This chapter discusses how the legal systems in Somaliland work and how the 
implementation of international human rights obligations in Somaliland works. It explores 
human rights problems in Somaliland and the strengths and weaknesses of the role played by 
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international human rights standards within the different legal systems in Somaliland. The 
human rights problems in Somaliland which the chapter focuses on and which are also raised 
as human rights problems in Somaliland in subsequent chapters,
10
 are issues related to the 
rights of women, refugees/internally displaced persons (‘IDPs’) and the media. The 
discussion of women’s rights in Somaliland is because they are an area of human rights with 
problems that arise from Somali cultural issues and are thus relevant throughout Somalia not 
just Somaliland. Women’s rights, along with media rights, are also sources of human rights 
problems in Somalia that are frequently raised internationally. Refugees/IDPs rights are an 
issue for which the external status of the self-determination exercised by Somaliland directly 
impacts international human rights obligations due to the effect it can have on the 
classification of refugees and IDPs, which is affected by the international status of 
Somaliland. 
By understanding the role of international human rights in Somaliland, the chapter further 
elaborates on the idea of how the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland, in a way that 
enables greater engagement by the international human rights system in Somaliland, may 
impact human rights protection in Somaliland. The chapter will also highlight the efforts 
there are to improve the protection of international human rights standards in Somaliland. 
The chapter will demonstrate that although there are serious human rights problems and 
problems with the human rights system in Somaliland, there is an established de facto state 
structure and civil society within Somaliland that make up the human rights system in 
Somaliland. Therefore, if Somaliland’s exercise of self-determination were agreed there is a 
human rights system within Somaliland with which the international human rights system 
could engage 
2.2 Civil Society and Human Rights in Somaliland 
Somaliland’s independent human rights groups have faced obstruction from the Somaliland 
authority despite freedoms of assembly and association being constitutionally guaranteed.
11
 
The Somaliland House of Representatives passed a non-binding resolution in 1999 stating 
that the entire Public Order Law which is used to suppress Somaliland civil society was 
unconstitutional.
12
 Despite this, Somaliland has for years also had no human rights 
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monitoring organisation after the Somaliland Human Rights Organization Network was 
effectively dismantled after a leadership struggle that was characterized by overt 
interference
13
 by the Somaliland authority. Other legislation has also been used to suppress 
Somaliland civil society. Civil society leaders in Somaliland have previously called on 
lawmakers to reject a draft bill on Combating and Preventing Terrorism.
14
 This is because it 
was said to violate human rights as “it grants security services sweeping powers to track 
phone and internet activity, empowers police to make arrests without warrants, and allows 
secret court hearings that exclude defendants and their representatives from attending”.
15
 As 
such it could prohibit the right to liberty, freedom of expression,
 16
 fair trial, the right to 
defence, freedom of movement and freedom of association, thereby violating both 
Somaliland's constitution and international human rights law.
17
 As the bill was broad and 




The repression of civil society in Somaliland has meant opposition political figures have been 
targeted
19
 examples of this include the arrest of three opposition leaders, who protested the 
Somaliland authorities decision to disqualify their groups from participating in local 
elections,
20
 a ban by the Somaliland authority on political gatherings and demonstrations,
21
 
over which no court exercised oversight
 22
 and crackdowns on demonstrations in support of 
governments in Somalia.
23
Such blanket bans on any kind of political assembly have been 
issued by the Somaliland Ministry of the Interior without offering legal justification.
24
 
Existing statutory law also means that acts which amount to defamation and slander are dealt 
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with through criminal legislation and carry detention sentences and are not dealt with as civil 
matters in line with human rights.
25
  
Somaliland has offered greater political stability than central and southern Somalia.
26
 This 
has in turn lead to greater organised civil and social activity with an active non-governmental 
organisation community and a network of human rights defenders in Somaliland which 
campaign for fuller protection of human rights. Campaigns have been made on cases of 
arbitrary detention, media repression and unfair trials, including for political offence
27
 but 
reports of human rights violations and abuses are still commonplace.
28
 Although there are 
problems with civil society repression in Somaliland there is a civil society which promotes 
the defence of human rights and a legal structure that interacts with civil society, Therefore, if 
Somaliland exercised an agreed form of self-determination that enabled it to engage with the 
international human rights system, there is a structure within Somaliland separate from the 
Somali Republic with which the international human rights system could interact with. As 
such, any agreed constitutional arrangement for the exercise of self-determination in 
Somaliland would need to facilitate engagement between the international human rights 
system with the human rights system in Somaliland which has a separate identity from that of 
the Somali Republic. Therefore, the arrangement for the exercise of self-determination by 
Somaliland should enable direct interaction rather than interaction that is dependent on the 
Somali Republic. 
2.3 The Somaliland Courts System  
The Somaliland authority has strived to establish a stable nation “with a functional and fair 
justice system”.
29
 Access to justice is guaranteed under the Judiciary Organization Act and 
the Somaliland Constitution,
30
 every person is entitled to institute proceedings in a court and 
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to defend him/herself in a court. The Somaliland Constitution also states
31 
 that the 
Somaliland State shall provide free legal defence and that court fees may be waived for the 
poor.
32 
There are private legal aid providers who assist those who cannot afford attorney fees 
and in addition to this, the Somaliland authorities have also approved a legal aid policy and 
drafted, but not yet approved, a Legal Aid Act.
33
 Despite this, women, poor people, IDPs and 
vulnerable people in general face obstacles in accessing justice.
 34
 Issues such as personal 
favourism, political influence and lack of transparency are all constraints to obtaining free 
and equal access to justice
35




The judiciary in Somaliland has a formal hierarchy of courts, up to a supreme court.
37
 This 
judicial system is more established with a central territorial structure in Somaliland than the 
less formal regional courts system in territory controlled by the government of the Somali 
Republic offering the opportunity to develop greater legal stability. Although Somaliland’s 
judicial system extends to all administrative regions within Somaliland
38 
the judiciary is 
underfunded
39
and has a ‘limited number of functioning courts
40
 that do not extend to all areas 
of those administrative regions, with rural and remote areas within the regions particularly 
lacking judicial resources.
41
 As such, people in rural and pastoral locations do not have access 





There are also basic problems with the judiciary in Somaliland, such as a limited number of 
judges.
44
 Somaliland has approximately 100 judges,
45
 very few of whom are qualified 
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 and most of them do not have formal legal training
47
 and thus require additional 
legal training.
48
 This problem is compounded further by the simple issue of Judges not having 
copies of Somaliland laws.
49
In 2009 “[o]f the 54 judges serving in the courts of Hargeisa 
Region only 5 were qualified lawyers with University law degrees or equivalent legal 
knowledge.”
50
 The Ministry of Justice employed no lawyers
51
 and most prosecutors and 
lawyers operated without a law degree
52
 with district prosecutors usually being police 
officers.
53
 However, the number of lawyers in Somaliland with a law degree has since 
increased to roughly 300 lawyers and of these approximately 50 are women.
54
 Military courts 
are also a problem as contrary to the Somaliland Constitution, they hear cases beyond those 
against the military
55
and conduct summary trials which breach evidential and procedural 
rules
56
 and lawyers are intimidated and prosecuted before the military court.
57
 
Resource based problems such as those above mean there are also problems with the due 
process of law in Somaliland as surveys have shown 70% of detainees were sentenced by 
first instance courts without opportunity to appeal.
58
 Somaliland civil society organizations 
have raised concerns regarding the due process of law, the capacity of judges, prosecutors 
and police
59
 investigators, the effectiveness of trials and the use of Xeer in cases.
 60
 The 
independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia has also stated that in breach 
of the Somaliland Constitution, the judiciary has failed to challenge arbitrary and illegal 
detention of journalists, human rights defenders and ‘undisciplined’ juveniles.
61
 An example 
of this is despite a new prisons law a significant number of prisoners were imprisoned on an 
arbitrary basis and detained without a legal basis for example some women and girls have 
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also been imprisoned for disobeying parents and husbands.
62
 Such weak enforcement of 
existing laws and insufficient information on the justice system hampers access to justice as 
the delay of trials is a challenge and laws that hinder access to justice are not reviewed
63
 such 
as the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code that predate the Somaliland 
Constitution.
64
 As a consequence of these issues the judiciary is considered to lack 
independence, “while the Supreme Court is largely ineffective
65
”and where they exist courts 
and offices are considered to be poorly equipped.
66
  
As with Somaliland civil society, although there are problems with the courts system in 
Somaliland there is a courts system with which the international human rights can engage to 
potentially improve the meeting of international human rights standards in Somaliland. 
Again, as per Somaliland civil society, this courts system is also separate from the Somali 
Republic. Thus, an arrangement for the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland should 
allow interaction separate from the Somali Republic for it to have an impact on the 
international human rights system’s engagement with the Somaliland courts system.   
2.4 Human Rights and the Somaliland statutory legal system 
International human rights standards do play a role in Somaliland’s legal system but there are 
problems of both human rights violations within Somaliland and problems with the 
Somaliland legal system’s role in preventing or reducing human rights violations. Statutory 
law in Somaliland is almost exclusively based on former colonial laws pre-1991.
67
 Prison 
legislation is an example of the problems with the age of statutory law, as existing prison 
legislation is inconsistent with the Somaliland Constitution and human rights standards the 
constitution claims to uphold
68
 as it predates the Somaliland Constitution.
69
It therefore 
requires amending and modernising if it is to ensure compliance with international human 
rights.
70
 The Somaliland parliament has passed a Somaliland Prisons Law
71
 which replaced 
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the Somaliland Prisons Regulations Law which was in force in Somaliland after it had 
originally been adopted to be administered in the then ‘Northern Regions’ of the Somali 
Republic in 1984,
72
 seven years before Somaliland declared independence. Although the 
Somaliland Prisons Regulation Law is still in use in Somaliland its provisions are 
circumscribed by the provisions of the Somaliland Constitution and the practice of the 
Somaliland Corrections Force.
73
 Due to its age statutory law in Somaliland is also written in 
English, Italian and Arabic and is therefore “largely inaccessible to the limited number of 
Somaliland legal professionals”.
74
   
The Somaliland authority does claim responsibility for the protection of human rights and has 
mechanisms for their protection. Although, health and education “runs from paltry to almost 
non-existent in many areas”,
75
 under the Somaliland Constitution the government of the 
Somaliland Republic is responsible for the provision of free medicine and the care of the 
public welfare. The Somaliland Constitution further stipulates that the state shall combat 
communicable diseases and promote and extend healthcare centres.
76 
Health policy is pursued 
in Somaliland and the number of new health centres in Somaliland has increased.
77
 The right 
to education is also a fundamental right stipulated in the Somaliland Constitution
78
and the 
Somaliland authorities have introduced free primary education in the country, giving access 
to poor people and increasing girls’ enrolment in education.
79
Academic freedom is also less 
restricted than in territory controlled by the government of the Somali Republic and the 




Somaliland has a National Human Rights Commission which is a statutory body that was 
established by an Act of the Somaliland Parliament 
81
 in December 2005.
82
 Although there 
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have been problems with the Act, due to a lack of proper process in the selection of 
commissionaires
 
and the absence of  Somaliland civil society playing a role in the process of 
establishing the Commission.
83
 Neither was the Commission founded on the basis of Paris 
Principles. As a result of these issues the Commission’s independence and impartiality have 
suffered.
84
The Independent Expert on Human Rights in Somalia has also raised concerns that 
the Somaliland National Human Rights Commission‘s lack of resources will prevent it from 
carrying out its mandate effectively.
85
 Other statutory human rights bodies have also been 
established. A five-member Good Governance and Anti- Corruption Commission was 
established by Somaliland’s President
86





 This Commission was strengthened further in 2013 in an effort to 
crack down on the misuse of public funds.
89
 
This section demonstrates the separate identity and function of the Somaliland statutory 
system from that of the Somali Republic. Human rights guarantees are expressed in the 
Somaliland constitution and responsibilities are claimed by the Somaliland authority and 
bodies that oversee protection of human rights are statutory bodies under the Somaliland 
authority. Therefore, an arrangement for the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland that 
impacts engagement by the international human rights system in Somaliland would need to 
allow engagement that is not reliant on the Somali Republic. 
2.4.1 Women and statutory law in Somaliland 
Article 36 of the Somaliland Constitution guarantees women equal enjoyment of rights, and 
obliges the government to promote and enact laws on the rights of women to be free of 
customs and practices that are “injurious to their person and dignity”.
90
 A Rape and Sexual 
Offences Law was also adopted in 2018.
91
 These human rights frameworks are not 
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as women and girls face a high level of sexual violence throughout 
Somaliland, particularly gang rape.
93
 The implementation of the Rape and Sexual Offences 
Law has been delayed
94
 because of objections from religious leaders and other sections of 
civil society.
95
 As a consequence it has been amended which has negated many of the 
protections it introduced such as the exemption of fathers and grandfathers from prosecution 
for forced marriage.
96
 Internally displaced women and girls are particularly vulnerable to rape 
by armed men including government soldiers and militia members.
97
An example of the 
prevalence of discrimination against women is the almost universal practice of female genital 
mutilation (“FGM”) in Somaliland, with 98 per cent of 15-49 year olds having undergone the 
procedure and 77 per cent of those having undergone the most extreme form.
98
 This is despite 
the fact FGM is illegal,
99
 the Somaliland Constitution bans it, the Somali Penal Code covers 
"hurt", "grievous hurt" and "very grievous hurt" and Islam also prohibits the practice.
100
 
Despite this and in view of the prevalence of FGM, there is no national strategy in 
Somaliland for the eradication of FGM/circumcision or national law against it,
101
 despite a 
draft law having been developed by civil society with support of the UN since 2015
102
. This 
lack of importance of FGM indicating the cultural status of women in Somaliland. 
Women are also not always treated fairly before Somaliland courts and face numerous 
challenges when pursuing justice.
103
 This partly arises from the lack of women represented in 
the Somaliland legal system
104
. In Somaliland in 2008 there were only 4 women lawyers in 
Somaliland and no female judges or prosecutors
105
 and only 2 police stations in Hargeisa had 
women’s desks with women police officers.
106
 This has since increased to 75 women working 
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in the legal sector in Somaliland.
107
 The male dominated justice system is also reflected in the 
discrimination of women in political participation and decision making.
108
 
Although Somaliland’s constitution does not discriminate against women’s participation in 
the political process, it does not facilitate it either.
109
 Even though, women have voted in 
large numbers in all of Somaliland’s elections, women candidates have had little chance of 
being elected.
110
 Somaliland civil society has proposed a 10% quota for women in the Lower 
House of the Somaliland Parliament.
111
 The House of Representatives (the Lower House of 
the Somaliland parliament) did pass a minimal quota or reservation system for women but 
this was vetoed by the Guurti (the Upper House of the Somaliland parliament) and in May 
2014 the President of Somaliland “re-appealed to the lawmakers to take the gender quota 
issue into perspective”.
112
 As such, in 2010 there were 3 women in parliament out of 164 total 
members
113
 (1 woman in the House of Representatives, 1 in the Guurti, and a woman was 
elected chairperson of the Somaliland Human Rights Commission).
114
 Previous Somaliland 




A consequence of the obstacles in the legal system faced by women in Somaliland is that 
90% of women do not seek to pursue the enforcement of their rights because of the fear of 
accessing the male dominated justice system.
116 
“Therefore, victims of rape, domestic 
violence, or those who are deprived of their inheritance rights are not protected”.
117
 However, 
with assistance from the UN Development Program there were, as of 2018, 20 female 
prosecutors with the Somaliland Attorney general’s office which should increase women’s 
confidence to report crimes as shown by the prosecution of 134 rape cases in 2018.
118
 The 
UN Human Rights Council has also called on subnational authorities in Somalia to enable 
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full participation of women and has instructed members of the Council to help.
119
 However, it 
is unclear whether such reference to subnational authorities in Somalia includes the 
Somaliland authority which does not regard itself as a subnational authority but as a state 
authority or whether it was a reference to subnational authorities in the Somali Republic.  
The issues discussed above therefore highlight that systemic cultural human rights problems 
such as those relating to women’s rights may act as a barrier to the international human rights 
system’s engagement in Somaliland, regardless of the form of self-determination exercised in 
Somaliland. However, the calls by the UN Human Rights Council demonstrate that 
engagement in the form of interaction between international organisations such as the UN 
and Somaliland authorities that is possible, is hampered by the lack of clarity as to the status 
the exercise of self-determination takes in Somaliland. An agreed arrangement for the 
exercise of self-determination in Somaliland would therefore clarify the mechanisms and 
means through which engagement between the international human rights system and 
Somaliland could occur.   
2.4.2 Refugees and internally displaced persons and statutory law in Somaliland 
Many of those who fled Somaliland in 1991 have been unable to return to their homes after 
being repatriated and remain internally displaced.
120
 A significant number of people have also 
been reported to have been displaced by fighting between Somaliland forces and militia’s in 
the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn regions. A consequence of these events is an estimated third of the 
population Somaliland lives in forced displacement.
121
 
Because there is a lack of a formal national asylum framework, the situation for refugees in 
Somaliland has remained insecure and protection from human rights violations weak.
122
Some 
of the serious problems encountered by internally displaced persons in Somaliland that result 
from the lack of protections include overcrowding, severe malnourishment, lack of access to 
education programmes, economic exploitation of children and lack of public land.
123
 There 
has also been a lack of livelihood opportunities which has led to problems of protracted 
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 Lack of physical security is also a serious problem
125
with frequent violations 
of internally displaced persons including physical assaults, killings and deaths by individuals, 
rape, attempted rape (internally displaced women are particularly vulnerable to sexual 
violence),
126




There is a concern that Somaliland authorities view new arrivals of refugees and/or IDPs with 
increasing suspicion.
128
 Somaliland’s fight against Al Shabab has, in the past, led to many 
Somaliland officials to criticise immigration from southern and central Somalia and view new 
arrivals of refugees and/or internally displaced persons with increasing suspicion and as a 
source of insecurity.
129
 As a consequence, the Somaliland authorities have previously stated 
they would expel approximately 100,000 illegal immigrants within 30 days
130
 and have 
forcibly returned Ethiopian asylum-seekers
131
and because most of the deportations happen 
within 24 hours, UNHCR interventions usually failed.
132
 There is now a policy on the rights 
of internally displaced persons
133
 but there is no legal framework to protect internally 
displaced persons in Somaliland such as provision of access to basic health services, 
education, land, shelter and employment and the prospect of eviction from the land upon 
which they are squatters.
134
 The Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights 
of internally displaced persons (“the Representative”) regards all Somalis from within 
Somalia’s borders as internally displaced persons because the border between Somaliland and 
Somalia is not recognised as an international border.
135
 The Representative has noted 
Somaliland’s claim for independence but has confirmed that authorities in Somalia and 
Somaliland are to observe and apply the Guiding Principles on Displacement without 
discrimination.
136
 The Representative has stated internally displaced persons are defined by 
the Guiding Principles and the AU Convention on the Protection and Assistance of the 
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Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (“the Kampala Convention”)
137
 which apply if people 
“have not crossed an internationally recognised border”.
138
  
Somalia was among the first African states to sign the Kampala Convention but has not 
ratified it.
139
 Somaliland’s authority considers itself bound by the 1951 Refugee Convention 
under which forced returns are in defiance of international law, as well as the Somaliland 
Constitution.
140
 However, the Somaliland authorities treat internally displaced persons as 
foreigners (i.e. refugees or illegal immigrants).
141
 The Representative and the Somaliland 
authority, respectively, are therefore clear as to the Somaliland authority’s human rights 
obligations. However, because the status of Somaliland is not agreed the view of the 
Representative and the Somaliland authority as to whom those obligations benefit differs. 
The Representative is therefore unable to engage in relation to Somaliland’s obligations to 
internally displaced persons because Somaliland regards those internally displaced persons as 
refugees or illegal immigrants. 
2.4.3 The media and statutory law in Somaliland 
A contributing factor to limits of the human right system and Somaliland civil society’s role 
within it is the restriction of the media in Somaliland. While freedoms of expression and the 
press are guaranteed by the constitution, in practice, these rights are limited
142
as the 
Somaliland media faces statutory laws that predate the Somaliland Constitution
143
 and the 
human rights it guarantees, and the Somaliland authority’s tight control over the media.  
The Somaliland Constitution protects press freedom
144
 and LawNo.27/2004 (“the Press 
Law”) was passed in 2004.
145
 The Press Law decriminalised media offences and “according 
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to the Somaliland Constitution, takes precedence over Somalia’s penal code”.
146
 However, 
the Press Law has never been applied as Somaliland authorities have claimed the law requires 
more amendments before it can be utilized. 
147





 journalists who have frequently been targets for intimidation.
150
This 
is despite the fact it predates the Somaliland Constitution
151
 and is contrary to the human 
rights guarantees respecting freedom of expression and the decriminalisation of journalism 
under the Somaliland Constitution.
152
 Detention of Somaliland journalists is thus a major 
challenge to freedom of expression
 153
and the number of journalists arrested has been 
increasing.
154
 The vast majority of Somaliland journalists arrested are as a result of reporting 
corruption
155
 by Somaliland authority officials
156
 as Somaliland officials are susceptible to 
media reports and exercise the power to silence journalists who report the issues of corruption 
and nepotism by state officials.
157
 The detention of journalists is also frequently followed by 
closures of media stations.
158
 The state controlled radio station operates under strict authority 
guidelines and the creation of FM radio stations is restricted,
159
 for which many Somaliland 
lawyers argue there is no legal basis.
160
 Therefore, unlawful detention of journalists and the 
forced closure of media houses occur in clear violation of the Somaliland Constitution and 
Press Law as well as international norms related to freedom of expression.
161
  
Unlawful and repressive action by government officials undermines the right to information 
and freedom of expression as well as undermining the role the media plays in the oversight of 
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 The problems range from numerous low level abuse from government 
officials,
163
 intimidation, harassment and bribery
164
 to arrest and detention,
 165
 threats of 
violence and targeted killings.
166
 The House of Representatives and the Ministry of Interior 
have tried drafting new draconian media law when neither of these bodies have the 
jurisdiction to draft such a law.
167
The Somaliland media has rejected such law, “arguing that 
there is already a law governing Somaliland media, approved by parliament (the House of 
Representatives and Guurti) and signed by the former President i.e. Law No 27/2004”.
168
 And 
in the first  7 months of 2019 70 violations against media personnel were recorded, 28 
journalists were arrested and three media houses had been suspended.
169
 A 2015 directive by 
the Chief Justice prohibiting the arrest of journalists without a warrant has not been 
implemented.
170
 There are problems with the media itself in Somaliland arising from a lack 
of journalistic ethics and education,
171
 although, this cannot excuse the Somaliland 
governments conduct as both journalists and human rights defenders in all parts of 
Somaliland continue to face risks and suppression of their work.  
Despite problems of journalists being persecuted, the media in Somaliland is not censored
172
 
and engagement between the media and the Somaliland authority does occur. The 
Information Ministry has said a statutory press regulator needs to be introduced in the 
legislation, with representatives from both the government and the media.
173
 In 2012 the 
Somaliland authority and Somaliland Journalists Association reached a five-point agreement 
which highlighted highly sensitive issues including the implementation of the Press Law and 
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The situation regarding the rights of the media in Somaliland demonstrate the issues 
discussed above regarding Somaliland civil society, the Somaliland courts system and 
Somaliland statutory law. Although there are problems with all of these three parts of the 
Somaliland human rights system in relation to addressing the rights of the media, they do 
interact with each other in relation to this issue in a system that is separate from the Somali 
Republic. Therefore, there is a human rights system in Somaliland which the international 
human rights system could engage with in relation to protection of human rights and such 
engagement would be assisted by a clear arrangement for the exercise of self-determination 
that allows for official engagement with the international human rights system separate from 
the Somali Republic that is agreed by the government of the Somali Republic. 
2.5 Sharia Law 
Islam is the state religion under governments of the Somali Republic and the Somaliland 
authority,
175
 with Somalia’s population 99.9% Muslim and nearly all Somaliland residents 
being Sunni Muslims
176
who observe their religion strictly.
177
 Whilst the Somaliland 
Constitution allows for freedom of belief, it prohibits conversion from Islam and 
proselytizing by members of other faiths. It also requires that candidates for the Presidency, 
Vice Presidency, and House of Representatives be Muslim.
178
 
The Special Rapporteur for Women has stated “that the application and interpretation of 
sharia should be in conformity with international human rights and gender equality 
standards”
179
and the incorporation of Sharia law is one of “several factors to consider in 
developing the formal judicial system”.
180
 The Ulema Council in Somaliland serves to issue 
interpretive guidance to the executive and legislative branches of the federal government and 
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to resolve disagreements regarding Sharia law”.
181
 However, the Somaliland Constitution 
does not reconcile an adherence to Islamic Sharia with a western code of human rights.
182
 
There are substantial differences between statutory and Islamic Law with regard to issues 
such as the evidentiary burden and the definition of crimes”.
183
 For example, under sharia, 
there must be eye witness evidence to a murder, while statutory law considers the case as a 
whole with direct and indirect evidence in the absence of eye-witness evidence. In the case of 
rape, Islamic Law “demands direct evidence by four male witnesses to the actual sexual 
act”
184
 whereas statutory law takes into account the testimony of the victim, medical and 
other forms of evidence.
185
 Islamic Law also  imposes the death penalty for rape if the 
perpetrator is married and for an unmarried accused, the punishment is 90 lashes, whereas, 
statutory law carries a punishment of imprisonment.
186
 Laws against FGM has also been 
opposed on the basis they do not reflect Islamic principles
187
 as it is practiced in some forms 
‘to meet a perceived obligation under Islam’.
188
However, with Islam holding such a central 
position within a society that is so predominantly Muslim, relying on Islamic law as a means 
of resolving disputes
189
 appears to be a natural development, especially in the absence of 
access to another state authority based legal system.
190
  
 Sharia laws “detailed commands and prescribed punishments, is a very different kind of 
dispute resolution system than the traditional Somali Xeer with its focus on compromise and 
reconciliation”.
191
 As such, clan-based Islamic courts generally face fewer problems of 
legitimacy than their more religion-focused counterparts.
192
This is because the position of 
final authority held by clan elders “means decisions that would contradict Somali tradition 
are generally avoided” and punishments that go beyond lashings are rarely, if ever, carried 
out.
193
 In practice, Islamic Law is primarily applied in personal matters, especially in the 
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areas of marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
194
 The strength of this informal legal system that 
is not part of the public authority highlights that there are issues separate from the exercise of 
self-determination by Somaliland that will impact engagement between the international 
human rights system and Somaliland. 
2.6 Xeer 
Somaliland, presents itself as a liberal democracy,
195
 however, the virtual collapse of the 
structures designed to administer justice including law enforcement and the protection of 
human rights in the past and their current weakness have impeded progress towards the 
establishment of formal mechanisms of the rule of law.
196
 While the challenges facing the 
authorities in Somaliland include insecurity and the breakdown of the apparatus of the rule of 
law, Somali culture is rich in traditional “Xeer” (non-state customary)
 
and religious 
mechanisms of conflict resolution
197
 which are in place to deliver judicial and legal 
services
198
 and as such cannot be ignored when assessing the impact of international human 
rights standards in the Somaliland legal system or the impact on engagement of the 
international human rights system in Somaliland. 
2.6.1 How the Xeer legal system operates 
“Somali society is organized along binding ties of patrilineal kinship [with] Clans the most 
important form of organization in Somali society”.
199
 There are “seven clans, each of which 
traces its heritage to a different ancestor”
200
 and is in turn divisible into sub-clans, smaller 
family groups called lineages, and diyah groups,
201
 which are made up of extended families 
of which the Elders are the patriarchal head.
202
 Xeer justice is generally in the context of the 
diyah groups, “which can number anywhere from a few hundred to a few thousand 
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 and it is administered by the clan elders
204
of the diyya-paying (compensatory 
blood money) groups involved in a relevant dispute.
205
 
Xeer is based on clan responsibility for offences by individuals and “collective action to 
defend and vindicate rights of individual clan members”
206
 “rather than on individual 
punishment”,
207
 and “provides a broadly effective compensation (known as diyya or blood 
money) and reconciliation-based structure for the resolution of disputes”.
208
 “Each member is 
responsible for the crimes committed by anyone else from his diyah group. If someone in a 
group commits an offense, the whole group must pool its resources and contribute toward a 
payment (camels, other livestock, or money) to the victim's diyah group, with elders setting 
the amount of compensation using Xeer”.
209
 This is also “backed by the threat of the use of 
direct retaliatory force by the victim’s clan in the absence of a settlement”.
210
 The failure to 
sufficiently compensate a victim by a perpetrators group “could result in further unrest and 
revenge killings”.
211
 As a result of this system, elders and other clan leaders have a strong 
interest in preventing members from wrongdoing.
212
  
Xeer covers crimes such as intra and inter-group killings, injuries and misconduct as well as 
family and civil cases including marriage, family, land, and natural resources.
213
 If an 
incident occurs between different clans the elders of the alleged perpetrator’s diyya-paying 
group will be contacted and a meeting will be arranged as soon as possible.
214
 During the 
meeting “[t]he elders of the complaining clan will make their demand for compensation and 
present those of the other clan with the evidence documenting the incident that triggered the 
demand. If it is deemed necessary then all parties or any party to the original dispute can be 
called upon to present their side of the story and witnesses may appear to corroborate 
accounts”
215
 through a rigorous questioning process.
216
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The Elders serve as negotiators and mediators who seek to prevent revenge-motivated 
violence.
217
 As such the process goes beyond just providing compensation as there is also 
emphasis on healing and reconciliation with the elders providing closure and addressing 
lingering doubts and disputes.
218
 To enable this, Xeer has an “extremely dynamic system of 
rules, which can be adapted according to clan, circumstances and policy considerations”.
219
 
Compensation standards are widely known and frequently referred to by Somalis when 
discussing potential compensation for victims.
220
 The focus is therefore on compensation for 
loss arising from a breach of human rights and reconciliation within the community rather 
than rectification of how the breach occurred.  
2.6.2 Impact of Xeer 
Xeer courts have existed for centuries, long bringing a measure of legal calm throughout 
Somaliland.
221
 Prior to civil war in Somalia, “the state itself was the primary abuser of human 
rights, and its courts were known for their brutal, politically motivated persecutions”
 222
 as a 
consequence people in Somaliland have generally continued to resolve disputes using Xeer, 
rather than legal structures and statutory law of the de facto state of Somaliland.
223
 The Xeer 
mechanisms are “applied by well-respected traditional and religious leaders"
224
 such as 
members of the Guurti.
225
 A strong role is played by these elders
 
whose traditional leadership 
“is based on a segmentary social order, with clans and sub-clans led by elders”.
226
 Their 
intervention in all public matters tends to be accepted at the level of communities and 
authorities alike as “elders continue to be regarded throughout Somaliland as fundamental 
custodians and gatekeepers of peace and stability, retributional justice, safety and security, 








 Grubeck (n 177) 26. 
218
 Grubeck (n 177) 26. 
219




 Lombard (n 200). 
222




 HRC (n 100) para 88. 
225
 Alison (n 195).  
226






Xeer is passed down orally and the traditional laws include stipulations about the conduct of 
war but can also be harsh and unfair with individual rights sometimes being sacrificed in the 
name of stability.
228
 Despite the use of Xeer in Somaliland, bursts of fighting and crime do 
occur but Xeer remains a law that people respect, which provides “a justice system strong 
enough to hold together communities that have been fragmented by previous upheaval”.
229
 
Because of this, the application of Xeer is prevalent in Somaliland particularly in rural and 
remote areas
 230
 and is respected by the secular courts.
231
  
The influence of Xeer has advantages and disadvantages. As one Somaliland lawyer has 
observed “without the clans, Somaliland’s judicial system would collapse – this is because 
most petty cases are dealt with through clan structures rather than through the over-stretched 
courts”.
232
 Xeer has also “been a big part of Somaliland’s stability over the years”
233
 
upholding “the values of compromise, consensus-building and egalitarianism”.
234
 However, 
the status of Xeer can also have a negative impact on issues such as “police accountability as 
often police choose not to conduct an internal investigation of individual police officers 
involved in a fatal shooting to establish exact responsibility as [i]ndividual policemen may be 
reluctant to use force for fear of clan retaliation.”
235
 
Jurisdiction can also be affected as “[t]he police may be given a role in civil or traditional 
matters that are not within their formal jurisdiction”
236
 but is appreciated by those concerned. 
For example, a refusal to pay compensation awarded by Xeer “may lead to police detention 
including the detention of a family member of the alleged perpetrator”,
237
 despite no criminal 
offence having been committed or court hearing having taken place. Police and the military 
can intervene to separate militia forces in inter-clan conflict “but it is the clan leader 
delegations that negotiate a solution”.
238
 Judicial and police authorities fail to defend their 
constitutional prerogatives by willingly bestowing authority for law enforcement and 
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prosecution to clan leaders.
239
 “Police and judges will also refer minor crimes back to the 
elders even though there is no legal basis for such action”.
240
 This can often include intra-
family violence
 
as well as cases of rape and murder.
241
  
The strength of the informal justice of Xeer also impedes many people’s access to the formal 
statutory law based system
242
 because weakening trust in statutory law reduces concerns for 
its development and strengthening. As Xeer is outside the statutory legal system of the 
Somaliland authorities, if an arrangement for the exercise of self-determination by 
Somaliland led to increased engagement with the international human rights system then the 
impact of its engagement with the Somaliland authorities will be effected by a strong Xeer 
legal system due to its weakening effect on the statutory legal system in Somaliland. 
2.6.3 Women and the Xeer legal system 
The problems of discrimination against women, although systemic, are not formally part of 
the statutory legal system. In the Xeer legal system issues of discrimination against women 
are a formal part of its procedures and outcomes.  
Sexual discrimination is a problem with Xeer as Somali women have observed that 
“everything in the old customary law works for the man’s side” and that it “dominates 
women”.
243
 “All elders are male and women are not allowed to speak at Xeer proceedings, 
even when women are killed, their lives are traditionally compensated with half as many 
camels as men's”.
244
As such, it is argued “that nomadic traditions are used by Somali men to 




Domestic and sexual violence are some of the most commonly reported violations of 
women’s rights throughout Somalia.
246
 “While the Xeer code theoretically includes 
punishments for rape”
247
 this sort of violence remains taboo in most Somali communities
248
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and is considered a matter for the family and clan and thus generally handled only by the 
clans involved.
249
 Rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence are dealt with 
by clans as a civil dispute, not involving the victim, and are often solved by
250
 “either the 
payment of blood money or a forced marriage between the victim and the perpetrator”.
251
 
This application of Xeer  has continued to be applied in rape, sexual and other gender based 




Although Xeer may protect the survivors honour, reduce shame, eliminate ostracism and 
“ensure full payment of her dowry by the attacker’s clan to the survivor’s clan, as well as 
preserve the peace between contending families or sub-clans”,
253
 forced marriage under Xeer 
does not comply with international human rights standards.
254
 As such traditional ways of 
solving rape cases can be an obstacle to the legal methods of punishing rapists, as convicted 
rapists can be charged with two separate crimes, one against the victim and another against 
the state
255
 and elders often intervene and withdraw a case in court under statutory law in 
order to resolve the matter under Xeer.
256
 
Adherence to Somali traditions also means it is difficult for a girl to immediately report a 
rape if she does not have severe injuries as such the number of rapes reported to the Sexual 
Assaults Referral Centre (SARC) in Somaliland or the police are limited.
 257
 Because of this 
local officials say “the weak presence of the government in some regions of Somaliland and 
[the] reliance on traditional customs are factors preventing women from reporting violence 
against them”.
258
 As “Elders and families wish to avoid publicity as it involves clan 
honour”,
259
 the reality is “no cases are ever tried
260
” and the stigma attached to it means many 
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 The Special Rapporteur on violence against women has observed that 
Xeer has been found wanting in addressing cases concerning the rights of women, sexual 
offences or domestic violence against women as the rights of the victims can be subjugated to 
the rights of the clan.
262
 As such, the Independent Expert has stated that women victims of 
sexual and gender-based violence had no functioning judicial system to turn to.
263
  
The strength of the Xeer legal system means there maybe limitations that impact engagement 
between the international human rights system and the Somaliland governing structures if a 
large section of the Somaliland legal structure is an informal system which does not have a 
centralised structure with which the international human rights system could interact. Such 
limitations apply regardless of the arrangement for the exercise of self-determination and 
have an exclusionary effect on access to the Somaliland human rights system for a large 
proportion of Somalilanders. The impact of any reduction of discrimination against women 
within the statutory legal system that may result from greater official interaction with the 
international human rights system as a result of an agreed exercise of self-determination by 
Somaliland maybe weakened through a lack of connection with the potential recipients of 
such benefits through the legal system that will provide them.  
2.6.4 The Xeer legal system in Somaliland and reform 
Women are not the only group discriminated against under Xeer rules. The informal system 
has the potential to discriminate against less powerful clans and minority groups who are 
still
264
 excluded from the process
265
 as “the system is more likely to function between groups 
of comparable power”.
266
 “In Somali society, there are groups that live in a client-patron 
relationship with the dominant clan in the region”.
267
 These lesser groups can be shut out 
of Xeer hearings. “Similarly, people who have moved far from their original home can be 
vulnerable at Xeer hearings, because the sub-clans of the region have not entered 
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into Xeer agreements with the sub-clans of the migrants. They might be killed in vengeance 
without a trial or ordered to leave the area”.
268
 
The Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences pointed to 
“the rationale of preserving social harmony rather than punishing the individual or upholding 
the rights of the victim”
269
 as a shortcoming of Xeer as “the use of material compensation 
owing to the payment of blood money for homicides, makes families seek justice through that 
system rather than pursue formal criminal proceedings”.
270
 A lack of universal right of 
individuals access the Xeer legal system may have the effect of undermining the development 
of a statutory legal system, which would be the chief beneficiary of any positive impact 
arising from engagement with the international human rights system that could result from an 
arrangement for the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland. 
 The Special Rapporteur for violence against women has called for the clarification “the 
relationship and boundaries between customary law and institutions, and the civil and 
criminal justice system”.
271
 The Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in 
Somalia has also referred to the challenges and tensions that exist between the formal legal 
system and Xeer and how they pose “considerable challenges to the reform programmes 
within the justice sector”
272
and “the fight against impunity requires a linkage to be developed 
between the formal and customary justice systems”.
273
 There have also been moves to 
harmonise the three legal systems including, the remittance of cases such as rape and 
homicide to the statutory legal system.
274
 However, evaluations acknowledged that 




The Independent Expert has noted “that the positive aspects within Xeer should be identified 
and retained, and that it would be necessary to engage with clan elders on how Xeer can be 
made more human-rights compliant”.
276
 This has been supported with a warning that “efforts 
to force one system across all areas would undermine those systems that function locally, and 
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“rule of law” assistance could in those circumstances create more conflict by undermining the 
structures that currently underpin local peace and security arrangements”
277
 as “top down 
attempts to implement criminal and penal laws (with little enforcement capacities) can upset 
the local balance of power and undermine local initiatives that draw more on customary clan 
law and Islamic Law”.
278
  
Formal and informal engagement by actors from the international human rights system with 
the customary Somali legal system could offer a quicker path for legal empowerment. 
International organizations such as the Danish Refugee Council, the United Nations and the 
International Development Law Organisation have been working with clan elders to re-
evaluate Xeer and enhance its compatibility with international human rights standards, 
criminal justice standards and sharia.
279
 This initiative has led to positive changes in Xeer 
such as the abolition of widow inheritance and the promotion of individual criminal 
responsibility
280
 and the protection of minority clans.
281
 Therefore, Xeer does not have to end 
the possibility of engagement between the international human rights system, and the 
Somaliland legal system resulting from the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland, 
from having an impact on human rights protection. 
Other moves to reform and “subject Xeer to a standardized code that protects human 
rights
282
”have included the 2006 Somaliland Elders Declaration” (“the Declaration”).
283
 In 
the Declaration representatives from the government, tribal and religious leaders, and legal 
representatives “stated that Somali customary laws of revenge killings, intentional killings, 
payment and receipt of blood compensation (Diya), and issues relating to cases involving 
women, children, refugees, internally displaced persons, and other minorities are contrary to 
international human rights standards and Islamic Law”.
284
 The Declaration also committed 
elders, to submit the Xeer aspects of criminal law to statutory legal judicial control,
285
 for 
example, in cases of intentional and revenge killings, the accused were to be handed over “to 
the police and provided direction on the payment of compensation”.
286
 The Declaration also 
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included agreement regarding cases involving women and children.
287
 However, while the 
Xeer legal system has weakened its “efficacy as a mechanism for dispute resolution and a 
basis of expectations should not be underestimated”
288
 as most Somalis, do still honour it.
289
  
Although the strength of the Xeer legal system may weaken the possible impact increased 
interaction with international human rights system the Somaliland statutory legal system 
could gain from an agreed arrangement for the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland, 
such engagement may still be the best means through which the role played by the 
international human rights standards in the Xeer legal system may be increased. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Although the Somaliland legal system is under resourced, there is an established public 
authority and civil society based human rights systems in Somaliland separate from the 
Somali Republic, which the international human rights system could formally engage with. 
The stability of the de facto state authority and the presence of an established civil society in 
Somaliland,
290
 mean an agreed arrangement for self-determination in Somaliland that enables 
formal interaction between the international human rights system and Somaliland legal 
structures separately from the Somali Republic could provide greater potential for the 
protection of international human rights in Somaliland. For example, Somaliland is not an 
official signatory of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the age of a child is 
not defined in Somaliland, as a consequence many children are exposed to risks of harm and 
human rights violations
291
 because of a lack of legal clarification as to who is a child.
292
 The 
Somaliland authority has put together national plans of action for child rights and protection 
with national and international actors.
293
 Somaliland is also among the few places that have a 
Juvenile Justice Act.
294
 However, the Juvenile Justice Act of Somaliland is not always 
applied as the separate Juvenile Sections of the Somaliland courts are not functional and 
policies and guidelines for alternative child care are missing from the act.
295
 This lack of 
application of Juvenile Justice Law means the rights of the children are violated and leads to 
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children being exposed to abuses as children are prosecuted and tried as adults and are jailed 
with adults.
296
 This demonstrates that there are problems in Somaliland’s human rights 
structure but there is a structure that is trying to apply international human rights standards 
that different actors from the international human rights system could assist with. The Report 
on the Committee on the Rights of the Child does not reference any interaction with 
Somaliland authorities or discuss Somaliland at all and would only discuss the federal Somali 
arrangement.
297
 This engagement may be impacted by the form self-determination exercised 
in Somaliland takes, for example whether the arrangement would allow Somaliland to sign up 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
This chapter has also demonstrated there are problems with the legal system/systems in 
Somaliland that may cause an obstacle to interaction between the international human rights 
system and legal structures in Somaliland. The Sharia and Xeer legal systems are both 
informal legal systems outside of the de facto state authority’s control and thus engagement 
between these sections of the Somaliland legal system with the international human rights 
system will be limited, regardless of the form self-determination takes in Somaliland. 
However, both legal systems have an impact on the statutory legal system and will therefore 
affect the impact any engagement the international human rights system has in Somaliland 
that may arise from a constitutional arrangement for the exercise of self-determination in 
Somaliland. 
The problems in relation to the rights of the media demonstrate there are problems that arise 
from the Somaliland authority’s current approach to this issue. However, this problem also 
demonstrates the presence of a legal structure and a civil society with which the international 
system can engage regarding those human rights problems. The difference between the 
Somaliland authority’s and the international human rights system’s view of IDP’s in 
Somaliland show the link between the human rights system in Somaliland and how the lack 
of an agreed arrangement for the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland impacts who is 
given the status of IDPs and what international human rights obligations apply.
298
 An 
agreement between the Somaliland authority and the Somali Republic as to the exercise of 
self-determination by Somaliland and the subsequent clarification of the responsibilities of 
the legal system in Somaliland under international human rights law could enable the 
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possibility of formal interaction between Somaliland and the international human rights 
system on the basis of the subsequently agreed responsibilities. However, the problems in 
relation to women’s rights show that there are limits to the impact the arrangement for self-
determination in Somaliland can have on engagement by the international human rights 
system, as cultural and systemic discrimination against women impacts all three legal 










Current Debates and Current Arrangements regarding the exercise of self-
determination by Somaliland. 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the context in which the current debates about the exercise of self-
determination by Somaliland are considered. It discusses previous considerations and debates 
regarding the possible exercise of self-determination by Somaliland and the current positions 
taken in relation to the form of self-determination currently exercised by Somaliland. This 
chapter therefore provides the basis of the discussion of the current status given to 
Somaliland by the international community and the context in which engagement between 
Somaliland and the international human rights system occurs. 
3.2 Self-determination 
Self-determination can be seen as a variable right depending on a combination of factors, 
most importantly the degree of stabilization in allowing the claim to self-determination and 
the degree to which the responding government represents the people.
1
 Self-determination “is 
generally accepted as customary international law”
2
 and “[f]or many years the majority of 
states in the UN General Assembly asserted that the expressed will of peoples to be free from 
colonial domination was the only face self-determination had”.
3
 However, the Declaration on 
the Principles of International Law Covering Friendly Relations said “any political status 
freely determined by a people constitutes a mode of implementing the right of self-
determination”
4
 but it “disclaimed any intent to authorize or encourage the dismemberment of 
states, but its disclaimer was tied to a concept of internal self-determination”.
5
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International law has been vague about the specifics of the right to self-determination.
6
 
Article 1 of the International Covenants hold that all peoples have the right to self-
determination, which entitles Peoples to freely determine their political status and pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.
7
 This was also reflected in the 1960 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Declaration 
against Colonialism) which also identified the right as peoples under ‘alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation’ blurring the definition of Peoples.
8
 However, these do confirm 
that self-determination is a right of Peoples not a status that can be recognised by 
governments.
9
 As a right of Peoples, self-determination has an external and an internal 
aspect. The external aspect including sovereignty and independent statehood or other political 
status freely determined by a people. The internal aspect is generally held to include the right 
to participation in the democratic governance of the state.
10
 Although commonly held, there 
are no standard forms to these aspects of the right which allows a rich and diverse array of 
ways in which self-determination can operate.
11
 The general consideration across aspects of 
Peoples’ right to self-determination is political, and other, control of a shared view of the 
future by a Peoples
12
 with a distinct character which is reflected in the government under 
which they live.
13
 The ways the right to self-determination can be expressed is not 
exhaustive
14
 as such it allows for nuanced forms in which the right to self-determination can 
be exercised by a Peoples
15
, which People from distinct political/geographical groups
16
 can 
use to meet their right to self-determination.
17
 To apply the rigid internal/external self-
determination approach distorts many varied ways Peoples associate
18
 and would restrict the 
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expansion of the right to self-determination, as allowing transnational relations and 
cooperation across borders for political reasons.
19
 
Qualifications to the right to self-determination demonstrate that “[t]he contextual restriction 
of external self-determination and the sharp division between external and internal self-
determination appear to be dissolving, however gradually and hesitantly”.20 Even if the 
divisions are not dissolving they are linked, as there are claims that “the right to exercise 
external self-determination should be conditional on the presence of internal self-
determination: the expression of people’s free will”.21 Therefore, “[t]he self-determination 
principle in the UN era has a great many faces”22 and these faces are provided by a spectrum 
of different forms of self-determination that are tied to the extent to which the section of the 
population seeking self-determination is represented in the state. The more representative 
governments are of those sections of the population seeking self-determination, the lesser the 
degree of destabilisation the international community will tolerate in accepting a claim for 
self-determination.23 Therefore internal self-determination, which “concerns the right of 
peoples within a state to choose their political status, the extent of their political participation 
and the form of their government”,24 could be a viable alternative to full sovereign 
independence for Somaliland. Although, “[t]he logic of the principle of self-determination 
extends beyond the question of independent statehood to political and cultural options 
exercisable within the established state”.25 
3.3 Internal self-determination and Constitutional arrangements 
3.3.1 Autonomy, decentralisation and devolution 
Self-determination can be exercised internally with in a state in a variety of forms. The form 
the exercise of the right of self-determination takes “will usually depend on the constitutional 
order of the state concerned and may challenge the present centralised structure of most 
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 Opting for these constitutional arrangements can be “tied to an abandonment of 
claims to self-determination. Or rather, one might say that these settlements can be taken as 
an exercise of the self-determination claim at the internal level”.
27
 Autonomy, 
decentralisation and devolution are all arrangements for exercising power internally with in a 
state by entities separate from the central state authority.  
Autonomy of a region or part of a state from the central government of that state can allow a 
section of the state varying degrees of decision making powers separate from the state, this 
can include the pursuit of most policies and the power to pass most laws or it can be 
exclusive control in a region or part of a state “over only certain aspects of policy”.
28
 
Autonomy allows local actors to take decisions themselves and “denotes self-governance of a 
demographically distinct territorial unit within the state”.
29
 Although Article 4 of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples includes the right to autonomy as an aspect 
of the exercise of the right to self-determination
30
, under international law there is no right to 
autonomy.
31
 The extent of the self-governance within a state will be established by  
constitutional law and/or autonomy statute.
32
 Operating within the state’s constitutional 
framework, autonomy usually denotes original decision-making power in relation to 
devolved competences. In this respect autonomy differs from decentralization. Rather than 
powers to make original decisions as autonomy allows, decentralisation allows local agencies 
some room to implement decisions taken by the central authority.
33
  
Like decentralisation, devolution moves powers from the central authority to local authorities 
or regions; however, devolution moves autonomous powers to make decisions rather than 
powers to implement as per decentralisation. Some devolved settlements “re-allocate 
sovereignty to constituent entities or offer shared sovereignty between the centre and 
regions.”
34
 Devolution can occur state wide and can establish an entity which is not quite a 
federation and can result in asymmetrical autonomy. Separating power from the central state 
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authority through autonomy, decentralisation or devolution can occur within different types 
of constitutional arrangements. 
3.3.2 Unitarianism 
Whereas the Somali Republic is held to be a federal state, Somaliland is a unitary state. Due 
to the concerns about a powerful centralised unitary state of Somalia arising from its 
history,
35
 a discussion of a unitary arrangement needs to involve discussion of devolution 
within a unitary system. Devolution within a unitary state transfers powers from a central 
authority to specific entities which are still one sovereign central state.
36
  Even with 
negotiations, the transfer of authority is a top-down process
37
 in which the central 
government of the unitary state delegates powers to regional authorities.
38
 This is in contrast 
to the bottom-up process in forming a federal state where individual local government units 
join together to create a layer of government above them “for limited purposes”.
39
 Despite 
this contrast the difference between a decentralised unitary state and a federation can be as 
slight as the difference between a confederation and a federation can be.
40
 In theory, 
devolution within a unitary state can sometimes provide greater autonomy to regional 




Federalism can be the devolving of sovereignty from the central authority or the transferring 
of sovereignty from the regions to the centre.
42
Federalisation tends to be offered where a 
secessionist entity has established control of a territory with no prospect of capture by the 





 “would suggest that any federation implies a right to self-
determination of territorial entities that are no longer fully represented in and by the centre. 
Given the restrictive attitude exhibited from among the organised international community 
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The Somali Republic has officially been a federal state since 2004,
46
 an advantage of this is 
that federalism satisfies both a desire to establish a central government and a desire to have 
strong regional governance
47
 both of which are strong desires that have arisen from the 
emotional consequences of Somalia’s history.
48
 Federal states are able to satisfy these desires 
because they are generally based on geographical devolution with guarantees for the 
autonomy of the subnational units.
49
 These guarantees take the form of the central authority 
and the regions sharing power, with the centre unable, on its own authority, to change the 
constitution.
50
 Power and responsibilities are shared between a federal government and 
regional authorities. These powers can be exercised equally or exercised mostly by the 
federal government or regional authority.
51
  
A diversity of relationships can also occur within different federal arrangements with all 
member states of a federation having identical rights and duties or member-states having 
different levels of autonomy from a central government. It is even possible to grant the right 
to secede or disassociate from a federation to some regions.
52
 A federation can therefore be 
multi-functional so issues of responsibility can be separated out and a federal constitution can 
specifically limit powers of a central government.
53
 Currently the federal government of the 
Somali Republic has responsibility for national defence, security, monetary and economic 
regulation, nationality and immigration, national symbols and foreign relations, whilst 




3.3.3.1 Federalism and Somalia 
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The understanding of federalism by the public in Somalia is limited.
55
 Some groups claim 
that federalism is an externally supported
56
 attempt to weaken a Greater Somalia in which all 
Somalis are united in one state, with others suggesting that federalism will lead to a break-up 
of the country into exclusive clan based entities.
57
 Others see federalism as a viable solution 
to the political crisis in Somalia that offers “a middle solution between an autocratic, 
centralized system of governance and outright secession”.
58
 
The different federal arrangements proposed for Somalia reflect the lack of an agreed view of 
federalism in Somalia. The leaders of the regional authority of Puntland “argue for a version 
that accords so much autonomy to the constituent parts of the Somali state they hope even 
Somaliland might be tempted back into the fold”.
59
  Such proposed constitutional 
arrangements could mean “Somalia would look more like a multi-state free trade zone than a 
single nation”.
60
 Whereas, the central Mogadishu governments of the Somali Republic prefer 
a far stronger central government “than many outside the capital are willing to 
countenance”.
61
 The lack of consensus in Somalia “about the merits and meaning of 
federalism”
62
 and with federalism meaning so many things within Somalia some argue “it is 




Despite the inconsistent Somali view of federalism, it has had high-level support from the 
international community as the preferred means to establish a stable state.
64
 This adds fuel to 
the ideas of those Somalis that view federalism as an externally driven means to weaken a 
Greater Somalia. Finances and support from regional actors and the wider international 
community have both prevented the ‘federal project’ from collapsing, and have promoted and 
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given it additional momentum as the forum for development
65
 such as AMISOM’s operations 
which have “created a political environment in which federalism has remained the dominant 
political process”.
66
 A consequence of this support is that generally proponents and 




A confederation is a union of states in which “[i]ndependent States 'confederate' to establish 
common and complimentary policies”
68
under a confederation agreement of the constituent 
territorial units.
69
 The two or more independent states of a confederation enter a treaty for 
specific reasons the nature of which can be to whatever extent is agreed such as mutual trade, 
political rapprochement and/or geographical necessity.
70
 However the agreement would not 
have any foreign sovereignty implications.
71
 A confederation is therefore a group “of separate 
but equal states linked by international treaties”,
72
 with sovereignty resting with the uniting 
states rather than the shared central state in a federation.
73
 An advantage of this is that it 
reduces potential friction
74
 as the central government and the regional sub-states are 
constitutionally co-sovereign with neither level of government subordinated to the other”.
75
 
However, this means it can also lead to fragmentation,
76
 as demonstrated by attempts in 
Africa to create the Senegambia confederation between Senegal and Gambia which was 
aborted in the 1980s
77
 and Somalilanders may think that if they are going to get a 
confederacy then they may as well have unattached independent statehood.
78
  
3.4 Debates regarding the exercise of internal self-determination by Somaliland 
Discussions concerning potential arrangements between the Somali Republic and Somaliland 
on the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland have generally focussed on the unitary, 
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federal and confederal political systems and their increasingly decentralised and devolved 
structure and thus their ability to allow for self-determination internally within a state.
79
 This 
means the discussions regarding the self-determination of Somaliland have focussed on the 
re-establishing of a united Somalia in one form or another. However, a legacy of the poor 
governance in the pre-1991 Somalia under Siad Barre has left a persisting distrust of an 
overbearing centralized government, for many Somalis
80
 who associate a unitary state system 
with Siad Barre’s authoritarian regime.
81
 The affect this has had on constitutional discussions 
regarding the exercise of self-determination has been to fuel demands for federalism and 
statehood by certain groups.
82
  
There is however a lack of comprehensive understanding of the concepts of 'federalism' and 
‘decentralization’ and the resulting lack of consensus has led to federalism being generally 
understood to be the only alternative to the centralised unitary system of the Siad Barre 
regime.
83
 As a consequence although federalism and/or Somaliland statehood are not the only 
constitutional options
84
there is little discussion of alternative models of decentralization
85
 
which has encouraged external actors, such as donors and regional influencers, to push for 
rapid implementation of the federal project.
86
 
In contrast to a single unified personality of Somalia resulting from federation or Somaliland 
resulting from statehood, there is a lack of understanding in the Somali Republic and 
Somaliland regarding different constitutional arrangements and the diverse interests and 
concerns held in relation to a potential outcome to the dispute between the Somali Republic 
and Somaliland. Managing the diverse interests and concerns will require flexibility in 
finalising and implementing any constitutional framework in Somaliland and sub-state 
territories of the Somali Republic
87
 and would entail a continual process of conflict 
management regarding approaches to external relations.
88
 The requirement of flexibility also 
touches on a concern that a process for reaching an agreed arrangement in Somalia should be 
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not be too planned and should not be top down.
89
 Top-down attempts in the region to revive 
central state institutions have resulted in the delegitimisation of involvement by external 
actors
90
in the domestic sphere and thus may impact subsequent engagement with the 
international human rights system, as an external actor. 
Many different interests affect how relevant stakeholders may approach a constitutional 
outcome in Somalia and consideration of the different approaches to a possible constitutional 
arrangement may help to reconcile these interests.
91
 However, as the focus of this thesis is the 
impact of self-determination in Somaliland on engagement between the international human 
rights system and Somaliland, there will not be an analysis of issues such as the balance of 
executive power in Somaliland, what accountability mechanisms will be necessary or 
comparative issues of fiscal decentralization
 
or resource-related issues in different parts of 
Somalia and Somaliland
92
as these are relevant to an assessment of the governing capacity of 
authorities in the Somali Republic and Somaliland. What is of importance however is the 
political stability in the Somali Republic and Somaliland, as political stability of a state 
government of Somalia is required if a clear constitutional arrangement that legally 
establishes and protects any internal arrangement for the exercise of self-determination in 
Somaliland. Although, Democratic credentials however are not respected as criteria for the 
recognition of sovereignty anywhere in the world.
93
  
3.5 Foreign Policy 
Within the different constitutional arrangements there is a lot of flexibility to reach an 
arrangement between the ‘parent state’ and the territory in which greater self-determination is 
sought. However, consideration needs to be given to how constitutional arrangements for the 
exercise of self-determination affect foreign policy as it is a territories control of foreign 
policy and thus external self-determination that impacts the degree of freedom a territory has 
to engage with the international human rights system in its own right. This is because formal 
foreign relations are “those of one sovereign people with another, which live under a separate 
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 the consequence of this is that foreign policy and external relations tend to be 
within the powers of the central institutions of a state.
95
  
Article 74 of the 1969 Vienna Treaty on the Law of Treaties
96
 allows foreign relations 
between de facto states and non-recognising countries and international courts hold that de 
facto states may be given legal recognition in spite of the lack of formal diplomatic 
relations
97
 without bestowing meaningful recognition
98
 as “the conclusion of a treaty does not 
in itself affect the situation in regard to diplomatic or consular relations”.
99
 State practice, 
however, reflects that economic external relations would come from the centre. This is 
reinforced by organisations which operate almost exclusively at state level as shown by the 
articles of agreement of the World Bank and the IMF, and UN agency mandates which “make 
it difficult for them to work through any agency other than a legally recognised 
government”.
100
 However, variations do occur such as with foreign trade
101
 and the 
international legal system is still able to cope with de facto states. In general, though there are 
fewer discrepancies between decentralised constitutional arrangements in regard to foreign 
affairs than in most other aspects of government
102
 with an advantage of them being that in 
foreign relations they normally have a unified single personality.
103
  
3.5.1 Unitarianism and Foreign Policy 
For the purposes of implementation of international human rights obligations an advantage of 
a decentralised unitary state is that it has a “single international personality”.
104
Therefore, 
international obligations can be “more readily legislated in a unitary state because the central 
political unit has exclusive authority over the laws of the country”.
105
  However, in relation to 
                                                          
94
 Lewis (n 37) 61. 
95
 Lewis (n 37) 61. 
96
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331, Art 74. 
97
 Scott Pegg, ‘De Facto States in the International System, Institute of International Relation’ (1998) The 
University of British Columbia Working Paper No 21, 12-13 
<www.liu.xplorex.com/sites/liu/files/Publications/webwp21.pdf> accessed 22 April 2017; AK Eggers, ‘When is 
a State a State? The Case for Recognition of Somaliland’ (2007) 30 Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 211, 214. 
98
 Brad Poore, ‘Somaliland: Shackled To A Failed State’ (2009) 45 Stanford Journal of International Law 117, 
119. 
99
 Vienna Convention (n 96) Article 74. 
100
 Lewis (n 37) 31. 
101
 Lewis (n 37) 61. 
102
 Lewis (n 37) 62. 
103
 Lewis (n 37) 88. 
104
 Lewis (n 37) 90. 
105




Somaliland’s engagement with the international human rights system this is a disadvantage as 
the advantages of the potential exercise of external self-determination within a confederal or 
federal arrangement that arise from Somaliland’s greater political stability than that of the 
Somali Republic would be lost.
106
  
3.5.2 Federalism and Foreign Policy 
There are differences in the conduct of foreign policy by a federal state than the conduct of 
foreign policy under other constitutional arrangements such as a unitary state which could 
have consequences for engagement with the international human rights system. In federal 
states it is more difficult to take decisions to ratify treaties
107
 as well as to comply with and 
report on obligations under treaties
108
 as awareness of treaties and their impacts is lower at 
the sub-state levels of government such as regional government.
109
 As such, in federal states a 
regional authority may not comply with international laws, or inconsistent laws may prevent 
the implementation of human rights obligations. Such problems can be overcome through 
coordination of laws and a constitutional court can “oversee the process of coordination and 
implementation”.
110
 However, this does not address the potential advantage of separate 
engagement with the international human rights system by the Somaliland authority from the 
less stable government of the Somali Republic.  
Some federal systems allow a degree of independence in treaty making but these maybe on 
limited issues with restrictions such as a requirement not to conflict with obligations of the 
central government or the maintenance of the right of the central government to approve the 




 and the United Arab 
Emirates.
113
 Despite the flexibility in relation to foreign affairs shown by different federal 
arrangements of a federal state there is a loss by regional states of “international personality 
and separate representation”.
114
 A possible disadvantage therefore of a federal system to the 
implementation of human rights is that a federal government can be embarrassed 
internationally by the failure to comply with international obligations more than a regional 
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authority without legal personality.
115
 However, within a federal system regional authorities 




As with issues around internal self-determination as discussed above, for a federal 
arrangement to incorporate an external element of self-determination in the exercise of the 
right within a sub-state entity, a level of political stability by the state government is required. 
Such political stability is necessary for the constitutional institutions that address inconsistent 
laws and political institutions and processes that enable co-ordination. This is not available 
through the Somali Republic. 
3.5.3 Confederalism and Foreign Policy 





 and maintain a separate international personality
119
 within the 
international community as separate states.
120
 In establishing a confederal arrangement 
between the Somali Republic and Somaliland, an asymmetrical confederation may allow a 
unitary Somaliland a greater degree of autonomy than other territorial units within Somalia 
enabling it to engage with the international human rights system in its own right. A 
confederation for specific purposes
121
 such as an economic union comparable to the EU
122
 or 
Ethiopia and Eritrea’s agreement to limit links to just sharing a currency upon Eritrea’s 
secession,
123
 would also allow a separate engagement with the international human rights 
system by Somaliland. Confederal structures may therefore help develop cooperation whilst 
maintaining independence of individual regional authorities to engage internationally
124
 and 
enable Somaliland a degree of sovereignty and external self-determination that could prevent 
the government of the Somali Republic from being an obstacle to engagement between 
Somaliland and the international human rights system, as there would not be the requirement 
for the central Somali state to provide a legal and political constitutional structure to enable 
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external engagement by the authorities exercising self-determination in Somaliland which 
there is with federalism.
125
  
3.6 External self-determination 
External self-determination is seen in the three main methods for exercising the right to self-
determination mentioned in the General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) “emergence as a 
sovereign independent state; …free association with an independent state; or … integration 
with an independent state”.
126
 The resolution does not imply that independence or secession 
from an independent state is the only means of exercising the right,
127
 it is the right of 
Peoples to politically participate.
128
 External self-determination as a recognised sovereign 
state is just one end of the scale of different forms of self-determination and has largely been 
applied to colonial entities and closely analogous cases.
129
 As such, it has rarely been applied 
to cases of secession from a state which has previously seceded from another state.
130
 
 Many benefits are seen to flow from the personality and status
131
 arising from external self-
determination. For full participation in the international community, external self-
determination is required frequently in the form of “independence and sustained effective 
control of territory, combined with a degree of recognition, although there have been attempts 
to set higher standards for entry, as with EC policy on recognition of highest-level republics 
of the former Yugoslavia”.
132
 The international community’s response to separatist 
movements seeking external self-determination as a state has been strongly influenced by the 




The formation and recognition of states is generally guided by the contradictory international 
norms of self-determination and territorial integrity.
134
 The Badinter Commission referred to 
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 and the Western Sahara case
136
  defined the principle of self-
determination as “the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples”
137
 which 
suggests that it is the right of people to participate in their social economic and political 
development.
138
 Self-determination does not however necessarily mean a right to secede. The 
legitimacy of the right to self-determination is dependent on the legitimacy of the state’s 
government that is declaring independence and thus the destabilizing effect to the 
international community.
139









The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) held to be customary law,
143
 confirms the enduring political and international 
legal maxim that from the deprivation of basic human rights a right to secession can arise.
144
 
The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also recognises the right to 
rebellion as a last resort against tyranny and oppression.
145
 This qualification to territorial 
integrity and the rights to secession was reiterated in the Vienna Declaration
146
 with the 
distinction that it does not apply when there is “a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind”,
147
 making it clear that partial or 
total disruption of territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the UN Charter.
148
 
Therefore, since 1970 the uncompromising principle of territorial integrity has now expanded 
and developed to that point that the UN General Assembly suggests that there may be a right 
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of peoples to secede if a government is unrepresentative of people under any definition
149
 so 
that forcible secession of parts of a state (without outside intervention) may not be prohibited 
by international law.
150
 Somaliland has argued the atrocities of the Siad Barre regime satisfy 
the criteria of tyranny and oppression providing Somaliland with sufficient grounds for self–
determination and secession.
151
   
3.6.1 Statehood 
Since declaring independence in 1991 and confirming a constitution by referendum in 2001 
the Somaliland administrations in Hargeisa have held that self-determination is exercised  in 
Somaliland as a Somaliland sovereign independent state. It is on the basis of sovereign 
independent statehood that Somaliland wants to engage with the international human rights 
system and it is therefore on this basis that a discussion of how the exercise of self-
determination in Somaliland may impact engagement with the international human rights 
system should start. Sovereign statehood offers full external self-determination and thus the 
greatest level of potential engagement. However, sovereign statehood is hard to achieve and 
there are several issues that affect the possibility of Somaliland achieving it that will be 
explored. As such, although sovereign independence is what Somaliland claims, there are 
other possible arrangements for the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland that are 
relevant to engagement with the international human rights system.
152
 
In discussing Somaliland’s claim to self-determination as a state, consideration needs to be 
given to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
153
 (‘Montevideo 
Convention’), as to engage with the international human rights system as a state Somaliland 
does need to satisfy the Montevideo Convention. Under Article 1 of the Montevideo 
Convention to qualify as “a person of international law”
154
 Somaliland needs to possess “(a) a 
permanent population; (b) defined territory; (c)[effective] government; and (d) capacity to 
enter into relations with the other states”.
155
 The importance of these criteria were highlighted 
by Talmon when he said “[a] declaration by the international community even a binding 
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decision of the United Nations Security Council cannot replace criteria for statehood which 
are otherwise missing”.
156
 Within Somaliland’s borders there is a stable permanent 
population of approximately 3 million, the territory of Somaliland is also clearly defined in 
three treaties between the UK and France, Italy and Ethiopia.
157
 Somaliland also has effective 
state institutions such as a currency, a constitution, elected local and state authorities, an 
independent judiciary, as well as an army and custodial forces.
158
  As part of its case for 
independence, the Somaliland authority therefore maintains that it fulfils the criteria for 
statehood under the Montevideo Convention.
159
 
Although it appears that Somaliland satisfies the Montevideo criteria for statehood, Article 3 
of the Montevideo Convention states that “[t]he political existence of the state is independent 
of recognition by the other states”.
160
 Therefore, under the Montevideo Convention 
international law allows states a wide degree of discretion and manoeuvrability and does not 
impose an obligation on states to recognise a territory that satisfies the criteria for statehood 
only an obligation not to recognise a state if it does not. Even so, states do consider the 
Montevideo Convention legal criteria by which they are bound to justify their recognition of 
a territory as a state so that if premature recognition is given when the Montevideo criteria 




In most states sovereignty, the supreme political authority is vested in people but in the 
context of Somaliland this tells us very little, if we do not know who the people consist of 
and through what rules and what institutions their sovereignty is expressed.
162
 In the context 
of Somalia sovereignty can reside with all adult citizens within the territory of Somalia, it can 
be vested in the constituent territorial units and it can also rest with the clans.
163
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An absolute conception of sovereignty is that a state is either the supreme authority in its 
territory or it is not
164
 and thus sovereignty is not partially realised.
165
 From this point of view 
the absence of international recognition of sovereignty would make a discussion about 
different forms of sovereignty meaningless
166
 because without sovereignty there is not a 
state.
167
 Recognition of sovereignty tends to be an additional and decisive criterion of 
statehood which is suggestive of a constitutive approach,
168
 although state practice
169
 appears 
to counter the constitutive view that prior to recognition no legal personality exists.
170
 A view 
of sovereignty as simply fixed and indivisible has been challenged
171
 with the view that there 





 As a result of these criticisms and observations the 
constitutive theory and the view that non-recognition does not have a status preventing effect 
has been largely rejected
174
 and the view that recognition “establishes, confirms or provides 
evidence of the objective legal situation that is the existence of the State” held.
175
 This view 
of sovereignty makes possible a conception of varying degrees of sovereignty or statehood, 
including for territories that lack international recognition as states.
176
 Satisfaction of the 
criteria for statehood is therefore no longer the decisive factor for acceptance into or 
engagement with, the international community.
177
  
3.6.3 Territorial Integrity  
UN Practice in relation to self-determination and territorial integrity is not always consistent, 
the UN approach to proposed settlements in Nagarno Karabakh and Northern Cyprus 
demonstrate how far the international community is “willing to go in order to retain, 
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nominally, the doctrine of territorial unity of states”.
178
 However, the International Court of 
Justice (‘ICJ’) in its Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence In Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion
179
 supported the Quebec case that 
"the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations 
between states".
180
 As such, secession from a parent state, such as in Somaliland’s situation 
does not fall into such relations and should therefore not violate territorial integrity, nor 
breach international law.
181
 Although, territorial integrity can limit the exercise of self-
determination in states in which the government represents the whole population in 
accordance with the exercise of internal self-determination.
182
 Due to the political instability 
of the government of the Somali Republic which has led to an inability to create a state 
structure that enables the exercise of internal self-determination, it is unclear whether this 
would apply in Somaliland. The ICJ opinion has however left open the possibility that 
although a declaration of independence was lawful under international law, recognition of the 
statehood of the seceding territory maybe unlawful.
183
  
There are legal issues regarding territories seceding from a state which impact international 
engagement with a territory on the basis of statehood. Territorial integrity does not 
necessarily stop the exercise of self-determination but territorial integrity is a concern that 
affects the international community’s engagement with Somaliland. This is demonstrated by 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which affirms and expands the view 
of what the exercise of the right of self-determination by a Peoples includes a provision at 
Article 46.1 that nothing in the Declaration may be interpreted as implying ‘authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states’.
184
 Such concerns make the 
international community reluctant to engage with Somaliland in a way that could be 
considered recognition of Somaliland’s independent statehood and thus an infringement of 
the territorial integrity of the Somali Republic. Although UN practice does allow for self-
determination to override claims of territorial integrity, under international law the result of 
the 2001 referendum in Somaliland on its independence does not necessarily give legitimacy 
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to Somaliland’s claim to secession as a sovereign state, as the vote for the referendum 
reflected only a minority of the overall population of the recognised state of the Somali 
Republic and the minority cannot dictate to the majority.
185
 If the argument that the 2001 
referendum was illegitimate is accepted then it raises the question of whether recognition of 
Somaliland as a state by another state would be premature and amount to an intervention in 
the internal affairs of the Somali Republic.
186
  
An assessment of the application of the criteria for sovereign statehood, such as the 
Montevideo Convention, to Somaliland therefore cannot be considered in isolation as 
Somaliland is a de jure part of a recognised state of Somalia.187 As such, it can be argued that 
recognition of Somaliland’s secession from Somalia would violate the Somali Republic’s 
territorial integrity.188 What is unique about Somaliland’s case for recognition is that the 
larger recognised state does not comply with the Montevideo criteria in many respects189 as 
the governments of the Somali Republic have not been effective governments over a clearly 
defined territory. Proponents of Somaliland independence, therefore, do not argue for a 
general right to secede but that recognition in this case would be more favourable than the 
continuation of the failed Somali Republic state.190 This argument means it can also be 
posited that recognising Somaliland does not violate the principle of not recognising states 
that are established through the violation of jus cogens191 as there is not an effective parent 
state to reassert control.192  
3.6.4 Secession 
Although the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs 
of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty stated that ‘every State 
has the inalienable right to self-determination’
193
, the right to exercise self-determination does 
not grant the right to independence,
194
 neither does it prohibit secession expressly
195
 as 
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demonstrated by the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States which understood the external aspect of self-





 case the Canadian Supreme Court held that the right of a state’s minority to 
effectively participate in political and economic processes gives rise to a right to internal self-
determination or “remedial succession”.
198
 Therefore, when a clear majority want secession 
there is an obligation to negotiate a possible settlement in accordance with four principles of 
constitutionalism, the rule of law, democracy, federalism and protection of minority rights. If 
meaningful internal self-determination is denied then unilateral secession is acceptable.
199
 
Although Quebec addressed the issue of secession from a state, it did not explicitly address 
what happens when the central government of a state is that of a failed state.
200
 In contrast to 
Quebec, there are no avenues, democratic or otherwise, available to Somalilanders for 
internal self-determination. There is not the politically stable government there is in Canada 
which can agree to or grant such a right with the required constitutional institutions to protect 
such a right and there has not been for decades. In such a case it could be said that the level of 
effectiveness required of Somaliland as a new state is lower as a consequence of the Somali 
Republic’s lack of effectiveness as a recognised state.
201
 However, “[t]here is neither 
legislation nor customary international law that expressly prohibits or allows secession from a 
failed state as opposed to a democratic state”.
202
  
The South African Foreign Ministry provided a legal opinion on Somaliland’s independence 
which observed that “while it does not authorise secession the right to self-determination 
does not prohibit secession”.
203
 Eritrea and Bangladesh are examples of self-determination 
which resulted in secession which were accepted by the international community.
204
 
However, the act of secession has come to be viewed not as part of the right to self-
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determination but as a possible right separate from self-determination.
205
 The lack of clarity 
in relation to self-determination, territorial integrity and secession means that a consensus on 
what the standards of legitimate secession are has not been reached.
206
 International law and 
the international community’s approach to secession appears to reflect the Canadian Supreme 
Court in Quebec
207
 in that “international law does not specifically grant component parts of 
sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their ‘parent’ state”.
208
 This 
approach matches the international community’s ever present fears of the unknown potential 
for never ending secession, the result being that secession is considered a last resort.
209
  
In view of the fears of the international community of the problems resulting from the 
territorial break ups of the decolonisation period and the examples of secession accepted by 
the international community, it can be argued that international law neither prohibits nor 
encourages secession outside of the colonial experience but if a state’s secession is successful 
international law will recognise it.210 This imprecise approach reflects a practical approach in 
international law to reflect a need, noted by Talmon, for international law not to appear out of 
touch and so it cannot completely disregard states that exist in fact.211  
3.6.5 Prospects for sovereign statehood for Somaliland 
Some legal scholars claim the absence of a valid act of union between British and Italian 
Somaliland and the fact that Italian Somaliland was technically under UN trusteeship, 
invalidate the act of union
212
that created the Somali Republic. Because of these discrepancies 
in the creation of the Somali Republic, Somaliland has presented its case for statehood in 
terms of the dissolution of a failed union. This allows Somaliland to place its claim within a 
wider tradition of legally acceptable dissolutions
213
 which includes dissolutions of 
“Egypt/Syria, Cape Verde/Guinea Bissau, and Senegal/Gambia.
214
 As well as the more recent 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia
 215
whose constituent republics, were recognized only 
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after other countries decided to treat the dissolution of the Yugoslav union “legally equivalent 
to what happened in the former Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia, albeit without the consent 
of the parent state”.
216
 
Somaliland’s claim to self-determination and statehood has several aspects which give it a 
uniqueness. Somaliland’s separate colonial existence prior to unification, its claim to former 
colonial borders,
 217
and its five days of sovereign independence after decolonisation has also 
been used to argue that, the recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state is consistent with 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union’s respect for the territorial integrity of borders at 
the moment of independence from colonial rule.
218 
A 2005 African Union (‘AU’) fact-finding 
mission highlighted that these different aspects mean ‘‘Somaliland’s search for recognition 
historically unique and self-justified in African political history’’.
219
 
The argument that Somaliland satisfies the Constitutive Act of the African Union is based on 
the premise that Somaliland satisfies the principle of uti possidetis that the boundaries 
between former colonies should be kept intact, by claiming it maintains the borders of its 
colonial incarnation as British Somaliland. The history of Somaliland’s independence as 
decolonised state prior to unification under the Somali Republic adds to this argument and 
thus Somaliland’s claims to statehood. It is also why in Somaliland’s territorial dispute with 
Puntland it insists on the continual territorial integrity of the former British protectorate.
220
 
Despite these unique legal arguments sovereign statehood for Somaliland is politically 
difficult. The international community is unwilling to recognise Somaliland without an 
African consensus.
221
 Regionally, African states are worried about weakening the principle of 
uti possidetis
222
 which would add to their own internal concerns
223
despite Somaliland’s 
historical background. These concerns of African states are used by the Somali Republic to 
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frustrate Somaliland’s aim of being a sovereign state through its maintenance of juridical 
statehood.
224
 As such even when governments of the Somali Republic have been “unable to 
exercise authority over more than a few neighbourhoods in the capital’’
225
 they have been 
recognised as the government over all of Somalia by the UN, the Arab League and the AU. 
This is in contrast to over two decades of Somaliland’s unrecognized, effective de facto 
statehood.
226
 This has allowed the Somali Republic to effectively veto Somaliland’s attempts 
to progress its claim of statehood. The importance of the Somali Republic as the parent state 
in Somalia is demonstrated by the recognized sovereign independence of Eritrea and South 
Sudan which both gained recognition once their parent states had agreed to it.
227
 
As has been shown above, prospects of the international community engaging with 
Somaliland on the basis it is a sovereign independent state are not likely soon. A successful 
secession that maintains international legal principles such as territorial integrity and uti 
possidetis involves addressing the concerns and subsequently obtaining the agreement of a 
parent state. There are therefore currently too many legal issues and internal interests, related 
to how the international community engages with Somaliland, for Somaliland to engage with 
the international community on the basis it is a sovereign independent state. 
3.7 Current arrangement 
This section addresses what the current arrangement for the exercise of self-determination is 
between the Somali Republic and Somaliland. A discussion of the current political 
arrangement between the Somali Republic and Somaliland is required because this is the 
starting point for an agreed arrangement for self-determination in Somaliland. The current 
arrangement between the Somali Republic and Somaliland is also the starting point from 
which an assessment of how the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland may affect 
engagement with the international human rights system can be made. An understanding of the 
current arrangement is also essential to understanding the confusion that affects the status 
accorded to Somaliland by the international community and the international human rights 
system’s engagement with Somaliland, both issues of which will be elaborated upon further 
in subsequent chapters.  
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The current arrangement between the Somali Republic and Somaliland not only relates to the 
subsequent confusion that effects the international human rights system’s engagement with 
Somaliland and the confusion as to the legal status of Somaliland’s current arrangement but 
also relates to the strength of Somaliland’s legitimate arguments in relation to its claim for 
statehood.  
3.7.1 Current Arrangement in Somaliland 
The territory of Somaliland is currently a de jure part of the state of the Somali Republic 
which encompasses all of the territory of Somalia. However, the governments of the Somali 
Republic have had “little effective or direct control over the majority of the country”
228
 and 
its continued existence is ensured largely by an international military mission.
229
 Once again 
demonstrating the difficulty of a lack of a politically stable state with which a constitutional 
arrangement for the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland can be established. Since 
declaring independence no member of the UN has recognised Somaliland as a sovereign 
state. 
The government of the Somali Republic considers Somaliland to be a territorial unit of a 
federal Somalia. The Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland (“Somaliland Constitution”) 
recognizes the territory of Somaliland as an independent sovereign state, separate from the 
rest of Somalia since 1991
230
 and therefore exercising external self-determination. The 
Somaliland Constitution does not include any provisions in relation to a “structural 
relationship with the Republic of Somalia, except to highlight Somaliland’s 
independence”.
231
 However, as no member of the international community recognises 
Somaliland’s independence, the government of the Somali Republic’s position that 
Somaliland exercises an unauthorised form of self-determination can be viewed as correct 
under international law. Although, as I demonstrate in later chapters engagement by the 
international community and the international human rights system with Somaliland makes 
any view of Somaliland’s self-determination more opaque. 
3.7.1.1 De Facto State 
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Although Somaliland is a de jure part of Somalia, Somaliland also engages with the 
international human rights system on the basis of being a de facto state. A de facto state is a 
sovereign anomaly, in that it controls territory and has provided governance of a territory 
over an extended period of time but is unrecognized by the international community.
232
 A de 
facto state can control territory as a “peoples exercising a right to self-determination outside 
of the decolonisation context, with the aim of establishing a newly independent State”
233
and 
“as political entities seeking separation from the State” whose recognition is withheld by the 
international community due to non-recognition by the parent state.
234
Both of these de facto 
state descriptions apply to Somaliland. 
As a de facto state, Somaliland has exercised a form of self-determination that has enabled it 
to establish governmental institutions, including a President and bicameral legislature 
consisting of the Guurti (the Upper House of Elders) and a popularly elected House of 
Representatives (the Lower House).
235
 These institutions have been separate from every 
government of the Somali Republic, none of which have been popularly elected and all of 
whom have been affected by the civil conflict in the territory of the Somali Republic, which 
has been on-going since Somaliland declared independence in 1991.
236
The political stability 
of these Somaliland authority institutions and governing systems in relation to the 
government of the Somali Republic, as discussed throughout this thesis, demonstrate the 
difficulty of international engagement and thus the exercise of the external self-determination 
of all Peoples in Somalia being conducted through the government of the Somali Republic 
and is discussed in more detail below. The success of the exercise of self-determination in 
Somaliland is also a persuasive argument for external self-determination to be exercised in 
Somaliland without the Somali Republic acting as an intermediary. 
The forms of support for, and international engagement with de facto states by the 
international community are varied.
237
 As such, although there is generally a focus on 
recognition of de facto states there are other avenues available for exercising external self-
determination which fall short of full recognition as a sovereign state by the international 
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community. For example, not all membership of economic organisations is reliant on 
juridical statehood. Membership of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) 
region, for example, is reliant on economies as such Hong Kong and Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) 
can participate in APEC along with the People’s Republic of China. In the World Trade 
Organisation governments are the participating parties, the two main qualifications are that 
members must represent a customs union that maintains tariff and non-tariff trade restrictions 
and the government must control those tariffs and show functional competence.
238
 Therefore, 
there are arrangements for the exercise of self-determination short of statehood and 
subsequent international engagement. Application of such an approach to the international 
human rights system could involve consideration of jurisdiction rather than states. However, 
further consideration of this issue would involve a much wider discussion that would divert 
too far from a focus on Somaliland. 
Taiwan shows that lack of diplomatic relations as a sovereign state does not preclude 
economic success.
239
 Under the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) pleasing name Chinese 
Taipei, Taiwan has become a member of the Asian Development Bank, the World Trade 
Organisation
240
 and an observer on some OECD panels.
241
 Despite being denied UN 
recognition, the government of Taiwan has also incorporated the International Human Rights 
Covenants into law.
242
A “Taiwan model” for exercising self-determination therefore requires 
flexibility from the de facto state and non-diplomatic partners. Membership of economic 
organisations and a ‘Taiwan Model’ also both demonstrate the importance of the parent state 
agreement or acceptance of such an alternative arrangement for the exercise of external self-
determination. 
3.7.1.2 Somaliland Governance 
Another strategy de facto states use to seek access to the international system is to “proclaim 
their stability, their successful institutions, and their democratic credentials”.
243
 Somaliland’s 
claim to democratic credentials in part were demonstrated on 31 May 2001 when 3.5 million 
Somalilanders reaffirmed their support for sovereign independence in a constitutional 
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 that was considered to be largely compliant with internationally recognized 
election procedures
 245
 with few voting irregularities or instances of fraud.
246
 The result of the 




Somaliland’s claims to stability and successful institutions derive in part from being held up 
against a consensus within the international community that the Somali Republic 
governments have administered a ‘failed state’.
248
 On a scale from highest to lowest of 1 to 7 
in terms of countries in terms of their civil liberties and political freedoms Freedom House’s 
‘‘Freedom in the World’’ index gives Somalia 7.
249
 In contrast Somaliland has a functioning 











 A result of the institutions Somaliland has established has been a period of 
relative stability.
255
 The political hybrid that forms Somaliland’s constitutional arrangement 
has been received favourably by international observers
256
and the Somaliland authority has 
been regarded as one of the more democratic governments in Africa.
257
 The Freedom in the 
World index gives Somaliland 4.5 which compares well to Somalia’s 7 but which is also 
better than most of the other neighbouring countries such Uganda with 5, Djibouti’s 5.5, 
Ethiopia with 6; and Sudan with 7.
258
 Of its regional neighbours only Kenya’s 4 scores 
marginally better than Somaliland.
259
 A former foreign minister has stated that the 
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Somaliland Constitution is ‘‘the single biggest asset we have created’’
 260
 which demonstrates 
a feeling of “no turning back on Somaliland’s institutions”
 261
when considering constitutional 
arrangements. 
Somaliland has used traditional clan based democracy to develop a modern democratic 
system “that transcends clan politics and allegiances”
262
 which has successfully held elections 
for its head of state, lower house of parliament and local councils.
263
 However, “Somaliland’s 
government remains fundamentally a product of political compromise, negotiation, and 
consensus and the presidency is often not strong enough to defy the diverse coalition of clan 
and other interests that support it”.
264
Individual members of the Guurti have not had their 
own mandate challenged since 1997
265
 and the Guurti extended the previous President’s term 
of office twice with a minimal acknowledgment of constitutional requirements and in 2007 
extended the term of Somaliland’s local district councils without legal basis.
266
 “There is 
virtually no transparency around government expenditures in Somaliland”
267
 and the 
executive has ignored the legislative amendments to the budget and sometimes operates 
without any budget at all rather than address the amendments, and frequently doesn’t submit 
an expenditure report to the House of Representatives.
268
  
Despite the problems, the stability of Somaliland since it declared independence has resulted 
in a legal structure in Somaliland that has better placed to protect human rights than the 
unstable government of the Somali Republic. Not only providing an argument to support the 
Somaliland authority’s claim to independent statehood but also demonstrating a capacity to 
exercise a broader range of forms of external self-determination. However, it is the 
government of the Somali Republic which is recognised as the government of Somalia, of 
which Somaliland is a de jure part. External self-determination has not been exercised 
consistently in Somaliland so the Somaliland authority is unable to engage with the 
international human rights system in its own right separate from governments of the Somali 
Republic. The result of this is that any benefit to engagement between Somaliland and the 
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international human rights system’s that may be gained from the Somaliland authority’s 
stability or the presence of a Somaliland legal system
269
 is dependent on the less stable 
government of the Somali Republic. In order to avoid reliance by Somaliland upon the less 
stable governments of the Somali Republic when engaging with the international human 
rights system, an agreed arrangement for the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland 
would need to enable a degree of external self-determination to allow such engagement. 
3.7.2 The Current Arrangement in the Somali Republic 
The current political arrangement in place in the Somali Republic is a consociational 4.5 
arrangement regarding representation of clans. The term 'consociationalism' is commonly 
understood to refer to non-majoritarian or consensus democracy where group representation 
along clan lines in the Somali Republic, is guaranteed regardless of territorial cohesion.
270
 
Consociational arrangements can be used within all the constitutional arrangements for the 
exercise of self-determination discussed in this chapter and within a state as a whole or within 
regional units.
271
 In Somalia a 4.5 consociational arrangement is used as a “clan-based 
power-sharing formula”
 272
 which “provides equal political representation to the four clan 
families in Somalia - the Darood, Digil and Mirifle, Dir and Hawiye - with a number of 
smaller clans receiving, cumulatively, half representation”.
273
 The system is defended by 
“clans historically marginalized by the previously domineering Darood and Hawiye 
clans”
274
and has resulted in the Somali Republic’s longest lasting form of decentralized 
governance.
275
 Although relevant to effective internal governance in Somalia, the 
consociational arrangement does not impact the ability of regional authorities to engage with 
the international human rights system as it does not concern the exercise of external self-
determination. 
The Provisional Federal Constitution does establish Somalia as a federal State but 
decentralization is not explained in detail.
276
 There is a lack of clarity regarding the division 
of legal responsibility for human rights obligations there would be between the government 
of the Somali Republic and a Somaliland authority under the Somali Republic’s constitution. 
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 Moseley (n 64). 
276




The Provisional Federal Constitution of the Somali Republic does highlight foreign affairs 
are the responsibility of the federal government
277
 with other powers to be “negotiated and 
agreed upon by the federal government and the federal member states”.
278
 The current 
arrangement under the Somali Republic therefore provides an arrangement for the internal 
exercise of power but does not allow a level of self-determination to be exercised within 
Somaliland which would allow engagement with the international human rights system. The 
lack of clarity regarding responsibility for human rights protection also affects a discussion of 
the human rights obligations in Somaliland
279




3.7.3 Puntland  
Puntland is relevant to a discussion of the exercise of self-determination in Somalia because 
there are differences between Somaliland and Puntland in relation to the exercise of self-
determination which their respective administrations claim to exercise, with Somaliland 
claiming statehood and Puntland claiming autonomy in a federal Somalia. The differences 
and similarities between the engagement the two territories have with the international 
community and the international human rights system confuses the assessment of what 
Somaliland’s status is now and therefore what impact any change in the exercise of self-
determination may have.281 
3.7.3.1 Puntland - Sool and Sanaag 
Puntland is an autonomous federal state of the Somali Republic, which declared sovereignty 
within Somalia in 1998
282
 and is Somaliland’s neighbour on its eastern border.
283
 The 
Puntland authorities have opposed Somaliland independence and on the basis of clan 
assertions of rights to the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag, which were part of British 
Somaliland when it gained independence in 1960,
284
 Puntland has periodically declared 
intentions to retake the territories.
285
 Puntland’s claim to Sool and Sanaag is based on clan 
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ethnicity as the Warsengheli and Dhulbahante clans in Sanaag, Sool and Cayn also belong to 
the Harti clan family which most inhabitants of Puntland belong to.
286
 It is generally agreed 
that about half of the residents of the Sanaag and a higher proportion in the Sool sympathise 
with Puntland. In the 2001 referendum on Somaliland independence voter turnout in the Sool 
region was only 31% well below the national average with many voters in that region using 
their non-vote as a way of opposing independence.
287
 The dispute over the Sool and Sanaag 
has caused significant political violence
288
 between Sool, Sanaag and Caynabo militias and 
the Somaliland Army,
289
 as well as limited direct military confrontations between Somaliland 
and Puntland forces over the region.
290
 The political violence has also included assassinations 




Peace agreements between the parties to the dispute have now been signed with an agreement 
reached between the President of Somaliland and the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn Leader in Dubai 
on 27 June 2012 to end human rights violations resulting from the conflict in the region.
292
 In 
August 2012 a peace accord was signed in Hargeisa between the Somaliland authority and 
representatives of the Sool community.
293
 However, reports of violence continue to occur and 
the use of force by Somaliland, including lethal force, must comply with human rights 
standards.
294
 The Independent Expert on the Situation of Human rights in Somalia has drawn 
attention to developments in the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn regions because they “had potential 
to get out of hand”
295
 as belief that the Sool and Sanaag regions hold significant gas and oil 
deposits is only likely to fuel the conflict.
296
 The conflict has also stoked other human rights 
                                                          
286
 Pegg (n 159) 197. 
287
 Shinn (n 221) 3. 
288
 HRC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General - United Nations support to end human rights abuses and combat 
impunity in Somalia’ (21 September 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/21/36, 5. 
289
 HRC, ‘Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia’ (29 August 2011) UN 
Doc A/HRC/18/48, 13;  UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’ (21 May 2019) UN Doc 
S/2019/393, para 18. 
290
 HRC (n 2) 6. 
291
 HRC (n 289) 13; UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’ (20 August 2019) UN Doc 
S/2019/661, para 32. 
292
 HRC (n 288) 5. 
293
 Interpeace, ‘Somaliland: Talks Between Elders’ (22 November 2012) 
<www.interpeace.org/2012/11/somaliland-talks-between-elders/> accessed 16 December 2014. 
294
 HRC, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human rights in Somalia’ (22 August 2012) UN 
Doc A/HRC/21/61, 18. 
295
 HRC (n 294) 10. 
296




abuses in Somaliland as there have been a number of reports that Somaliland authorities have 
repeatedly arrested and detained journalists working on issues around the disputed regions.
297
 
There is an international fear that secession may create a volatile trapped minority
298
 in areas 
such as the disputed border regions of Sool and Sanaag where a network of violent jihadists 
favours unity.
299
 However, grassroots reconciliation conferences have been held by 
Somaliland elders since 1992 so fear of a volatile state maybe excessive
300
 and recognition of 
Somaliland statehood or an agreement as to the arrangement for the self-determination in 
Somaliland would also mean those claims could be assisted by access to international 
tribunals and appropriate international law.
301
 
3.7.3.2 Puntland and the current arrangement 
Puntland, like Somaliland, has established a separate authority from the government of the 
Somali Republic. However, unlike Somaliland, Puntland’s constitution formally commits it 
to being part of a future federal Somalia. Although, a lack of progress in establishing stability 
in southern and central Somalia and the governments of the Somali Republic has pushed 
Puntland closer to full secession with the adoption by Puntland of its own flag, emblem, coat 
of arms and anthem.
302
  
Despite the move towards a more secessionist stance the Puntland Constitution is compatible 
with the Provisional Federal Constitution of the Somali Republic
303
as reflected by the 
international community’s interaction with the Puntland Government.
304
 This is because rules 
under the Provisional Federal Constitution,
305
 relating to federal member states would allow 
Puntland to continue its authority’s institutions and local administrations.
306
 Although, the 
Puntland Constitution establishes itself as a part of the Somali Republic, it also states that 
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until a federal constitution of the Somali Republic is completed and ratified by a popular 
referendum, “Puntland shall have the status of an independent state”.
307
 It also states that the 
provisions regarding the status of Puntland as an independent state until a federal constitution 
is established can be reviewed if a federal system is not agreed upon “or instability persists 
indefinitely in other parts of Somalia”.
308
 Therefore, both the Puntland Constitution and 
Provisional Federal Constitution share similar language about the need for negotiation in 





 due to the lack of discussion of the level of autonomy exercised by regional 
units and the division of responsibilities between the central government of the Somali 




This chapter has set out the current debates regarding potential arrangements for the exercise 
of self-determination by Somaliland and address some of the issues relevant to interested 
Somali parties and the international community.
312
 The arrangements for the exercise of self-
determination which have been discussed demonstrate a flexibility and overlap as to the 
extent to which self-determination may be exercised by regional authorities under such 
arrangements. For example a confederation or a federation can develop from the other form 
of government.
313
As such, arrangements that join elements from different models can be 
developed to suit specific needs.
314
 In considering the possible arrangements the relevant 
Somali parties do not include just the Somali Republic and Somaliland but other regional 
authorities
315
such as Puntland which do not have the same governing capacity.
316
 The 
capacities and interests of these authorities would need to be considered if an arrangement for 
the exercise of self-determination were reached.  
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Federalism is the favoured arrangement both within the Somali Republic and internationally 
as a means to accommodate the desire for the self-determination in Somaliland but 
discussions of federalism and the other arrangements have not demonstrated how they may 
accommodate both the level of external self-determination which Somaliland has exercised as 
a de facto state
317
 and which would be essential to engagement with the international human 
rights system and the agreement of the Somali Republic as the parent state. 
It is the historical circumstances to Somaliland’s decolonisation and declaration of 
independence and the subsequent stability that has been established that has maintained the 
impetus of Somaliland’s claim to statehood. It is also this which distinguishes Somaliland and 
provides it a basis from which it can assuage some of the concerns regarding the territorial 
integrity of Somalia and the principle of uti possidetis that may dissuade states from engaging 
with Somaliland and its exercise of self-determination as a state. Despite the historical 
background and the consequential argument that Somaliland’s statehood would not have a 
negative effect on the principles of territorial integrity and uti possidetis, states do still have 




The stability of governance in Somaliland compared to the governance in southern and 
central Somalia, ostensibly under the governments of the Somali Republic, highlights a 
reality of engaging on the ground in Somalia. If an international actor aims to engage in 
Somaliland then they must interact with the Somaliland authorities in some way regardless of 
the official legal status of Somaliland. The political stability of the governance that the 
exercise of self-determination in Somaliland through the Somaliland authority has produced 
means that the benefits of the external self-determination that Somaliland exercises separate 
from the government of the Somali Republic through its current unrecognised arrangement 
will need to protected. This leads to the inconsistent status given to Somaliland and 
inconsistent engagement had with Somaliland by the international community.
319
  
The flexibility of the arrangements discussed and the political problems envisioned in 
Somaliland statehood demonstrate that the formal model that a potential constitutional 
arrangement between Somaliland and the Somali Republic is based is not of key importance 
                                                          
317
 As discussed at chapter 4. 
318
 Discussed in more depth at chapters 4 and 6. 
319




what is required in order to enhance and protect the exercise of self-determination that 
enables formal engagement in all its forms with the international human rights system is 
permission from the parent state. This will be elaborated on further in the next chapters 










Status of Somaliland and the international community 
4.1 Introduction 
Somaliland’s status under international law is unclear because it is a de jure part of a federal 
Somalia but the international community interacts with it as a de facto state. Somaliland is 
denied external recognition but the majority of the Somaliland population regard Somaliland 
as a legitimate state and the Somaliland authority tries to fulfil the functions of a government 
of a state such as providing security, infrastructure and basic health and educational services. 
Somaliland is therefore in a paradox between being "a legal state with limited internal 
legitimacy and an internationally ‘‘illegal’’ state which enjoys widespread domestic 
legitimacy”.
1
   
As an unrecognised state Somaliland views itself as capable of entering into relations with 
other states and seeks constitutional independence and international recognition as a 
sovereign state. To this end “Somaliland’s engagement with the rest of the world has been 
almost entirely focused on gaining international recognition for its self-declared 
independence from Somalia”.
2
 However, as will be elaborated upon in this chapter, moves by 
international organisations or individual states to recognise Somaliland as a state have been 
largely dependent on a lead from Africa, due to many states’ fear of appearing imperialist in 
their policies.  
As Somaliland is unable to achieve substantive recognition it remains illegitimate in 
international eyes.
3
 The international approach to Somaliland can be characterised as that of a 
“limited acceptance approach” as the international community conducts relations with 
Somaliland on a level that is accepted by the federal government of the Somali Republic but 
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which is short of recognising Somaliland as a state.
4
 The international community therefore 
interacts with Somaliland on the basis that Somaliland can act in the capacity of a state but 
withholds recognition and the rights that statehood would entail. The difference in the formal 
and informal status accorded to Somaliland is demonstrated by the differences and overlaps 
in the relationship between Somaliland and the international community (both through 
international organisations and individual states).  
The uncertainty of Somaliland’s status is reflected in the obligations which Somaliland is 
expected to uphold
5
 for which, as a de jure part of Somalia, governments of the Somali 
Republic should be expected to have responsibility. Despite the fact Somaliland does not 
have the capacity to enforce international agreements,
6
 Somaliland has acted and been treated 
as a state internationally which contrasts and/or is inconsistent with the international human 
rights system’s interaction with Somaliland as discussed in Chapter 6. It has reached 
agreements with states such as Ethiopia regarding cooperation in the long term use of its port 
of Berbera
7
 and Somaliland has reached agreements with states and international 
organisations in other areas
8
 such as aid, election monitoring, security and counter-terrorism, 
trade and immigration.
9
 Despite the absence of recognised sovereignty, Somaliland has been 
expected to undertake some of the duties of statehood such as accepting the return of refugees 
with several countries such as UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden denying asylum 
on the grounds the homeland of Somaliland is safe.
10
 The members of international 
community such as the Seychelles
11
, UAE and Yemen
12
 have made agreements with the 
Somaliland authority relating to the use Somaliland ports to combat piracy.
13
 Conduct such as 
this from the international community towards Somaliland, indicates that the governance of 
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Somaliland by the Somaliland authority is effective enough to maintain an adequate level of 
stability for such actions.  
4.2 Recognition of Somaliland 
Either as a regional entity of a failed state or as a de facto unrecognised state, Somaliland has 
had to assume certain responsibilities on behalf of the government of the Somali Republic.  
An example of this is the running of a legitimate vote
14
 for the independence referendum of 
2001 which established a constitution based on universal suffrage and has overseen the 
restoration of peace and demobilisation of combatants.
15
 Somaliland has also engaged in 
other state like diplomatic activities such as ministerial visits,
16
 opening diplomatic offices in 
many capitals around the world
17
 as well as accepting several embassies in Hargeisa.
18
 
Somaliland’s passport is also recognised by South Africa, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia
19
 but 
in spite of these state-like activities between Somaliland and the international community no 




The impact of the inconsistency in the status given to Somaliland depends on the 
international actor in question as issues such as secession, territorial integrity and uti 
possidetis can be used to support whichever political position is being pursued. The status 
given and political position taken by international actors in their relations with Somaliland is 
important as due to the level of discretion there is in international state recognition, 
Somaliland’s relations with interstate organisations, regional powers and other states are 
significant in evaluating the potential likelihood of Somaliland exercising different degrees of 
self-determination. This is because donors, such as states like the UK and Denmark and 
international organisations such as the EU provide the majority of funding for social services, 
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institutional support, and security operations
21
 and will therefore play a big part in the 
Somaliland authority’s capacity to uphold human rights protection in Somaliland. 
The status of Somaliland is also impacted by and/or distinguished from the international 
community’s engagement or relationship with the government of the Somali Republic 
because it is the recognised government of Somalia the state of which Somaliland is a 
territory and the government of the Somali Republic currently opposes Somaliland 
independence. Therefore, the greater the interaction of the government of the Somali 
Republic with the international community as a state government the weaker the argument 
that the Somaliland authority is the government of a state territory. 
Up until the latter part of 2012 forces of the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali 
Republic (“TFG”) controlled no more territory than Mogadishu.
22
 Governments of the Somali 
Republic have received various expressions of support from the international community but 
states were reluctant to give formal recognition of the TFG,
23
 only five countries extended 
diplomatic recognition to it.
24
 Despite this the TFG held the seat for Somalia at the UN, Arab 
League, AU
25
 and other international bodies. This gave an international voice to those 
arguing for a unified Somalia under a government of the Somali Republic which Somaliland 
separatists have not have.
26
  
In contrast to the approach to the recognition given to Somaliland and the Somali Republic, 
the UN appears to show a willingness to work with the Somaliland authority. UN agencies 
have tacitly acknowledged Somaliland’s separate status by conducting tacit negotiations with 
Somaliland.
27
 When UNSOM’s intervened in Somalia in 1992-1995 it acquiesced to 
Somaliland’s refusal to accept foreign troops on its territory
28
 and this remains the case with 
the presence of UNSOM in Somaliland still on hold as the Somaliland authority does not 
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accept a UNSOM mandate in Somaliland. Somaliland’s relative stability as a de facto state 
has also encouraged pragmatic inventiveness on the part of the UN, such as the UN 
Development Program,
29
 to pursue a development strategy that directly benefits Somaliland’s 
process of state formation such as the enhancement of the institutions of the state under the 
Somaliland authority.
30
 However, no UN official or agency has formally recognised 




The diplomatic efforts of the UN Security Council at resolving conflict in Somalia have also 
persistently endeavoured to reconstruct a central state
32
 and establish a strong government in 
Mogadishu.
33
 Again, in contrast to its own efforts, the UN has not called for non-recognition 
of Somaliland for the lack of fulfilment of statehood criteria or international law.
34
 Neither 
has the UN declared Somaliland’s independence invalid as it has in the past with other 
territories which have declared independence such as the homeland states in South Africa.
35
 
This demonstrates an inconsistent or even contradictory approach to Somaliland’s status all 
of which result in a lack of clarity that makes engagement with Somaliland more difficult. It 
also demonstrates an ability on the part of Peoples in Somaliland to exercise a degree of 
external self-determination even if informal, which discussions of a federal Somalia would 
not allow and which Peoples in Somaliland are not prepared to give up.    
4.3 International collective engagement processes 
4.3.1 Road Map/New Deal 
There have been a number of international processes which the international community has 
taken a collective approach to involvement in trying to resolve conflict in Somalia. Processes 
is a term I use to describe a different aspect of engagement by the international community in 
Somalia that involves the attempt to agree and establish a consistent broad approach in order 
to establish stability and initiate development across all aspects of Somali society in 
Somaliland and the Somali Republic. This is in distinction from the engagement of the 
                                                          
29
 Moe L Wiuff, ‘Hybrid and “Everyday” Political Ordering: Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy (2011) 
63 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 143, 165. 
30
 Ibid; examples of which are discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
31
 Arieff (n 9) 69. 
32
 II Ahmed and RH Green, ‘The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: local-level 
effects, external interventions and reconstruction’ (1999) 20(1) Third World Quarterly 113, 125. 
33
 Arieff (n 9) 69. 
34
 Talmon (n 27) 116. 
35




international community with separate identifiable issues. These broad approach processes 
engage with human rights issues in Somaliland differently from how international 
organisations and state actors engage in relation to other specific issues. 
The Road Map/New Deal was the process used to establish a stable government in the Somali 
Republic’s capital Mogadishu. Mogadishu was therefore the focus with little discussion of 
control of the wider territory of Somalia and little reference to Somaliland. The “Road Map” 
was mandated by the Kampala Accord
36
  which was signed by the then President and Speaker 
of the Somali Republic in June 2011.
37
 The Road Map called for the resignation of the Prime 
Minister and postponed elections until 2012 this extended the writ of the government of the 
Somali Republic, which at the time was the Transitional Federal Government until August 
2012 in order to enable the long term process of reconciliation in Somalia.
38
 The aim of the 
Roadmap was to improve security in Mogadishu and southern and central Somalia through 
the pursuit of “national reconciliation and outreach”
39




The New Deal was also part of the ongoing Road Map process, it was a framework 
developed by the G7 group and endorsed in Busan, South Korea in December 2011 by over 
40 states and organisations.
41
 The New Deal principles were the result of the Fourth High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
42
  and were a list of international financial pledges to the 
New Deal for Somalia
43
which included human right and humanitarian law requirements.
44
 
The Road Map’s reference to human rights focussed on how the Transitional Federal 
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 ‘Communique – A new deal for Somalia’ (EU-Somalia New Deal Conference, Brussels, 16 September 2013) 
1 <http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/new-deal-for-somalia-
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In 2013 the New Deal sought to establish a development framework to govern assistance 
from the international community to Somalia over three years.
46
 The agenda for this 
framework included assistance for the strengthening and expansion of justice. The 
Communique from the New Deal conference in Brussels of September 2013 highlighted this 
by stating the aim of the New Deal was to ‘create a better future for all Somali people’
47
 
(although whether all Somali people included Somalilanders was not clarified) ‘by means of 
a dialogue and process that promotes political reconciliation and establishes peace, security, 
justice and sustainable development throughout the country’
48
 (again it was not clarified 
whether throughout the country included Somaliland). The Communique from the conference 




The Communique highlighted “that security and justice go hand in hand”
50
 and stated that 
improving human rights through appropriate legal frameworks and addressing sexual 
violence and violence against women required judicial, independent, accessible and 
legitimate justice institutions.
51
 However, it did not provide the details as to what jurisdiction 
would be supported in such reforms or what it meant by legitimacy bearing in mind the 
comparable stability of the Somaliland authority in Hargeisa. 
The aim of the New Deal conference was “to create a better future for all Somali people, by 
means of a dialogue and process that promotes political reconciliation and establishes peace, 
security, justice and sustainable development throughout the country”.
52
 This suggests the 
goal for the international community was a sovereign united Somalia. This view of the 
international community’s approach to Somaliland is further evidenced by the encouragement 
of an inclusive national dialogue between the federal government of the Somali Republic and 
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existing and emerging administrations
53
with the view that it would lead to the establishment 
of local and regional authorities and federal units, anchored in the Provisional Constitution of 
the Somali Republic.
54
 The Communique goes onto to state that local authorities and federal 
units would be “building blocks for a viable, united, sovereign and stable Somali state”
55
and 
“we underscored the importance of including all Somalis in the political process”.
56
 The 
Somaliland authority was therefore encouraged to be involved in the New Deal.  
The encouragement to the Somaliland authority and the intended engagement with various 
sections of civil society is all on the basis of Somaliland being a territorial unit of a sovereign 
state of Somalia and makes no hint at the possibility of a dialogue with Somaliland as or 
about exercising self-determination in Somaliland being exercised as an independent 
territory. The reference to engagement between the international community and 
Somalilanders is framed from the perspective of “highlight[ing] the importance of 
strengthening mutual accountability between the international community and Somalia, and 
between the Federal Government and the Somali people”
57
 not between the international 
community the federal government of the Somali Republic and regional authorities nor the 
regional authorities and the Somali people. As a consequence of this the Somaliland 
authority’s reaction was to welcome the New Deal process to the extent it offered a more 
effective mechanism to deliver development assistance to Somaliland and the Somali 
Republic.
58
 However, Somaliland chose not to participate in the Conference. This was on the 
basis that the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland had built a separate state, from the 
Somali Republic which meets in full the criteria of customary international law for statehood 
and would not cooperate in attempts to rebuild the former unified state of Somalia, if it 
purports to include Somaliland. Neither would the Somaliland authority cooperate in any 
effort to use aid as a lever to force Somaliland to become part of Somalia under a government 
of the Somali Republic.
59
 
4.3.2 Somali Compact and Somaliland Special Arrangement 
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The Somali Compact and the Somaliland Special Arrangement (“the Somaliland 
Arrangement”) are international agreed arrangements for the direction of aid for development 
in Somalia, in both the Somali Republic and Somaliland respectively, which arose from the 
New Deal process. The Somali Compact refers throughout to Somalia and makes no 
distinction between Somaliland and the Somali Republic as being separate entities. The 
Somaliland Arrangement discusses Somaliland as being administered by a government 
separate from that supported by the Somali Compact. The Somali Compact and Somaliland 
Arrangement demonstrate the lack of clarity in the international community’s approach to 
Somaliland as both agreements were put together as part of the same process but dealt with 
Somalia and Somaliland, and the Somaliland ‘government’ (authority) separately. 
4.3.3 The Somali Compact 
The Somali Compact drew from the federal government of the Somali Republic’s Six Pillar 
Programme, Puntland’s second Five Year Development Plan and other sub-states 
(Mogadishu, Baidoa, Galkayo and Garowe) were also consulted in putting the Somali 
Compact together. The Somaliland Arrangement drew from Somaliland’s Five Peacebuilding 
and Stability Goals’ priorities.
60
   
The Somali Compact indicated the status it intended Somaliland, the Somali Republic and 
Somalia should be given by saying the Somali Compact is “a key political document that: 
strengthens the mutual commitments between the Federal Government and international 
partners”
61
 and that implementation of the Compact “will facilitate the process of dialogue on 
the federal model of Somalia”.
62
 This confirms the intent demonstrated in the Communique 
that engagement the international community has with regional authorities in Somalia is on 
the basis of them being part of a federal state of Somalia. It also makes it hard to separate the 
political from the legal relationships because it is unclear whether there is an intent that the 
political engagement the international community has with Somaliland, the Somali Republic 
and other Somali authorities does or should have any legal consequences.  
The lack of clarity of Somaliland’s status leads to confusion as to the intended basis of the 
international community’s relations in Somalia as although the Somali Compact’s aim is 
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“broadening the national dialogue to ensure effective implementation of the 
Compact”
63
parameters are placed on ‘broadening dialogue’ because dialogue is to be “in line 
with the Provisional Constitution”
 64




A stated short-term goal of the government of the Somali Republic as stated in the Compact 
is “the establishment of government authority by setting up interim administration at district 
and regional levels”.
66
 The compact’s priority under inclusive politics is to “[a]dvance 
political dialogue to clarify and settle relations between federal government and existing 
emerging administrations”
67
 it then goes onto clarify that the dialogue it was aiming at was at 
“both local and national levels”
68
  but there are problems with this as it is unclear what these 
levels are. The Somali Compact refers throughout to the recognition of Somalia’s territorial 
integrity and the determination of the international community to maintain the territorial 
integrity of Somalia. The Somali Compact also makes no reference to a Somaliland authority 
or Somaliland Government. Thereby the Somali Compact upholds the recognition of the 
sovereign territory of Somalia as including Somaliland or at least not providing evidence of 
the territory of Somaliland as being a sovereign independent state. 
Any engagement the international community does intend to have with the regional 
authorities is on the basis of a federalist constitution as the Communique promotes 
“federalism, dialogue and reconciliation, highlighting the importance of the strengthening of 
relations and cooperation between the Federal Government and the regions in this process. 
We therefore looked forward to the Federal Government’s plan to promote federalism”.
69
   
The Somali Compact then states the role the international community see’s for other Somali 
authorities “[i]n this respect, the establishment of local and regional administrations and 
federal units, in the spirit of the Provisional Constitution, are key milestones for a vibrant and 
stable Somalia”.
70
 Therefore, from the Somali Compact it can be taken that the international 
community regards regional entities, such as Somaliland, as essential for the guarantee of 
human rights but as subordinate authorities to a federal government of the Somali Republic. 
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4.3.3.1 Post Somali Compact 
The mixed status given to the Somali Republic and Somaliland has continued since the 
Somali Compact was agreed. In 2014, High Level Partnership Forum’s (HLPF), which 
oversee the implementation of the Somali Compact and have been co-chaired by the 
President of the government of the Somali Republic and the UN
71
and attended by 
Ambassadors and international agency representatives,
72
 were held in order to discuss the 
progress of the Federal Government of Somalia and the associated support of the 
international community in achieving activities outlined in the New Deal Compact, Vision 
2016 and the Peace and State Building Goals.
73
 These meetings endorsed the New Deal 
Somali Compact and stated it “marked a new phase in the political relationship between 
Somalia and the international community”.
74
  
Communiques from the meetings referred to the government of the Somali Republic’s and 
the Somali Compact’s commitment to working towards “the unity of Somalia with the 
international community's commitment to provide support”.
75
 Commitment to the “[t]he 
finalisation of a new federal state structure” of Somalia
76
was also stated. When other Somali 
administrations were discussed Somaliland was not raised whereas Puntland, the Interim 
Jubba Administration (IJA), Galmudug and emerging administrations were but only in the 
context of close engagement in the government of the Somali Republic’s  led plans under the 
New Deal. The communique also welcomed progress towards the formation of interim 
administrations in southwest and central Somalia but not Somaliland or “Northwest 
Somalia”.
77
 Somali Compact donors’ support of the federal government of the Somali 
Republic and sub-federal authorities in defeating al-Shabaab was also confirmed but 




4.3.4 Somaliland Arrangement 
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The Somaliland authority did not support the New Deal process but the Somaliland authority 
along with civil society in Somaliland adopted the Somaliland Arrangement which was based 
on the New Deal principles and is fully compatible with the Somaliland authority’s (which 
regards Somaliland as a sovereign state) national plan and priorities.
79
 The aim was that the 
Somaliland Arrangement would form a distinct and separate component of the broader New 
Deal to facilitate coordination between the international donor community and Somaliland 
authority and civil society with no input from the federal government of the Somali 
Republic.
80
 The Somaliland Arrangement is intended to serve as a strategic framework for 
international partners to support a limited number of priority areas of Somaliland's 




The funds under the Somaliland Arrangement are not given to the Somaliland authority but 
are administered in consultation with the Somaliland authority through the Somaliland 
Development Fund. This fund was created as part of the Somaliland Arrangement and is 
supported by the UK Department for International Development, Danida and Norway
82
 and is 
fully aligned with the New Deal principles.
83
 The Somaliland Arrangement states that “based 
on the achievement of jointly agreed benchmarks international assistance will increasingly be 
channelled through Somaliland’s systems”.
84
 This indicates that the international community 
will increasingly engage with Somaliland in terms of funding on the basis of the Somaliland 
authority being a government of Somaliland that exercises external self-determination. At 
priority one of the benchmarks is support for the court system, for which the Somaliland 
Ministry of Justice and the Somaliland Supreme Court are listed as having responsibility, 
which again indicates Somaliland as being an identifiable actor with a personality separate 
from the Somali Republic. 
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 Somaliland Special Arrangement (2013 – 2016) (updated November 2014) 27 





The Somaliland Arrangement “lays out a way forward for institutionalising on-going 
Somaliland processes and initiatives within an overarching and equal partnership between the 
Somaliland government, its people and the international community. It is underpinned by a 
need to protect and build upon Somaliland’s development gains”.
85
 This seems to be in 
contrast to the frequent reaffirmation of the federal government of the Somali Republic’s 
control of Somalia throughout the Somali Compact as discussed above. This is because it 
refers to the Somaliland “Government” as being in an equal partnership with the international 
community and the sovereign actors of which it is composed. As such it points to the idea 
that the international community are engaging with Somaliland as if it were a sovereign state 
exercising external self-determination of its people. This separate engagement with the 
Somaliland authority and the government of the Somali Republic is supported further by the 
Somaliland Arrangement which is stated to be a separate and distinct part of the Somali 
Compact that amounts to two arrangements developed through separate processes 
implemented using separate government systems and mechanisms.
86
 As such Somaliland’s 
government is on an equal footing to the government of the Somali Republic. 
 The Somaliland Arrangement is held to be the sole framework for engaging with 
Somaliland’s development process under the New Deal partnership.
87
 However, the pillars 
for the development plan of Somaliland which were consolidated and taken into 
consideration through the lens of the Peace and State Building Goal by the Somaliland 
authority and civil society representatives that led the Somaliland Arrangement drafting 
process correspond to the federal government of the Somali Republic’s New Deal goals 
which refer to a united federal Somalia.
88
 This again highlights the confusion in the status 
given to Somaliland as the international community is indicating a view of Somaliland as 
being part of the Somali Republic’s territory but is engaging with Somaliland on basis equal 
to that of the Somali Republic.  
Despite the fact the status of the Somaliland administration in Hargeisa has not been agreed 
by the internationally recognised government of the Somali Republic, the language of the 
Somaliland Arrangement refers to the “Somaliland government”
89
 throughout and not the 
Somaliland authority or authorities as reports from other international bodies seem to make a 
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 Ibid 21. 
89






 This along with the unqualified referral to “the ratification of the Somaliland 
Constitution  by popular referendum in 2001”,
91
 could be construe as a possible tacit 
recognition of Somaliland’s sovereign aspirations and  the Hargeisa administration’s 
authority in or control of the territory of Somaliland, if not recognition of Somaliland as a 
sovereign state. The Somaliland Arrangement does not however, contain any qualification 
that the Somaliland Arrangement itself does or does not uphold the Somali Republic’s claim 
to sovereignty over the territory of Somaliland.  
The Somaliland Arrangement states that a framework was agreed between ‘the government 
of Somaliland’ and development partners for “joint monitoring of peacebuilding and state 
building outcomes based on mutually-acceptable indicators to be jointly developed by 
government and international partners”.
92
 As the Somaliland ‘government’ only wants 
recognised sovereign independence, mutually acceptable indicators that are separate from any 
other Somali administration inherently recognise a degree of external self-determination. This 
engagement by the international community with Somaliland under the Somaliland 
Arrangement is a further demonstration of a degree of acceptance of external self-
determination by Somaliland. 
The ongoing monitoring of the Somaliland Arrangement has included the High Level Aid 
Coordination Forum (HLACF) which was first established in 2011 as a means for ensuring 
harmonization and complementarity between donors and the government in implementing 
Somaliland’s National Development Plan.
93
 The HLCAF has since integrated structures for 
aid management and coordination structures of the Somaliland Arrangement, as its platform 
for facilitating policy dialogue and implementation of projects towards the Somaliland 
Arrangement’s Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal.
94
 
Under the HLACF the Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee has met with 
the Somaliland President and Minister of Trade and Foreign Investment and other senior 
government officials, representatives from civil society and the private sector, and members 
of the international community in Hargeisa, in relation to advancing development progress 
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and implementation of New Deal principles under the Somaliland Arrangement.
95
 There have 
also been meetings between Somaliland government officials, civil society and their 
development partners such as policymakers from foreign governments, representatives from 
the EU, African Development Bank, UN agencies, international NGOs and private sector 
development actors, to discuss ways to make the New Deal cooperation plan a reality on the 
ground.
96
 These meetings which the international community has supported have included 




The contemporaneous nature of the Somali Compact and the Somaliland Arrangement to 
each other and the contrasting expression of the status within them of the respective 
administrations in Hargeisa and Mogadishu are examples of the unspoken recognition of the 
extent and limits of control of the two administrations and the unwillingness of the 
international community to clearly set out the limits to engagement with the two authorities 
on the basis of their sovereignty and/or exercise of external self-determination or lack thereof 
under international law. 
4.4 Puntland 
Puntland does not see itself as an independent state and has made no declaration in this 
regard. It regards itself as part of federal Somalia although the extent of its federal autonomy 
has not been agreed with the government of the Somali Republic. The Provisional Somali 
Constitution indicates that two or more regions can form a member state
98
and Puntland has 
been held up as the benchmark for aspirant federal member states of the federal Somali 
Republic.
99
 However, Puntland’s governmental institutions grew from an insurgency framed 
by regional clan identity and the influence of a Harti sub-clan in North Mudug over the 
course of more than a decade. This basis for the establishment of Puntland sets a difficult 
precedent for other aspiring federal member states because such a clear clan basis has not 
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Despite Puntland’s declared intent to remain part of the Somali Republic, Puntland is 
frequently engaged with separately from the Somali Republic by the international community 
but in a limited way similarly to engagement with Somaliland. Puntland has received signals 
from the international community that its territorial integrity should not be affected by the 
Somali Compact.
101
 This was reinforced by a signed agreement in October 2014 between the 
government of the Somali Republic and Puntland. Puntland has demonstrated that a top-down 
approach to implementing the Provisional Somali Constitution of the Mogadishu government 
“will entail reaching accommodations with existing political realities”.
102
 
International Organisations including the World Bank, UN,
103
 AU, EU, IGAD and key donor 
states
104
have engaged with Puntland and the Puntland President through donor conferences 
and in meetings focussed exclusively on Puntland.
105
 AU representatives have stated that the 
AU would support the development of Puntland security forces in order to combat terrorism, 
piracy and human trafficking and have praised the Puntland elections. The AU 
representatives have also stated that the international community is “ready to assist Puntland 
in handling its development, to consider its suggestion instead of dictating plans to 
Puntland”.
106
 This is comparable to the relationship the international community has with 
Somaliland under the Somaliland Arrangement. 
Other direct engagement with Puntland in an external self-determination capacity has 
included an arrangement between Somaliland and Puntland and the Seychelles with regards 
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to prisoner transfer agreements
107
 and sentencing pirates
108
 and financing from the UK 
through the UN to build a new Ministry of Justice in Puntland and expand Puntland’s prison 
to enable pirates to be handed over to the Puntland authorities.
109
 The EU’s inclusion of the 
state of Galmudug in plans to strengthen Somalia’s judicial capacity indicates that 
engagement with sub-national authorities is likely to continue as the governments in regions 
such as Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug are able to wield varying amounts of authority 
over their territories.
110
 This overlap of treatment of Somaliland and Puntland can be regarded 
as evidence that the informal status afforded to Somaliland by the international community 
may not amount to unofficial recognition of its sovereign independent statehood.  
However, the status inferred upon Somaliland by the international community can also be 
distinguished as being more autonomous, from that status inferred upon Puntland, on the 
basis that Puntland does not have a separate process for dealing with the administration of 
international funds for its development separate from the Somali Compact process as 
Somaliland does under the Somaliland Arrangement as despite severing ties with the 
government of the Somali Republic, Puntland still took part in the New Deal process.
111
 
4.5 Regional actors and Somaliland’s status 
The lack of formal recognition of Somaliland independence by international actors in the 
Horn of Africa region and the wider Middle East, North Africa and African regions reflects 
the political concerns regarding secession, uti possidetis and territorial sovereignty of the 
individual actors within those regions. The state actors and international organisations within 
these regions have a strong influence on Somaliland’s efforts to achieve recognised statehood 
because many international actors outside of the region, with an imperial legacy in Africa or 
with a concern about being associated with such a legacy, will not take the lead without 
regional actors. This affects the level of engagement the international community has had 
with Somaliland because states do not want to create a level of engagement from which a de 
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facto status, that is a contradiction of the status regional actors are prepared to give, can be 
inferred.   
IGAD is the Regional Economic Commission for the Horn of Africa. It provides the 
institutional framework for regional economic integration, towards increasing prosperity and 
integration into the global economy.
112
 IGAD is in the process of trying to transform itself 
into a free trade area, with the intention of speeding up infrastructure projects in order to 
develop the region.
113
 Engagement by regional organisations, such as IGAD, in Somalia and 
the influence they exercise is largely affected by the political and economic concerns of 
individual state actors. To this end stability in Somalia remains a major concern for 
neighbouring states and as such the approach of IGAD
114
 (whose current members are 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, The Somali Republic, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda
115
) 
is the non-recognition of Somaliland independence. All three neighbouring states of Somalia 
(Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti) have troops in Somalia and IGAD and the AU have 




Concerns about the economic impact of the stability of Somalia is the basis upon which much 
engagement with the Somali Republic, as the state authority of Somalia is based and adds to 
the desire of regional actors to maintain stability. Such engagement in Somalia includes 
assistance with a view to ensuring that Somalia attains the infrastructure rehabilitation, 
economic recovery, post conflict reconstruction, institution and capacity building it needs.
117
  
Engagement with the government in Mogadishu is an example of the regional organisations 
and their members attempting to maintain the territorial sovereignty of individual members. 
This motivation has been confirmed by IGAD, in statements highlighting the need for 
ongoing political processes in Somalia to establish regional administrations to be anchored on 
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the principles of leadership by the government of the Somali Republic and respect for the 
Provisional Constitution of Somalia.
118
 Such reaffirmation of Somalia’s territorial integrity is 
also linked to the reluctance, within the wider Horn of Africa, to see another secession take 
place within the region following South Sudan’s struggles
119
 and the instability it has 
produced. 
4.5.1 The African Union 
As with the issues of the wider international community needing regional actors to take the 
lead, recognition by the AU is essential to wider international recognition of Somaliland. This 
is because the “UN and other various Western donors have indicated at one time or another 




In December 2005 Somaliland’s application for AU membership was submitted; and, 
although the Somaliland President met with the AU Commission Chairperson to discuss 
Somaliland’s application in May 2006,
121
 no response to the application has ever been 
issued.
122
 In order to obtain AU recognition Somaliland would require the vote of a simple 
majority of AU member states.
123
 Individual AU member states policies towards Somaliland 
are discretionary because the AU lacks a “common policy on issues of ‘second generation’ 
independence”.
124
 As such, individual states in the AU could recognise Somaliland on the 
basis of their own principles, however, this may lead to a problematic legal situation where a 
member is not recognised by all AU members, as is the case with Western Sahara.
125
  
The underlying fear behind AU opposition to the recognition of Somaliland’s secession is 
that it will have a domino effect which could lead to the ‘Balkanisation of Africa’
126
 and 
undermine the principle of uti possidetis. Many major political powers in Africa feel that the 
sovereignty of their own national boundaries could be threatened because “[o]ver 90 per cent 
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of states contain significant, historically rooted minority groups (about a third do not even 
have a majority group)”.
127
 The AU is aware that there are clan or tribal issues relevant to 
Somaliland independence
128
 as the Isaaq clan account for well over half of the Somaliland 
population.
129
In contrast to such concerns about Somalia’s borders and on the basis of the 
decolonisation of the Horn of Africa, an AU fact-finding mission on Somaliland’s status in 
2005 reported favourably on Somaliland’s claim for sovereignty and found that Somaliland’s 
situation is unique and should not be linked to the African fear of the Balkanisation of 
different ethnic groups.
130
 The report stated Somaliland was “unique and self-justified in 
African political history” and that “the case should not be linked to the notion of opening a 
Pandora’s Box” in relation to the consideration of former colonial boundaries.
131
 The 
Somaliland Foreign Ministry has reiterated that recognition of Somaliland will not "open 
Pandora's box in Africa", and “[n]either will it set a precedent”.
132
 However, to muddy the 
waters in response to this certain unionists have highlighted the potential issue of Sool and 
Sanaag’s
133
 secession from Somaliland.
134
 
The AU’s approach to Somaliland’s status is inconsistent as despite the findings of the AU 
fact finding mission in 2005 the AU has reiterated its commitment to the unity, territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of Somalia
135
 and appears increasingly to support actively the 
unifying of Somalia.
136
 The AU has extended support and recognition to state building efforts 
in the south
137
 and has allowed two successive governments of the Somali Republic from 
Mogadishu to take the AU seat even though both demonstrated little local authority or 
power.
138
 Furthermore, reports of the Chairman of the African Union Commission to the 
Secretary General of the UN
139
 have stated that Somalia is a federal state, as enshrined in its 
Provisional Constitution. This supports a view that the international community engages with 
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Somaliland as a de jure territory of Somalia. This is further supported by the AU’s reference 
to the unresolved relationship between Somaliland and Puntland as being between territorial 
entities that are both “other self-declared and semi-autonomous states”
140
 and specifically 
refers to their disputes such as boundary delineation, revenue collection, and social service 
delivery as issues at sub-state administrative level,
141
 which is a clear distinction from the 
federal level of the government of the Somali Republic.  
References to Somaliland in AU reports also demonstrate the status given to Somaliland 
through the AU’s engagement in Somalia. The Report of the Chairperson of the African 
Union Commission states that engagement with Somaliland in relation to constitutional 
issues is on the same basis as that of sub-states Puntland and Jubba. Reports of the Chairman 
of the African Union Commission to the Secretary General of the UN
142
 also confirm the 
AU’s support of the federal government of the Somali Republic
143
 but does not reference 
support for Somaliland. 
However, the AU’s engagement recognises the reality of Somaliland’s territorial control as a 
de facto state which again leads to an inconsistency in its conduct with Somaliland. The AU 
peacekeeping force does not conduct peacekeeping operations in Somaliland due to the 
Somaliland authority not giving its consent. Somaliland has also attended events with the AU 
to which it has been invited, in an effort to lobby and elicit tacit or covert recognition of 
Somaliland.
144
 The AU’s engagement shows it has interpreted Somaliland independence as 
secession from the recognised sovereign state of Somalia. The legal dimension of whether 
Somaliland recognition sets a precedent for other African cases and its impact on the 




AMISOM is the African Union military mission that has been taking on Al Shabab in 
southern and central Somalia in support of the national forces of the Somali Republic and 
other allied militias. AMISOM has been militarily successful in its current AU mandated 
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mission to create stable conditions in which the Road Map to peace and the New Deal 
development process can be implemented
146
 through coordination of protection actors in 
Somalia.
147
 Although AMISOM is the AU’s military mission, in terms of support the US is 
the biggest contributor and provides AMISOM with money, equipment and training. The UN 
provides logistical support, food, housing, an international mandate and training in how to 
avoid or respond to civilian casualties. The EU provides AMISOM with money
148
 and the EU 
and the US also pay the Somalian National Forces.
149
 This international support for the 
government of the Somali Republic as the government of Somalia has been reiterated by the 
AU in calls to AU Member States and “international partners to provide the requisite support 
for stabilization and post‐conflict reconstruction in Somalia and to be guided in their 
engagement by the priority framework elaborated by the Government of Somalia”.
150
 
AMISOM has recognised the reality of Somaliland’s territorial control as a de facto state as it 
has not conducted peacekeeping operations in Somaliland due to the Somaliland authority not 
giving its consent.  
4.5.3 Ethiopia 
Ethiopia, the major power in the Horn of Africa, is widely perceived to prefer a weak and 
divided Somalia.
151
 It is therefore thought to be comfortable with the current confusion in 
relation to Somaliland’s status.
152
 As a consequence it has taken a contradictory approach to 
Somalia by supporting both Somaliland and the Somali Government.
153
 Through its approach 
to engagement with the Somali Republic and Somaliland, Ethiopia hopes to secure maritime 
access through Somaliland whilst also reducing the possibility of a strong unified Somalia 
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and the subsequent threat of separatist Somali movements within its own borders.
154
 These 
aims have led to a level of involvement in Somalia by Ethiopia so that it is now considered to 




Ethiopia’s troops had been in Somalia since 2007
156
 after cross border incursions arising from 
the conflict in Somalia led to Ethiopia invading Somalia in 2006.
157
 Ethiopia supported the 
Djibouti Agreement of 2008 between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (the 
government of the Somali Republic at the time) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of 
Somalia (ARS) to enable Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the territory of the Somali Republic as 
it called for a cessation of armed confrontation.
158
 As a consequence entry of Ethiopian forces 
into Somalia would now be contrary to the Djibouti agreement.
159
 However, Ethiopia is now 
militarily involved in the Somali Republic through AMISOM. 
The influence of Ethiopia within IGAD has led to a diplomatic intervention by IGAD which 
resulted in the signing of an agreement to form an interim administration (the IJA) in Jubba, 
(a region of Somalia that borders Ethiopia), an agreement which was of relevance to the 
constitutional debate in Somalia.
160
 Ethiopia has also offered to mediate between Puntland 
and the Somali Government such actions confirm the view that Ethiopia would prefer to 




Despite the potential instability created by Ethiopia with its engagement with sub-state 
entities in Somalia, Ethiopia is conscious of its role as the home of the AU and does not want 
to push an issue that that could impact the borders and governance of any AU member states 
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and thus may divide opinion amongst AU members.
 162
 As such, due to the historic and 
ongoing involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia and the questions that might be raised regarding 
its motives in the region,
163
 Ethiopia has been reluctant to recognise Somaliland first
164
 as 
“Somalia would immediately attribute nefarious motives to Ethiopian recognition of 
Somaliland, arguing that it wishes to balkanize Somalia and weaken Somali unity”.
165
  
Ethiopia therefore continues to engage with the government of the Somali Republic
166
 but 
also engages with Somaliland on the basis of cooperative relations in several areas.
167
 
Ethiopia is the most important ally of Somaliland both militarily and diplomatically.
168
 
Ethiopia was the first country that established diplomatic relations with Hargeisa by opening 
a Consulate which issues visas to Somaliland passport holders and has as such also 
recognises Somaliland passports. In addition to this, Ethiopia Airlines flies to Somaliland 
several times per week
169
 with regular trade mission flights between Addis Ababa and 
Hargeisa.
170
 Somaliland also maintains a diplomatic office in Addis Ababa which has 
resulted in the signing of agreements between Ethiopia and Somaliland aimed at enhancing 
trade and communications.
171
 These include Ethiopia’s agreement to ship goods through the 
Somaliland port of Berbera and establish customs offices at major border crossings.
172
Such 
engagement by Ethiopia is on the basis of Somaliland’s status as being more than that of an 
internal sub-state territory and more akin to that of a State. However, even though Ethiopia is 
considered to be directly supportive of Somaliland's independence claims, there are no signs 
that Ethiopia is ready to recognize Somaliland and has stated several times that Ethiopia 
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Djibouti does not recognise the sovereign independence of Somaliland, however, Djibouti is 
an important neighbour to Somaliland for several reasons. Firstly, Djiboutians and 
Somalilanders have common ancestral lineage and geographical tenancy, since the clans of 
Somaliland live both in Djibouti and Somaliland. Secondly, more recently, Djiboutian 
businessmen, especially from the circles of the ruling family, have invested significantly in 
Somaliland with large scale business projects. 
Due to the economic and thus political importance of Somaliland to Djibouti, it has and does 
engage in bilateral state like agreements with Somaliland. Djibouti has positioned itself as 
neutral and allowed Somaliland diplomatic representatives in its capital.
174
 Formal diplomatic 
relations between Somaliland and Djibouti started early in 1999 when Somaliland's 
diplomatic office in Djibouti officially opened, however Djibouti has not opened any 
diplomatic office in Hargeisa. The Somaliland diplomatic office in Djibouti is confined to 
minor activities, such as welcoming Somaliland delegates to Djibouti. This low-key 
diplomatic relationship deteriorated in early 2000, when Djibouti hosted the Somali Peace 
Conference in Arta, which the Somaliland authority has boycotted ever since. Although 
Djibouti fears competition from the port of Berbera
175
and the access to trade that it can 
provide to the Horn of Africa, Djibouti agreed to diplomatic relations being re-established 
and to co-operation on trade and border controls being started in 2003.
176
 Bi-lateral co-
operation on such state-like issues can be seen as an acknowledgement of the effectiveness of 
Somaliland’s control of its territory and evidence of the recognition of the stability of the 
Somaliland authority’s governance and its ability to exercise all aspects of self-determination. 
Djibouti's political position on Somaliland's recognition has been ambivalent at best and 
hostile at worst. Djibouti has not supported Somaliland's quest for recognition at any 
international forum, such as IGAD, AU or the Arab League. By contrast, Somaliland has 
cooperated with Djibouti in securing the Djibouti-Somaliland border since it declared 
independence.  
4.5.5 Kenya 
Security is the prime concern of Kenya as the population of northeast Kenya is largely 
Somali. Such security concerns mean that Kenya does not want to reduce stability in Somalia. 
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To this end Kenya has also positioned itself as neutral with regards to the situation between 
Somaliland and Somali Republic and has allowed Somaliland diplomatic representatives in 
its capital.
177
 However, Kenya has not taken a neutral stance with regard to the conflict in 
Somalia as security and humanitarian problems caused by the conflict in Somalia have 
become an important public and political concern in Kenya as decolonisation split the tribal 
domains that span Somalia and Kenya leaving long-running border disputes.
178
  
In combination with concerns about border security there is some anxiety within Kenya about 
the rise of Rwanda and Uganda (which have contributed to and have lost the highest number 
of troops in Somalia) and whose ‘soldiers turned Presidents’ have turned their countries into 
economic performers and “darlings of the West” as poverty and corruption have increased in 
Kenya.
179
 Such security and political concerns encouraged Kenya to train and equip militia in 
Somalia in 2008 despite US and EU discouragement and in October 2011 the Kenyan 
Defence Force (“KDF”) entered Somalia to remove al-Shabaab from several cities of the 
Jubba regions, including the port city of Kismayo
180




In making a military intervention, Kenya was not interested in a battle for Mogadishu it 
wanted to get in and get out and create a kind of Kenyan protectorate called Jubaland. The 
ongoing security problems for Kenya resulting from infiltration by Al Shabab in Kenya led 
the KDF to be formally admitted into AMISOM in February 2012 and in late 2012 the KDF 
took Kismayo the source of the majority of Al Shabab’s funding.
182
 In doing so, “Kenya has 
openly admitted to supporting the creation of a buffer-state in southern Somalia to protect its 
interests”
 183
 and arguably undermined the federal government of the Somali Republic “by 
actively supporting the establishment of a sub-national administration in the Jubba regions 
against its will”.
184
 The government of the Somali Republic accused Kenya of violating 
Somalia’s territorial sovereignty and said, “[t]he appointed representative to Jubba is not a 
consular to Kismayo, but he is a Kenyan governor to the region, so as for Kenya to take the 
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control and the ownership of land of this region”.
185
 This approach of Kenya to Somalia 
demonstrates a focus on political self-interest. As such, it is difficult to infer anything 
regarding the legal status of Somaliland but highlight to other states the wider political 
sensitivity of action taken regarding the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland.
 
 
4.6 Middle East and North Africa Region 
The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) engagement with Somaliland has been in relation to 
commercial issues and the development of close cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, 
the fight against piracy and regional affairs.
186
 UAE engagement, does suggest the possibility 
of engagement by Somaliland with the international community on a basis that is not strictly 
that of an internal territory of a greater sovereign state of Somalia but rather as a territorial 
unit exercising a degree of external self-determination of its Peoples in their own right. 
Therefore, as with other international conduct towards Somaliland, there is inconsistency 
between official status given to Somaliland and informal engagement with it. For example, 
Somaliland's Foreign Minister has led a Somaliland delegation to the UAE which included 
the Minister of the Presidency, the managing director of Berbera Port and the Somaliland 
Energy Minister. The delegation met with the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and 
discussed issues such as UAE investment in Somaliland, development cooperation as well as 
talks between Somaliland and the Somali Republic.
187
 The UAE has therefore engaged with 
Somaliland on the basis that it has a separate personality from Somalia but without 
recognising Somaliland as an independent State. The UAE has also made diplomatic efforts 





 the UAE brought the Presidents of Somaliland and the Somali Republic together to 
agree a framework for dialogue for future relations between the two countries.
190
 
Egypt remains a hurdle for Somaliland because it is an influential member of the AU. The 
engagement of Egypt with Somaliland is largely based on political concerns as it regards a 
powerful Somalia as a bulwark against Ethiopia in any future dispute involving the vital 
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resources of the Nile. Egypt therefore promotes Somali unity
191
 as a counterweight to 
Ethiopian influence in the Horn of Africa
192
and is reluctant to empower Somaliland with 
recognition because it is seen as an Ethiopian ally and Egypt does not want to strengthen 
Ethiopia’s position.
193
 To this end Egypt is not supportive of the Somaliland authority and 
has previously blocked Somaliland’s recognition by the Arab League.
194
  
Along with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have supported a view of the dispute between 
the Somali Republic and Somaliland as being between the Muslim Horn of Africa and 
Christian Ethiopia.
195
 This view is reflected by the Arab League’s financial support of 
governments of the Somali Republic (which has been a member of the League of Arab States 
since 1974) and Arab pressure in 2006, on the AU to put off its decision on Somaliland’s 
observer status, after an International Crisis Group report recommended that Somaliland be 
granted short-term interim observer status of the AU.
196
 Somaliland’s relations with Yemen 
soured when it recognised the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (the government 
of the Somali Republic at the time) after the Arta process. However, in 2006 the Yemeni 
Government negotiated agreements with Hargeisa over fishing resources and anti-piracy 
campaigns in the Red Sea
197
 demonstrating a preparedness to engage with Somaliland on a 
basis of external self-determination and an inconsistent approach between its official position 
and its informal conduct.  
Sudan has also had low level contact with Somaliland with flights between Khartoum and 
Hargeisa and FM radio relays between the two territories.
198
 As with Somaliland’s relations 
with states such as Yemen, this demonstrates the willingness to engage with Somaliland on a 
basis that reflects a level of external self-determination that is greater than that of an internal 
sub-state territory if it benefits the engaging State. 
Turkey has promised to open regional development offices in Somaliland and Puntland
199
 and 
is also one of the biggest investor developers in the Somali Republic and has undertaken 
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many tangible and visible projects in the country that has improved the quality of life for 
many in the Somali Republic.
200
 The Turkish Prime Minister visited famine devastated 
people in Somalia in 2011 accompanied by a large contingent of humanitarian agents who 
then continued to serve the famine-afflicted population years after his visit.
201
 Turkish public 
and non-governmental sectors have also been very active in rebuilding schools, hospitals, 
water systems and roads in and around Mogadishu and providing supplies for internally 
displaced people in the capital. Additionally, Turkey has provided scholarships for hundreds 
of Somali students to study in Turkish schools and universities and has offered to help rebuild 
security forces of the government of the Somali Republic.
202
 Turkey’s engagement in 
Somalia with both the Somaliland authority and the government of the Somali Republic 
reflect the confused basis upon which Somaliland can claim to engage with the world. 
As discussed, there are dynamics amongst members of the region that affect individual 
members’ engagement with Somaliland. As with Somalia’s Horn of Africa neighbours the 
importance of the status afforded to Somaliland in its engagement with International actors in 
the Middle East and North Africa region is the impact this has with members of the wider 
international community who are influenced in their engagement in Somalia by Somalia’s 
near neighbours, before clear diplomatic action is taken to recognise Somaliland’s 
independence. This in turn has an impact on the engagement that may arise from 
Somaliland’s participation in international organisations and the links they have to the 
international human rights system as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
4.7 Other International Actors 
4.7.1 European Union 
There is no common policy from the EU towards Somaliland. Individual European state 
policies vary with Norway, Denmark and Sweden supporting recognition of Somaliland and 
Somaliland institutions
203
 and Italy and France being pro unification,
204
 with Italy avoiding 
any engagement with Somaliland at all.
205
The different approaches taken by different EU 
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Member States are for a variety of reasons and some of these reasons are due to a historical 
legacy.
206
 As such, Italy, as the former colonial power of the territory that Somaliland regards 
as being the Somali Republic, supports the Somali Republic’s recognition as the state 
authority of Somalia. The UK, the former colonial power of the territory which forms 
Somaliland, supports the Somaliland authority’s desire for sovereign statehood. 
As an organisation the EU engages with the Somaliland authority directly in matters relating 
to the EUs cooperation and intervention in Somaliland.
207
 Examples of such engagement 
include the EU envoy to Somalia/Somaliland meeting the Somaliland President and Foreign 
Minister in relation to Somaliland’s engagement with the New Deal program
208
as the New 
Deal is the program that facilitates partnership and interaction between the EU, Somaliland 
and the Somali Republic in relation to aid, security, politics and other areas. 
The EU, as well as other international partners, channel aid and investment directly to 
Somaliland through the Somaliland Development Fund which the Hargeisa administration 
jointly operates together with the governments of the UK and Denmark under the Somaliland 
Arrangement and funding from the EU is used according to the Somaliland authority’s 
development plan.
209
 As with engagement with regional actors, engagement with the EU on 
this basis demonstrates an acceptance of the Somaliland authority as having a level of control 
in Somaliland that the de jure State authority over Somaliland, the government of the Somali 
Republic, does not and therefore an inconsistency as to the status of the self-determination 
that is exercised in Somaliland. Individual EU Member States (Holland) and non-EU 
Member States (Norway and Australia) have also demonstrated a willingness to support the 
Somaliland authority in relation to improving the justice law & order sectors and reforming 
correctional facilities.
210
 Even though the EU does not recognise Somaliland as a state it has 
still supported Somaliland’s democratisation and thus its argument for political legitimacy,
211
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There is also a contradiction in the EU’s engagement, as the Somali Republic’s largest, 
multilateral donor is the EU.
213
 The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, the 
President of the European Commission, and the EU Council President, as well as EU Foreign 
Ministers and members of the European Parliament’s Development Committee have had 
meetings with the President of the Somali Republic.
214
 The Council of the European Union 
has also supported EU training missions in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) which has contributed 
to the strengthening of the armed forces of the Somali Republic since 2010. All of this has 
been as part of an EU strategy for a stable, democratic and prosperous Somalia embedded in 
an EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa.
215
 The EU and its Member States are key 
security partners for the Somali Republic as the EU is the main donor to AMISOM, and 
bilateral support from individual EU Member States is crucial in helping to rebuild the 
Somali Republic’s security sector this includes support and engagement with the Somali 
National Army, AMISOM, Somali police, maritime security and stabilisation efforts.
216
 
The difference in the approaches of states within the EU demonstrate the lack of agreement 
and an inconsistent approach to Somaliland self-determination. As such, this approach 
enforces the potential for an informal engagement with Somaliland as a self-determining 
entity that recognises a capacity to exercise external self-determination that is beyond that of 
an internal territory of a federal Somalia but is not that of a recognised sovereign state.  
4.7.2 The United Kingdom 
The UK is of particular importance to the status given to Somaliland due to it being the 
former colonial power of the territory which the Somaliland authority claims falls within its 
borders. Because of the strong historical based links, the Somaliland diaspora within the UK 
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has used pressure to get public bodies such as individual councils to recognise the 
independence of Somaliland which, although has no legal bearing on the recognition of 
Somaliland as a sovereign state, demonstrates the strength of feeling towards the recognition 
of Somaliland independence. 
As with other states concerned with being viewed as imperialist the UK regards recognition 
of Somaliland as a matter for the AU
217
 and as such refuses to recognise Somaliland before 
the AU does.
218
 The lack of Arab support for the recognition of Somaliland has also added to 
the UK reluctance to give Somaliland recognition.
219
 However, the UK treats Somaliland 
“tacitly as an independent state”
220
 with diplomatic relations with Hargeisa and Mogadishu 
handled through different offices.
221
 UK support of the Somaliland authority has also 
included several bilateral agreements with Somaliland upon its independence in 1960,
222
 
generous financial aid and the granting of observer status in the Commonwealth.
 223
 The UK 
Minister of State for African Affairs has also addressed Somaliland’s parliament and 
Somaliland’s president has met with the UK Prime Minister in Downing Street.
224
 
Somaliland officials have also attended ministerial level meetings
225
with the UK 
Government. 
The UK’s policy is to “support international efforts to develop peaceful and sustainable 
democracy in Somaliland” and encourage negotiations with the Somali Republic’s 
government.
226
 To this end the British government has played a major part in promoting talks 
hosting, separately, the foreign ministers of Somalia and Somaliland.
227
 The mixed nature of 
the approach of Somaliland’s former colonial power in itself adds to the lack of certainty of 
the status given to the self-determination exercised in Somaliland and the concerns of 
balkanisation that may arise from the potential recognition of Somaliland independence. 
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4.7.3 The United States 
Like the UK, the US regards recognition of Somaliland as a matter for the AU.
228
 US 
reluctance to recognise Somaliland is also increased by the lack of Arab support for 
recognition.
229
 The US explicitly supports a one state solution, the US along with Italy has 
been paying the salaries of the Somali Republic’s armed forces
230
 and the government of the 
Somali Republic’s largest bilateral donor is the US.
231
 However, the US has also developed a 
‘dual-track’ process 
232
 for supporting the central government in Mogadishu in addition to 
authorities in Somaliland, Puntland, and other emerging entities in Somalia.
233
  The dual track 
of the US is to engage with the government of the Somali Republic and the Somaliland 
authority separately but not to recognise Somaliland as an independent state. As such, 
although the US did not officially recognise any of the transitional authorities in Mogadishu 
as the sovereign government of Somalia
234
 it did recognise the government of the Somali 
Republic as the national government of Somalia in January 2013. 
The priorities of US engagement with Somalia have shifted from targeting high value Al 
Qaeda figures in East Africa to degrading Al Shabab and shoring up public authority in 
Somalia.
235
 To this end the U.S. sees a “unified Somalia” in which the federal government of 
the Somali Republic, that is stable enough to help facilitate a negotiated political settlement 
throughout Somalia as being in the US best interests.
236
 In contradiction to this the US also 
wants to preserve the strengths of the regional administrations while reconciling them with 
Somalia’s national identity which includes engaging with a wide range of political actors in 
Somalia
237
in an effort to maintain any stability that can counter sources of extremism in the 
area. Through this policy the US has continued to fund humanitarian assistance and civil 
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The US dual track policy is symptomatic of the confused basis of engagement and thus legal 
status accorded to Somaliland by the international community. By unilaterally engaging all 
clan-based entities, proxy militias loyal to Ethiopia and Kenya, Puntland and Somaliland, 
U.S. policy has appeared to inadvertently endorse perpetual division and conflict.
239
 This in 
turn means the external status of different Somali territorial entities is unclear. The US 
approach to Somalia also demonstrates the trumping of a consistent approach to Somaliland 
regarding the status of its exercise of self-determination under international law, for those of 
political, security, economic or other concerns of states. 
4.8 International Financial Institutions 
The International Financial Institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”), the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) are important to Somaliland’s 
status because they are important to accessing international resources for development in 
Somaliland that include resources for systems and structures to protect human rights. The 
International Financial Institutions may also be an indicator of the possibilities for 
Somaliland’s international engagement as an unrecognised state because territorial entities 
that are not states are able to engage with the WTO on the basis, not of statehood but on the 
basis of having a separate customs boundary such as Taiwan. Engagement with the WTO on 
the basis of being a separate customs entity does however require the permission of the parent 
state to allow external self-determination in this area and Somaliland does not have that. 
The WTO, World Bank, IMF and African Development Bank all engage with the 
government of the Somali Republic as a member.
240
 However, for twenty years, the conflict, 
instability and absence of an effective government in Mogadishu has meant that the World 
Bank, the IMF and the African Development Bank have been unable to provide any tangible, 
sustained support in Somalia.
241
 In recent years the President of the Somali Republic has held 
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talks with high ranking officials from the World Bank in Mogadishu in order to urge the bank 
to help with a recovery in the Somali Republic from decades of conflict. Recognition of the 
federal government of the Somali Republic means the IMF could offer technical 
assistance and policy advice and could also mean the Somali Republic’s qualification for 
official development grants from the World Bank, IMF, and USAID,
242
 however, the Somali 
Republic is currently ineligible to borrow from the IMF due to its outstanding arrears.
243
 The 
African Development Bank has also engaged with governments of the Somali Republic in 
relation to economic and institutional development.
244
  
Under the New Deal the Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) has 
brought together several funds to be administered by the UN, the World Bank, and the 
African Development Bank. The separate funds will agree operating procedures with the 
government of the Somali Republic and development partners to ensure compatibility with 
the principles of the SDRF.
245
 The government of the Somali Republic, UN and the donor 
community including the EU, UK, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Italy have pledged to the 
SDRF under the New Deal Framework. The SDRF will not be the only mechanism to be used 
under the agreement as “the SDRF will initially run in parallel to on-going activities funds 
and programmes”.
246
 However, “Over time, financing may increasingly transition towards the 
SDRF framework as a preferred channel”.
247
  
The World Bank has engaged with Somaliland through the Somaliland Business Fund 
through which grants are provided to the private sector
248
 as part of the World Bank's Private 
Sector Re-Engagement Project Phase II that supports the investment climate, including the 
development of Berbera port and financial sector in Somaliland. The program is financed by 
the Danish International Development Agency, the (UK) Department for International 
Development, and the World Bank State and Peace-building Fund.
249
 Although, this 
engagement is recognition of Somaliland’s autonomy from the Somali Republic, the World 
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Bank is engaging with the private sector in Somaliland and not the Somaliland authority so 
inferences of a separate international legal personality of Somaliland are more difficult to 
make.  
The overlap of donors and their approach of both engaging with a government of the Somali 
Republic recognised as the government of Somalia and thus the de jure government of 
Somaliland and engagement with Somaliland as a separate territorial entity, again shows 
confusion as to the international community’s approach to the self-determination Somaliland. 
4.9 The international community and negotiations between Somalia and Somaliland  
The international community has tried to facilitate discussions between Somaliland and the 
Somali Republic. In April 2011, the UN‐sponsored high‐level consultative meeting in 
Nairobi  was a meeting attended by the Speaker of the Transitional Somali Federal 
Parliament, the Presidents of Puntland and Galmudug regions and representatives of key 
partners, including the AU, EU, League of Arab States, Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), Ethiopia, Kenya , Sudan and Uganda.
 250
 The purpose of the meeting was 
to reinvigorate dialogue, consultation and cooperation among Somali institutions and other 
stakeholders, with a view to agreeing a way forward to end the transition and determine post‐
transition arrangements and respective responsibilities of all stakeholders. The President and 
the Cabinet of the Somali Republic attempted to cancel the consultation and refused to attend 
on the basis that it could lead to further the factionalisation of Somalia.
251
 
There were further consultative constitutional conferences in Garowe in Puntland, known 




 National Consultative Constitutional Conference or 
Garowe I was in December 2011 and Somaliland was not invited.
253
 There were further 
international efforts to move the Road Map forward at a meeting of IGAD in January 2012 
and a meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia in Djibouti in February 
2012.
254
At the second Garowe conference, in February 2012, the “Garoowe II Principles”
255
 
were agreed. These resulted in consensus from those attending on a federal structure of 
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 The Garoowe II Principles were amended by the Galkayo Amendment on 29 
March 2012 when signatories of the Garoowe II Principles and the earlier Mogadishu Road 
Map met and agreed to decrease the number of Constituent Assembly Members.
257
  
Since the Garowe II conference international efforts to take the Road Map forward have 
continued. On 23 February 2012 the London Conference on Somalia,
258
 which was attended 
by 40 heads of state, was, although not stated publicly, the start of a multi-lateral political 
process.
259
 The process has had baggage from other state building processes such as in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia 1992-95 and many in Somalia regard such a multi-lateral 
process as de facto partition of Somalia by regional and global players.
260
The London 
Conference led to the Istanbul Conference on Somalia on 31 May 2012 –1 June 2012
261
 in 
which Somali representatives took part. This was preceded by a gathering of civil society 
organisations from 26 to 31 May 2012 in Istanbul,
262
 to which Somaliland organisations were 
also invited
263
 and was proceeded by a meeting of the International Contact Group on 
Somalia in Dubai from 27-28 June 2012 the aim of which was to take the Road Map forward 
by bringing groups together to resolve disagreements.
264
 These constitutional arrangements 
and discussions focussed on the peaceful stability of Somalia rather than effectiveness of 
governance such as the impact of constitutional arrangements on human rights protection. 
The Somali Republic’s Constituent Assembly was inaugurated in Mogadishu on 25 July 
2012
265
 to adopt a provisional constitution.
266
 Eighteen Somali regions participated in the 
Constituent Assembly but Somaliland was not among them.
267
 This ignoring of Somaliland 
could be viewed as an example of a passive acceptance by the parent state of Somaliland’s 
exercise of external self-determination. On 20 August 2012 the Somali Republic’s Parliament 
was inaugurated.
268
 In support of a Somali Republic’s Constitution of Somalia the UN 
Development Programme operates the Somalia Constitution Making Support Project which is 
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working towards development of a Somali National Federal Constitution.
269
 The National 
Stabilization Plan adopted by the Somali Republic in February 2013 “includes a roadmap on 
the establishment of local administrations across the country”.
270
 However, it is also unclear 
whether ‘local administrations’ includes those in Somaliland and Puntland and thus adds to 
the lack of clarity as to what the Somali Republic’s view is of the form the exercise of self-
determination by Somaliland takes. 
There have been further international conferences in relation to Somalia. In May 2013 there 
was a conference in London but the conference did not reflect Somaliland’s aims and goals, 
as such, the Somaliland authority rejected an invitation to attend. In September 2013 there 
was a conference in Brussels which  “encouraged an inclusive national dialogue between the 
Federal Government of Somalia and existing and emerging administrations”
271
 with a view 
that it would establish  “local and regional authorities and federal units…as building blocks 
for a viable, united, sovereign and stable Somali state”.
272
 This demonstrates a general 
international approach to engagement with Somaliland on the basis that it is a de jure part of 
a state of Somalia. The conference went on to confirm that this commitment to the Somali 
Republic was on the basis of federalism and that the Somali Compact and the promotion of 
“dialogue and reconciliation”
273
 and “the strengthening of relations and cooperation between 
the Federal Government and the regions”
274
 was also on a federalist basis. However, at a 
conference in January 2014 in Istanbul a commitment was made in the Istanbul II 
communique to dialogue “between the Government of Somaliland and the Federal 
Government of Somalia”
 275
which suggests an equal status between the Somali Republic and 
Somaliland. This equality of status is also highlighted by the lack of a similar status given at 
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Subsequent talks since the Istanbul conference with the UN, EU and IGAD have also 
focussed on building a federal Somalia and the implementation of a constitution for a federal 
Somalia277for example in 2019 the UN participated in a technical working group to develop a 
possible political settlement in Somalia which focussed on the Provisional Federal 
Constitution.
278
The focus of these talks reflects a general approach of the UN but with 
inconsistencies in its engagement regarding human rights.
279
 EU engagement in the talks 
contrasts with EU direct engagement in Somaliland, including investments with the 
Somaliland authority but reflects the different views amongst the individual members of the 
EU. IGAD’s participation in the talks is consistent with the organisations approach to 
engagement but not the engagement of its individual members.
280
As such, international 
efforts to facilitate dialogue between the Somaliland authority and the government of the 
Somali Republic and the basis upon which the international community has engaged with 
Somaliland and the Somali Republic has been confusing. Despite this the efforts by sections 
of the international community to encourage discussion between the Somaliland authority 
and the government of the Somali Republic to reach an agreement do suggest an openness to 
Somaliland exercising a form of self-determination from a broader range of potential 
arrangements for exercise of self-determination than the two ends of the spectrum of a federal 
Somalia and an independent state of Somaliland which the two parties represent. 
4.9.1 Somaliland’s status and negotiations 
Despite the confused approach by the international community to discussions between the 
Somali Republic and Somaliland, such negotiations do impact engagement that the 
international community has with and thus the status given to Somaliland because what is 
agreed between the Somali Republic and Somaliland the international community accepts. 
This is because a strategy for increased engagement by Somaliland with the international 
community on the basis of external self-determination, which appears to be effective, is to 
retain links with the parent state. As the parent state the Somali Republic can and does act as 
a gate keeper to formal engagement by Somaliland with the international community with 
engagement limited by what the Somali Republic, as the parent state accepts or at least does 
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 However, this could be considered to conflict with Somaliland’s efforts 
to gain recognised statehood.   
An example of this approach is Taiwan which has not declared independence and has 
membership of international organisations, such as the Asian Development Bank and 
observer status in the World Health Assembly
282
 on the basis of accepting the name ‘Chinese 
Taipei’
283
which is acceptable to the People’s Republic of China, which is regarded as the 
parent state. The problem for Taiwan in doing this is that any international engagement is 
increasingly dependent on Chinese approval due to the increased recognition this gives to 
Chinese claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. A similar example is the unrecognised self-
proclaimed State of Transnistria which is also able to trade, due to the parent state Moldova 
engaging with Transnistria with the consequence being Transnistria’s engagement with the 
international community depending on Moldova’s approval.
284
 As such, Somaliland’s links 
with the Somali Republic could be viewed as affirming its status as a de jure part of the state 
of Somalia. 
An alternative to the dampening effect on the recognised exercise of external self-
determination resulting from the maintenance of links with the parent state is the example of 
Cyprus.
285
 Cyprus as the parent state of the de facto state of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (“TRNC”) did not actively object
286
 to the TRNC’s observer status in the OIC.
287
 
However, this led to the TRNC’s status being raised from ‘community’ to ‘state’ in 2004, 
which could be argued to be a degree of de facto recognition of the TRNC’s status.
288
 In 
contradistinction to maintaining relations with the parent state is Azerbaijan’s rejection of any 
kind of engagement with Nagorno Karabakh. As a result, Nagorno Karabakh “faces almost 
complete international isolation with its only link with the outside world, and trade only 
possible through its patron state Armenia”.
289
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Alternatively, the “Ethiopian model” or “the Meles formula” variant of limited acceptance 
“seeks to reassure aid agencies, investors and outside governments by proactively removing 
the existing sovereign state’s objections to contacts with the de facto entity”
290
 without 
impacting on or determining the course of future events. This has the advantage of limited 
acceptance without angering the recognised sovereign state. Few governments of sovereign 
states, such as the government of the Somali Republic, are willing to allow or implement 
such a model
291
due to the political and emotional sensibilities discussed.  
Considering the important role a parent state can play in the status accorded to a territorial 
entity by the international community, Somaliland finds itself at an impasse because it has 
lacked an effective parent state from which to apply for secession.
292
 Neither is there 
sufficient economic incentive for international partners to cooperate with Somaliland to the 
degree
293
 to which they have with a de facto state such as Taiwan. This has a knock-on effect 
in relation to engagement on all issues including human rights protection in Somaliland. 




The stability of the authorities in Somaliland and the control of Somaliland territory in 
comparison to the lack of capacity of the government of the Somali Republic has meant that 
Somaliland has engaged in state-like activities with the international community that entail 
the exercise of a degree of external self-determination. This de facto status has been 
acknowledged by international organisations such as the UN, AU and individual states 
through their engagement with the Somaliland authority. However, in contradiction to this 
engagement the official position of all these international actors is that Somaliland is a de jure 
part of Somalia under the government of the Somali Republic in which no exercise of 
external self-determination is recognised. 
International processes (the Somali Compact and the Somaliland Arrangement) through 
which much of the international community has engaged in Somalia has been confused as to 
the basis on which engagement with the Somaliland authorities is to be conducted. The 
processes have both recognised a high level of self-determination exercised by Somaliland, 
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with the acknowledgement of many of its governing responsibilities.  However, the processes 
have also been consistent in making a point of maintaining that the territorial integrity
295
 of 
the Somali Republic is that of the territory of Somalia as claimed by the Somali Republic. 
The confusion as to the international status of Somaliland is further illustrated by the 
international community’s engagement with Puntland, as unlike Somaliland, Puntland is not 
claiming statehood. However, Puntland has been engaged with by parts of the international 
community on a similar basis as the international community’s engagement with Somaliland. 
Despite the confusion regarding Somaliland’s status, Somaliland has been able to engage 
with the international community in its own right with international agreements reached 
being a clear sign of de facto recognition of Somaliland’s international personality.
296
 This 
chapter demonstrates it is the political concerns and vested interests of individual states and 
international actors such as security, economic or political concerns and diplomatic caution 
that are the dominant influence in the status afforded to Somaliland.  The combination of 
acknowledgement of Somaliland’s successful control of its territory and the individual 
concerns of the international community has resulted in confusion as to Somaliland’s 
international status and the subsequent engagement with the international human rights 
system. This is because it has been shown that engagement with Somaliland’s regional 
neighbours is important to addressing many of the issues preventing the international 
community from furthering the exercise of external self-determination in Somaliland.  
Negotiations between Somaliland and the Somali Republic are not helped by the confused 
status of Somaliland. This is because Somaliland does not want to lose any advantages to the 
exercise of self-determination in Somaliland and the current international engagement that 
arise from the international community’s acknowledgement of Somaliland’s role as a de facto 
state. Whereas, negotiations pursued by the Somali Republic are with the international 
community’s support of a federal Somalia and without acknowledgement of Somaliland’s 
current exercise of responsibilities associated with the exercise of external self-determination. 
The inconsistent engagement with Somaliland by the international community and thus the 
unclear legal status that Somaliland can claim to exercise means that it is difficult to identify 
a measure for Somaliland’s current exercise of self-determination, against which different 
constitutional arrangements for the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland and how 
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they may impact Somaliland’s engagement with the international human rights system can be 
assessed. The lack of a legal status of Somaliland’s current exercise of self-determination also 
means that reaching an agreement between the government of the Somali Republic and the 
Somaliland authority, to a constitutional arrangement that allows Somaliland to exercise a 
form of self-determination that enables the international human rights system to engage in 
Somaliland separately from the Somali Republic, will also be affected. This is because 
although engagement as a de facto state is limited, Somaliland does not want to agree to a 
constitutional arrangement with a level of recognition that would reduce its ability to engage 











International Human Rights Obligations and Responsibilities in Somaliland 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter concerns the international human rights obligations which apply in Somaliland 
and the responsibility for protecting them. The obligations under international human rights 
treaties that apply to Somalia cannot be implemented by the government of the Somali 
Republic, as the recognised state of Somalia, as it does not have control in Somaliland, and 
the international human rights treaty bodies cannot engage with the Somaliland authority, 
which does have control in Somaliland, regarding those obligations as the Somaliland 
authority is not bound by them.  
Somaliland as a de facto state/non-state actor may subject itself to an international legal 
regulatory system by expressly accepting its authority through a unilateral declaration.
1
 
Violations of international human rights law by a non-state actor such as the Somaliland 
authority “attract state responsibility if elements of governmental authority are exercised in 
the absence or default of official authorities and in circumstances of a power vacuum in 
which the assumption of de facto authority appears necessary”.
2
 This suggests that 'states' 
obligations are triggered by the exercise of effective territorial control, reflecting the notion 
that power comes with responsibility.
3
 De facto states that result from the assumption of state 
authority can exist above and below state level but “[r]ejection of state authority must be 
accompanied by the establishment of a new effective power that is, by its extent and degree 
comparable to state power”.
4
 “In addition the entity must be minimally self-sufficient or at 
least aspire to become so”,
5
 so there must be legal personality as understood by state-centred 
public international law.
6
Therefore, for reasons of effectiveness, public international law can 
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give de facto states a limited legal personality with the capacity to sign treaties “to fulfil the 
need of the international community”.
7
  
As a de facto state, Somaliland may reference its acceptance of international human rights 
standards in its domestic constitutional framework or manifest acceptance in its conduct.
8
 
However, although a de facto state can make a unilateral declaration that a human rights 
treaty is applicable, the de facto state’s authority cannot be held to account under the treaty 
when this is done.
9
 The consequence of this is Somaliland “is effectively in political limbo as 
no outside government will interact with it on a formal level”.
10
 Somalilanders are therefore 
effectively bound to the instability of Somalia
11
 and the governance of the Somaliland 
authority, as individual complaints mechanisms do not work on the Somaliland authority as 
they are for individuals claiming to be victims of State action. Attribution of the act is only 
possible where the State has ceded power or territory or where the de facto state authority is 
an agent of necessity.
12
 
In order to explore the relevance of this issue to the overall thesis I will discuss how human 
rights obligations under treaties the government of the Somali Republic has ratified and 
customary international law, apply in Somaliland. These obligations and responsibility for 
them will be discussed in the context of Somaliland being a de facto state, as a de jure part of 
Somalia and the effect of Somaliland’s claim to statehood and international engagement with 
Somaliland in relation to human rights. 
The chapter is important in addressing what the impact engagement by the international 
human rights system in Somaliland and/or the lack of it, may be. This is due to the lack of 
clarity as to with which authority responsibility for the protection of human rights in 
Somaliland lies. This coincides with the lack of clarity as to the status accorded to Somaliland 
by international actors and the inconsistency of engagement with Somaliland
13
 which links to 
consideration of the international human rights obligations and subsequent protections that 
could be advanced in Somaliland if a basis for the exercise of self-determination in 
Somaliland were agreed between the Somaliland authority and the government of the Somali 
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Republic. This relates to the idea that an agreement with the Somali Republic government is 
required in order for the Somaliland authority to exercise a form of self-determination that 
would enable the international human rights system to engage directly with  Somaliland 
authorities and other actors in Somaliland, in relation to the international human rights 
standards applicable within Somaliland. 
5.2 De facto state authorities and customary international law 
It can be said that “Since the emergence of the international human rights regime”
 14
 the 
structure of the international human rights system has evolved
15
 so that the international legal 





“is neither self-evident nor immutable”.
17
 Therefore, although it is the government of the 
Somali Republic, as the government of the recognised state of Somalia, that has 
responsibilities under the international treaties the state of Somalia has ratified,  it could be 
argued that other actors could also be bound by international human rights law.
18
 
There is a mixed view as to how or whether obligations under treaties such as those of 
Somalia can apply to a de facto state authority such as the Somaliland authority. Part of the 
dispute arises over whether the necessary exercise of control that trigger human rights 
obligations is that of territorial, or control over a person.
19
Although, there is a growing 
opinion that any control, whether or not it is territorial,
20
 may give rise to obligations because 
in situations such as that in Somalia life continues despite a breakdown of the state 
government control as other actors appear to be in de facto control.
21
 However, those other 
actors do not enjoy any status in international law and are therefore not controlled if they 
exploit the population.
22
Therefore, a legal system needs to take into account social realities or 
it may lose the moral basis for its claim to be respected.
23
It is this realization that “has led to 
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the development of new bodies of law establishing the accountability of non-state actors for 
acts that essentially constitute violations of human rights”.
24
 
Part of the dispute as to the responsibilities of a de facto state is due to differences in the 
definition of de facto states. Although this dispute does not arise in relation to participation in 
treaties, because no matter the view of whether a political entity is considered to have 
responsibilities under general and customary international law, other states will not conclude 
treaties or participate in treaty regimes with them.
25
 Treaty rights in de facto systems can be 
highlighted, as the ECtHR did when it was prepared to accept that rights under the ECHR can 
be realised through the institutions of the de facto state authority of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus.
26
 It is unclear if such responsibilities can be impugned on the basis of the 
de facto state authority being a non-state actor responsible for territory with human rights 
responsibilities opposable to it or on the basis of the responsibilities of the state the de facto 
state authority claims to be.
27
 
As with issues regarding the status given by, and engagement between, the international 
community and Somaliland, the political interests of other states play a part in the 
international human rights standards for which Somaliland is held to be responsible. This is 
because a reason for the reluctance to accept authorities exercising the right to self-
determination of Peoples, such as the Somaliland authority are bound by international human 
rights obligations is the potential impact on its claim for recognition as a state.
28
Therefore, 
actors within the international community may consider whether acknowledging human 
rights responsibilities could contribute to the weakening of Somalia as a state, as such, the 
approach taken maybe to acknowledge the Somaliland authority’s responsibility for those 
obligations which would not “entail a permanent replacement” of Somalia as the state of 
which Somaliland is a de jure part.
29
 
5.3 Human rights responsibilities and Somaliland governance 
The non-recognition of Somaliland’s claim to be a sovereign independent state means it 
cannot be party to international human rights treaties or a member of the UN (which has 
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adopted certain human rights standards).
30
 As it is not the government of a recognised state, 
the Somaliland authority, therefore, does not have any obligations under international human 
right law. The international human rights obligations that do apply in Somaliland are those 
that arise from the international human rights treaties which the state of Somalia has ratified, 
of which Somaliland is considered a de jure part. However, the government of the Somali 
Republic in Mogadishu which is the government of the state of Somalia does not control the 
territory of Somaliland. The Somaliland authority could have responsibility as part of the 
state apparatus of the state of Somalia under the government of the Somali Republic. This is 
because sub-state entity’s, including provinces or federal units such as Puntland or 
supranational actors, do not create conceptual problems to responsibility for international 
human rights obligations as they deal with instances where state sovereignty has been 
conferred or transferred and “do not challenge the confines of state consent”.
31
 However, the 
status and responsibilities arising from the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland 
within a Somalia as a state have not been established.  
An effect of the factual situation in Somaliland is that although responsibility under human 
rights treaties lay with the government of the Somali Republic, it is the Somaliland authority 
that provide governance with greater political stability that controls the territory of 
Somaliland. As such, it is the Somaliland authority that is in a better position to implement 
the international human rights obligations applicable in Somaliland. However, as the 
government of the Somali Republic is the recognised state authority of Somaliland, any 
benefit to the protection of the human rights under treaties ratified by the State of Somalia 
that may come from engagement with the international human rights system can only come 
through the ineffective government of the Somali Republic. 
5.4 Human rights responsibilities in Somaliland and governments of the Somali Republic 
The international human rights obligations that apply in Somaliland arise from international 
treaties that governments of the Somali Republic have become party to.
 32
 Somalia is party to 
over 200 bilateral and multilateral treaties
  
which include treaties on, human rights and other 
issues relevant to the international human rights system such as refugees, health, educational 
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and cultural matters, the status of women, criminal matters, and the environment.
33
 As 
Somaliland is a de jure part of the territory of Somalia of which the government of the Somali 
Republic is the recognised government, the obligations of these legally binding treaties apply 
to Somaliland.
34
 However, there are problems and opportunities regarding responsibility for 
protection of the human rights obligations that may arise from the lack of territorial control of 
the governments of the Somali Republic in Somaliland and the control of Somaliland 
territory by the Somaliland authority. 
Although governments of the Somali Republic have signed and/or ratified human rights 
treaties,
35
 they have had no control or authority in the territory of Somaliland since 
Somaliland declared independence. The governments of the Somali Republic have therefore 
not implemented in Somaliland any of the human rights treaties they have ratified. As human 
rights instruments are formulated in terms of the obligations
 
of states there is no treaty law on 
the international human rights obligations of non-state actors
 36
 exercising a state function. 
There is therefore a gap in public international law with regard to the control of territory 
exercised by the Somaliland authorities and other public bodies in Somaliland. Treaty bodies 
cannot hold the Somaliland authority or other public bodies to account because they are not a 
signatory to treaties as states. The lack of clarity as to the status afforded them by the Somali 
Republic
37
 also means that it is unclear whether the Somaliland authority could be held 
responsible as part of the state apparatus of the Somali Republic. Individuals are therefore 
impacted by the status of the authorities exercising power in Somaliland if they seek 
protection of human rights or wish to hold human rights violators to account, due to the 
potential lack of remedies available for violations by non-signatories to applicable treaties.  
There are not only problems regarding responsibility for human rights but potential 
developments or improvements to human rights protection as well. The extent of the 
Somaliland authority’s control and its desire for its claims to Somaliland’s statehood to be 
recognised provide an opportunity to advance the protection of those human rights 
obligations applicable in Somaliland. There are international human rights obligations that 
the Somaliland authority has stated it would adopt if it exercised a sufficient level of 
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recognised self-determination but it is unable to because the governments of the Somali 
Republic have been the recognised state governments of the territory of Somaliland. 
Therefore, there is a practical impact that the exercise of self-determination by a Somaliland 
authority separate from government of the Somali Republic may have. There are potential 
improvements to human rights protection that could result from an agreed exercise of self-
determination that made clear the responsibilities in Somaliland for the implementation of 
human rights standards applicable in Somalia. 
5.5 Human rights responsibilities inferred by Somaliland’s status 
Legal personality to which de facto states aspire can be demonstrated through interaction 
with the international community. The international community has interacted with 
Somaliland authorities for many different purposes and the Somaliland authority has signed 
agreements in relation to combatting piracy and the use of Berbera Port with states
38
 
(although not in relation to human rights issues) indicating there is some recognition of 
Somaliland’s legal personality. As such, there is evidence of Somaliland having a personality 
that could potentially assume responsibility for human rights protection. 
A state’s responsibility for a breach of international law depends on its international 
obligations
39
 as a “state is only in breach of an obligation if the state is bound by the 
obligation at the time the breach occurs”.
40
 Conduct of any state organ will be considered an 
act under international law that could be a breach.
41
 The scope of state responsibility is 
therefore broad as the definition of an ‘organ’ of the state includes any person or entity 
accorded such status by international law and is “all the individual or collective entities which 
make up the organisation of the State and act on its behalf”.
42
 This includes de jure and de 
facto organs for example in the ICJ judgement Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide the Court the ICJ considered whether 
acts were wrongful state acts by looking at whether they were de facto organs of the 
respondent state. The circumstance in which responsibility arises is widened further as 
responsibility also arises from actors with delegated responsibility
43
 and includes a “person or 
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groups acting under the instruction, direction or control of a state”.
44
 Where non-state actors 
are empowered by and/or act in accordance with a state’s directions or control, effectively 
replacing the state or the state endorses such actions, the state is internationally responsible 
for those acts.
 45
   
Where a state is too weak and non-state actors assume state functions without or against state 
consent often demonstrating a “capacity to act beyond the control of states”
 46
 then  “the law 
of state responsibility and its rules on attribution are of little help”.
47
 Public international law 
rules on state responsibility would not allow the attribution of the actions of the non-state 
Somaliland authorities to the state government of the Somali Republic which is too weak 
either, to stop the non-state Somaliland authority from exercising responsibility for human 
rights
48
 or reassume the responsibilities of the state that the Somaliland authority is 
undertaking. Thereby demonstrating again, a gap in the protection of human rights.  
There is a problem that arises from the lack of clarity of Somaliland’s status both within 
Somalia and in relation to the government of the Somali Republic. The government of the 
Somali Republic does not accept the Somaliland authority’s and other public bodies claim of 
statehood which would suggest that those bodies are not de facto organs of the government of 
the Somali Republic. However, the government of the Somali Republic’s acquiescence 
through its lack of attempted prevention of authorities in Somaliland exercising such a role 
could be viewed as acknowledgment of their de facto function as state organs in Somaliland. 
As such Somaliland, as a de facto state seeking recognition of its sovereignty, can enhance its 
international legal personality through engagement with the international community in 
relation to the human rights obligations that the Somali Republic should be responsible for as 
the government of Somalia which is the state of which Somaliland is a de jure part. There are 
examples of this as The UN Independent Expert on the human rights of Somalia has urged 
the Somaliland authorities to adhere to the human rights obligations that have been assumed 
by the Federal Republic of Somalia
49
 and to ensure compliance with its human rights 
                                                          
44
 Ibid.  
45








 HRC, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia’ (19 July 2018) UN Doc 




obligations, by training the police force, to abide by human rights principles.
50
 This 
enhancement of Somaliland’s legal personality through undertaking such a role arises 
because it can be inferred from the government of the Somali Republic’s acquiescence that it 
does not consider such international human rights obligations to be its responsibility. 
The agency of necessity principle that acts of an insurrectionary movement are not 
attributable to the state unless the non-state considers itself as exercising power on behalf of 
the state
 
would also not improve accountability for the protection of human rights in 
Somaliland. The Somaliland authority is claiming that Somaliland is a sovereign state and, 
therefore, the Somaliland authority’s position is that it exercises power as a government of a 
state of Somaliland and is not exercising power on behalf of a state of Somalia. The agency 
of necessity principle may be argued to apply if Somaliland were to exercise self-
determination in a way that is short of statehood, through a constitutional arrangement within 
Somalia.51 It may also apply to an authority such as that in Puntland which does not claim to 
exercise power as a sovereign independent state.52 This demonstrates again the importance 
the role which agreement of the Somali Republic, as the parent state, plays in the exercise of 
self-determination by Somaliland in a way that enables greater engagement with the 
international human rights system. 
5.6 Human rights responsibilities and Somaliland’s claims to statehood 
Being a subject of international law with international legal personality
53
 cannot be regarded 
as an absolute concept as it “can be described as the possession of international rights and 
duties and the capacity to seek redress for alleged violations and to be held accountable for 
non-fulfilment of duties”
54
 as well as the ability to participate in the making of international 
law, participate in international organisations and conclude treaties.
55
 A de facto state such as 
Somaliland can enjoy a form of international legal personality and “can be held responsible 
for violations of international law committed in the process of its emergence as a sovereign 
and independent State, with some form of retroactive allocation of personality and 
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 However, international human rights obligations are “by derivation or analogy 
from the human rights obligations accepted by States”.
57
 State responsibility is therefore still 
the prime form of international legal personality.
58
 If a rebel group becomes the government 
they may be responsible for their acts but if they fail to become a government the state 
against which they have rebelled is not responsible
59
 and “any possibility of collective 
responsibility for their acts fails with them”.
60
If the insurgent movement becomes the 
government of the state then previous actions of that movement, when it was not the 
government of the state, will fall within the responsibility of the state.
61
This demonstrates 
that even when non-state actors are claiming to be de facto states that exercise self-
determination as a sovereign state there can still be a gap in responsibility for international 
human rights protection if such a claim is unsuccessful. 
Territorial entities seeking statehood and exercising government-like functions over 
territory
62
 can be considered to automatically acquire international human rights 
responsibilities.
63
 If a de facto state or non-state actor wants recognition then it needs to show 
it effectively takes on the responsibility of human rights obligations by demonstrating 
responsibility for public functions that a state would be responsible for and the human rights 
obligations applicable under international law regardless of whether they actually engage in 
the full scope of public functions. This is because “if territorial non-state actors claim to be 
states, or claim a right to become states by virtue of the right to self-determination, they 
cannot in good faith reject the applicability of norms that attach to statehood”.
64
 The 
Somaliland authority would therefore need to take on the responsibility to respect 
international human rights obligations if it wants Somaliland to secede from Somalia as a 
recognised sovereign State. The Somaliland authority has demonstrated a preparedness to 
take on such responsibilities as it has stated it is “responsible for complying with universal 
norms of human rights in customary law as reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human 
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 The Somaliland Constitution also declares that it will uphold all of the 




5.6.1 Responsibilities inferred by Somaliland 
The Somaliland authority has tried to infer Somaliland has an international legal personality 
by indicating it has assumed responsibility for human rights in pursuit of legitimising claims 
to Somaliland statehood. The desire for an international legal personality could be used to 
improve accountability for human rights for the population of Somaliland because unlike 
states, de facto states such as Somaliland that are seeking formal recognition of their status 
are susceptible to political pressure
67
 as “compliance with human rights law becomes an 
increasingly visible criterion for recognition of international status”.
68
 The Badinter 
Commission
69
 (“the Commission”) established by the EU to examine the EU’s approach to 
recognition of states in the wake of the breakup of the Former Yugoslavia,
70
 addressed the 
idea of morality and sovereign statehood. The Commission gave a series of opinions which 
provided guidelines
71
 that made recognition dependent on certain minimum standards 
including inter alia respect for the UN Charter and other international instruments particularly 
those in relation to the rule of law, democracy and human rights.
72
 For example there was a 
policy towards Kosovo of ‘standards before status’ which “linked achievements in 
institution-building and political reforms to the goal of independence”.
73
 This means political 
entities seeking international recognition as a state can be assessed in part on their human 
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  De facto states have therefore tried to ‘earn’ recognition of their claims of 
statehood by establishing effective institutions.
75
 
Reflecting its claims to meeting the standards of a state, Somaliland’s Constitution, expresses 
directly its commitment to international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law.
76
 On 
this constitutional basis the Somaliland authority is bound to these international laws, out of 
which specific obligations may arise. Under Article 10 of the Somaliland Constitution the 
‘Government’ of Somaliland is committed to observe “all treaties and agreements entered 
into by the former state of Somalia with foreign countries or corporations”
77
 ratified by the 
state of Somalia prior to 1991, when Somaliland declared independence,
78
 “provided that 
these do not conflict with the interests and concerns of the Republic of Somaliland”.
79
 These 
include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
80
 the United Nations Charter,
81
 the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (and Optional Protocol I which provides for individual petition 
to the UN Human Rights Committee), the Convention Related to the Status of Refugees, the 
Convention against Torture, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
Geneva Conventions.
82
Somaliland’s constitution provides that the Somaliland authorities will 
act in conformity with international law, respect human rights guarantees and provides that 
those guarantees are interpreted consistently with international human rights conventions.
83
 
An agreement to the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland may also demonstrate the 
limits of the international human rights system if the Somaliland authority no longer needs to 
garner support for the self-determination it claims to exercise, an example of this is the death 
penalty. As Somaliland is a Muslim country that upholds principles of Sharia law, which 
ordains the use of the death penalty, Article 24 of the Somaliland Constitution
84
 and the 
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 both legitimize the death penalty. As such in 2015 six people were 
executed in Somaliland.
86
 The deputy chairman of Somaliland Human Rights Commission
87
 
defended the execution of the six convicted prisoners on the basis it was part of judicial law 




Despite international pressure from the UNPOS Human Rights Unit on the “regional 
government of ‘Somaliland’”
89
 the Somaliland authority has rejected putting a moratorium on 
or abolishing the death penalty
 90
 and “has never formally abolished nor suspended the death 
penalty within its territory”.
91
 When defending the use of capital punishment within the 
territory of Somaliland, the Somaliland authorities have stated that the Republic of 
Somaliland respects its obligations as a member of the international community and adheres 
to the human rights enshrined in the Somaliland Constitution.
92
 However, the Somaliland 
authorities have also held “[i]t is the prerogative of every sovereign state to develop its own 
justice system within its prescribed authority as sanctioned by the will of its people. It is 
therefore a function of the Government of the Republic of Somaliland to adhere to and 
implement the laws of the country”.
93
 The issues around capital punishment therefore 
demonstrate that there are potential opportunities and problems to the impact of engagement 
with the international human rights system arising from an agreed exercise of self-
determination in Somaliland as even when Somaliland is trying to diplomatically and 
politically win friends it is still prepared to face down criticism of its human rights standards 
on the basis of its claims to sovereignty that result from the claims to the exercise of self-
determination in Somaliland as a state. 
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The Somaliland authority, has tried to take on obligations beyond those human rights 
obligations taken on by governments of the Somali Republic,
94
 such as the Somaliland 
authority stating it will implement the Convention of the Rights of the Child in Somaliland.
95
 
However, due to Somaliland’s international status, Somaliland cannot be held accountable by 
the international human rights system for those obligations which it has taken on separate 
from the Somali Republic. For Somaliland to be able to take on these obligations, Somaliland 
would need to exercise a degree of self-determination that would allow this and be recognised 
as doing so by Somaliland’s parent state, the Somali Republic. 
5.7 Gap in the law 
A consequence of the lack of clarity of the status of the self-determination exercised in 
Somaliland and the basis of international engagement with the Somaliland authority leads to 
confusion as to the extent of the gap in relation to responsibility for human rights. The 
political motivations of the international community, the lack of clarity as to Somaliland’s 
status and the unclear responsibility for international human rights standards in Somaliland 
can be factors that contribute to there being a gap in the protection of human rights. An 
example of the gap in responsibility for human rights protection is that highlighted above in 
which territory of a de facto state, such as Somaliland, is located within a state that is party to 
human rights treaties but it is outside the control of the government of the territorial state 
which is the government of the Somali Republic.
96
 As a consequence the government of the 
Somali Republic is not able to guarantee to the population of Somaliland, the full enjoyment 
of human rights under treaties that have been ratified by the de jure State.
97
  
The government of the Somali Republic is reluctant to attribute human rights obligations to 
Somaliland or any responsibilities under international law,
98
 because such an attribution can 
further Somaliland’s efforts to acquire an international status.
99
 As such, where public 
international law does oblige states to ensure certain results it can also prevent states from 
transferring responsibilities without appropriate controls. Therefore, public international law 
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can accommodate situations where the state has consented to governance without it,
100
 
demonstrating that again as per the issues of status and engagement, agreement of the parent 
state is of great importance.  
Although protection of human rights is a fundamental part of international law the conclusion 
of human rights treaties does not fall within the capacity of a de facto state but is usually open 
to states only.
101
 However, it is possible for de facto states to assume legal obligations by 
concluding treaties under international law
102
 but only with the binding element of such 
treaties becoming so through special agreements (e.g. Human Rights Advisory Panel for 
Kosovo) which is rarely done.
 103
 It is also usual that in such situations the political de facto 
obligations are played down and moral standards highlighted instead
104
 of the protection of 
human rights and the enforceability of such obligations. A gap involving a difference in 
protection of human rights is still demonstrated, however, in agreements such as this due to a 
lack of obligations imposed on de facto state authorities to comply with monitoring 
mechanisms such as the provision of state reports within the UN framework of human rights 
treaties. 
Treaty bodies and Special Procedures in relation to human rights violations by de facto 
regimes can only be targeted within the framework of “constructive dialogue” with the states 
and/or (if the states are reluctant) in shadow reports.
105
 There is therefore a gap in 
enforcement of human rights obligations and their protection. This is because as the actions 
of de facto state authorities cannot be attributed to the state, it is unlikely a treaty body will 
make specific recommendations to the de facto state authority in case it is considered 
evidence of the de facto state authority as a state authority.
106
  
Although obligations under the ECHR are not relevant to a discussion of international human 
rights obligations in Somaliland, an analysis of the application of the treaty can be useful here 
as the ECtHR has confirmed that rights under ECHR apply “to individuals within the 
jurisdiction of a state party and that jurisdictional competence [is] presumed to be exercised 
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throughout the entire territory of the State”.
107
 This presumption can “be limited where the 
State was prevented from exercising its authority, including in cases of acts of rebellion and 
the actions of a foreign state supporting the installation of a separatist de facto regime within 
the territory”.
108
 The factual situation thereby reduces the scope of the state’s jurisdiction to 
the “legal and diplomatic measures that the state party was able to take in support of the 
guarantee of the rights of those living in the territory.”
 109
 As such under the ECHR “the 
determination as to whether the territorial State has discharged its positive obligations in 
relation to territories outside of its effective control is made on a case-by-case basis”.
 110
 The 
ECtHR’s position is that the territorial State retains an obligation under the ECHR to use all 
diplomatic means to secure the protection of ECHR rights in the territory of the self-
proclaimed authority, including through diplomatic dealings with the occupying State or self-
proclaimed authority and by peaceful attempts to re-establish effective control over the 
separatist territory”.
111
 The ECtHR takes this position because it operates with the objective 
of avoiding a vacuum in the protection of rights under the European Convention of Human 
Rights “in circumstances that ‘would normally be covered by the Convention”.
 112
 However, 
the approach of the ECtHR can be viewed as imposing those treaty obligations from which 
the state has been prevented from discharging onto the de facto state authority that governs 
the territory and international human rights treaties that apply in Somaliland do not have the 
enforcement mechanisms of the ECHR. 
The problem with the gap created by the unclear position of de facto state authorities in 
public international law is that as they can “exercise powers similar to those of states” but can 
“remain unaccountable for their abuse of that power because their conduct does not amount 
to international crimes and is not related to an armed conflict”.
 113
 There is therefore a need to 
extend the reach of international human rights obligations
114
 and bridge the gap between the 
control exercised by the Somaliland authority and the lack of accountability for its 
responsibilities. Closing the gap and “holding those responsible for violations committed 
accountable for their actions”
 115
is required to prevent retractions of human rights protection 
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in Somaliland and Somalia more widely.
116
However, such a solution to a gap in protection of 
international human rights standards in Somaliland may cause a tension between the 
normative basis of states as the exclusive holders of human rights obligations under public 
international law which may lead to an inadequate guarantee of these rights
117
 and the reality 
of territorial control in Somaliland.
 118
 
5.8 Human rights responsibilities inferred by conduct 
Bringing together ideas of the application of human rights under customary international law 
and the claim of Somaliland to statehood, the conduct of governments of the Somali Republic 
and the Somaliland authority can be considered to infer an assumption of human rights 
responsibilities on the part of the Somaliland authority. 
The Human Rights Committee has proposed that human rights treaties are of a special 
character
119
 and human rights belong to the people with rights being vested in individuals
120
 
and so remain with them in succession. This idea can be transplanted to an insurgent 
movement taking over a territory, binding the new state or regime that exercises effective 
control over a territory and population that did enjoy rights under customary and or treaty 
law,
121
 to the existing human rights obligations that already apply to the territory.
 122
 This 
transference of obligations does avoid a legal vacuum, however, there is limited support for 
the conclusion as a matter of doctrine
123
as it depends on the problematic proposition that a 
territorial State can bind an effective autonomous territorial authority to an international legal 
regime “after the self-proclaimed authority has established its de facto independence”.
124
As 
such, it is not a settled matter of international law.
125
  
The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties establishes that newly 
independent States do not automatically secede to human rights treaties. Although when 
States separate succession to treaty obligations does automatically apply.
126
However, 
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automatic transference of human rights obligations from the recognised territorial state to 
secessionist authority as a doctrine has limited support, “it appears to be an established rule of 
international law that the actions of an insurrectional or other movement that succeeds in 
establishing a new State in part of the territory of a pre-existing State will be considered to be 
an act of the new State”.
127
 
An unusual aspect of Somaliland’s situation is that it is an effective territorial authority that is 
prevented from binding itself to international legal regimes by an ineffective state. In some 
circumstances a state may be willing to recognise human rights obligations as being those of 
the non-state actor or de facto regime, as a means of evading responsibility by the state for 
violations of those obligations.
128
However, an informal recognition of the government of the 
Somali Republic’s own lack of responsibility, such as the absence of references to human 
rights issues in Somaliland by governments of the Somali Republic when engaging with the 
international human rights system, could be regarded as an informal delegation of 
responsibility to the Somaliland authority. As such, this could be viewed as recognition of the 
exercise of external self-determination by Somaliland and thus a basis for negotiating an 
agreed status between Somaliland and its parent state.  
5.9 Conclusion 
There are international human rights obligations that apply in Somaliland via both its de jure 
status as part of the state of Somalia and as its status as a de facto state administered by the 
Somaliland authority. The lack of clarity as to the status of Somaliland’s international legal 
personality leads to uncertainty regarding responsibility for the implementation and 
protection of international human rights obligations in Somaliland. A consequence of this is 
that there are international human rights obligations that apply in Somaliland which the 
international human rights system does not engage with. The Somaliland authority has shown 
a willingness to increase international human rights obligations in Somaliland and fill the gap 
in the law regarding human rights protection that is currently left by the lack of clarity 
regarding the status of the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland and its impact on 
responsibility for human rights protection in Somaliland. 
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If Somaliland’s international legal personality was enhanced, and the exercise of an external 
element to the self-determination exercised in Somaliland was recognised by the international 
human rights system, then a potential increase in the international obligations to protect 
human rights in Somaliland could be placed upon the Somaliland authorities and there could 
be practical impacts on interaction between the international human rights system and the 
human rights system in Somaliland. This supports the argument that an agreement from the 
government of the Somali Republic, as the government of the parent state of Somaliland, as 
to the level of external self-determination exercised by the Somaliland authority could have a 
beneficial impact on engagement by the international human rights system in relation to 
human rights protection in Somaliland. This is because an agreed arrangement between the 
Somaliland authority and the government of the Somali Republic will enable responsibility 
for protection of human rights obligations to be clearly established therefore allowing the 
direct engagement with the authority exercising more stable governance in Somaliland, which 
it is currently lacking.
129
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Somaliland’s Engagement with the International Human Rights System 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses specifically on engagement between the international human rights 
system and Somaliland and is an analysis which combines how the assessment of the legal 
status with which Somaliland engages with the international community
1
 impacts 




As per the discussion of the status of Somaliland in its interaction with the different actors 
within the international community generally, there is a lack of clarity within the international 
human rights system as to how to engage with the protection of human rights within 
Somaliland. The lack of consistency in the international community’s engagement with 
Somaliland and the unclear legal status of Somaliland that arises from it means there is 
uncertainty as to what responsibility the Somaliland authority has or should be regarded as 
having, for the implementation of human rights standards within Somaliland that arise from 
the international human rights obligations that apply to the territory of Somaliland as a de 
jure part of Somalia. 
Depending on the international body, the basis upon which the international human rights 
system engages with Somaliland differs. Engagement in Somaliland can be direct 
engagement through reference to Somaliland separately or interaction with Somaliland public 
bodies or through the Somali Republic or not at all. This confusion means it is unclear 
whether Somaliland’s engagement with the international human rights system is as an 
internal territory of a federal Somalia which upholds responsibilities of the Somali Republic 
to protect human rights by exercising internal self-determination through its legal structures 
or as a separate identifiable territorial entity exercising external self-determination by 
implementing international human rights standards Somaliland has taken on as an entity 
claiming its own legal personality.  
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The inconsistencies in the international human rights system’s engagement with Somaliland 
can also result in Somaliland not being considered at all. When reference is made to 
Somaliland in international organisations reports it is included within reports on Somalia 
whilst also being identified as having an authority with responsibilities separate from those of 
the Somali Republic which is the de jure government of Somaliland, despite their being no 
constitutional agreement to the exercise of such responsibilities by the Somaliland authority. 
This difference in reference to human rights issues in Somaliland also reflects the different 
approach to the interaction bodies within the international human rights system have in 
Somaliland. 
The impact of the inconsistencies in international human rights system’s approach to 
engaging with different actors and systems in Somaliland to strengthen human rights 
protection, is due to the differences in the stability of the Somaliland authority and the 
government of the Somali Republic and their respective abilities to protect human rights. By 
considering engagement between different sections of the international human rights system 
and Somaliland authorities and contrasting this with engagement between the international 
human rights system and other governing bodies in Somalia, I will illustrate how the 
international human rights system engages with Somaliland. 
6.2 The Somali Compact and Somaliland Arrangement and Human Rights 
As discussed in earlier chapters the Somali Compact and Somaliland Arrangement are 
internationally agreed arrangements for the direction of aid in Somalia. They are separate 
political agreements that derive from the same Road Map and New Deal process that leave 
unclear the legal relationship between the international community and Somaliland and 
Somaliland and the Somali Republic. Both the Somali Compact and the Somaliland 
Arrangement address human rights issues within their separate processes but there is a 
contrast between the two processes as to the context in which responsibility for the protection 
of human rights are considered. 
6.2.1 The Somali Compact and Human Rights  
Engagement in Somalia by the international community under the framework of the Somali 
Compact is always in the context of maintaining a federal Somalia under a Mogadishu based 




context of the Somali Compact this approach is maintained. However, some of the Somali 
Compact reference of actors relevant to human rights issues in Somalia is vague. 
When discussing security, the Second Peace and Stability Goal (PSG) of the Somali Compact 
combines the idea of maintaining a federal Somalia and protecting human rights with the 
objective of establishing “unified, capable, accountable and rights based Somali federal 
security institutions providing basic safety and security for its citizen”.
3
 It goes on to say 
“with special attention to securing the rights of women, youth and children; increases 
equitable access to justice; contributes to the rule of law; applies human rights standards; 
adheres to international humanitarian law”.
4
 The Somali Compact does not however make 
such explicit reference to the constitutional structure of Somalia throughout. Priority three of 
the second PSG refers to combatants in Somalia being disengaged in line with international 
law and human rights
5
 and the federal government of ‘Somalia’s Action Plan’ to End the 
Recruitment and Use of Children in Armed Conflict.
6
 It does not state if reference to 
combatants in Somalia includes forces in Somaliland and Puntland and the violence that has 
arisen due to the disputed Sool and Sanaag region. Therefore, it is unclear if responsibility for 
meeting the international standards referred to is regarded by the Somali Republic and/or 
international community as extending to all of Somalia or to territory which the government 
of the Somali Republic controls and if so whether the parties to the Somali Compact, 
including the government of the Somali Republic, regard Somaliland as having responsibility 
for international law and human rights within the respective territories over which the 
Somaliland authority has control. 
Engagement by the international community to uphold international human rights in Somalia 
is raised at priority one of the third Peace and Stability Goal for Justice, of the Somali 
Compact, with the stated aim of establishing a Legal Policy and Drafting Unit within the 
Ministry of Justice of the Somali Republic
7
 which it is to be “composed of well-trained 
experts on law-making, is gender-sensitive and upholds the Convention of the Rights of the 
Child and principles of juvenile justice”.
8
 The unit is also to ensure that the existing legal 
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framework is coherent with the Somali Republic’s constitution and international standards.
9
 
Although, whether the legal framework applies to Somalia of the Somali Republic is not 
clarified. In contrast to support for the protection of international human rights by the 
government of the Somali Republic, the Somali Compact also recognised that “provision of 
most services in Somalia [are] by non-state actors and NGOs”.
10
 It does not clarify which 
actors are considered non-state actors and could include sub-state authorities due to the 
unclear nature as to which regional authorities are part of the constitutional structure of the 
Somali Republic state. Neither does the Somali Compact elaborate the role non-state actors or 
sub-state authorities, should play in the application of such international standards.  
The aim of the third Peace and Stability Goal for justice is to “[e]stablish independent and 
accountable justice institutions capable of addressing the needs of the people of Somalia by 
delivering for all”
11
 in order to establish “a sound legal framework compliant with human 
rights, ensuring access to justice and quality delivery of justice for the people of Somalia”.
12
 
Priority 2 of the third Peace and Stability Goal states the Somali Compact aims to increase 
the capacity of justice provision with the establishment of “regional courts, as foreseen by the 
Constitution, and other justice institutions”.
13
It also sets out that the international community 
will increase human rights protection within the boundaries of the Provisional Constitution. 
The lack of clarity as to Somaliland’s status within the federal Somalia which the Provisional 





 and “other justice institutions”
16
 does not make clear on what basis or even if, 
public bodies in Somaliland should be engaged in relation to human rights responsibilities. 
The assertion of a focus on the Somali Republic guiding engagement by the international 
human rights system in Somalia is also shown in other parts of the Somali Compact. The 
Compact highlights that funds can be channelled to federal units through agreed mechanisms 
and in line with the federal constitutional framework.
17
 Although it also highlights a regard 
for the separate identity of regions and federal units but not the extent or form that the 
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exercise of that separate identity may take.
18
 This demonstrates the confusion as to the basis 
of human rights engagement in Somalia. Consideration of separate systems is also reflected 
in the idea of strengthening existing human rights mechanisms,
19
 which leaves open whether 
systems in Somaliland and Puntland would be included because the degree of self-
determination they respectively claim to exercise has not been agreed by the Somali 
Republic. This is added to further by the reference to the protection of human rights through 
the establishment of a human rights commission of a centralised Somali Republic 
Government. Therefore, it leaves unclear whether Somaliland and Puntland are regions with 
separate legal systems that should operate with a form of internationally acknowledged 
external self-determination or legal systems which should be brought under a Mogadishu 
centred authority. 
The Somali Compact states the “improvements in the lives of Somali people”
20
 will be the 
measurement by which the Somali Compact assesses the success of the international 
community’s engagement with Somalia but who the Somali people includes is not made 
clear. The Somali Compact also adds that “the continued outreach to, and inclusion of, all 
regions and future Federal States, including Puntland,”
21
 are substantive contributions to this 
goal. Therefore, successful engagement with Somaliland under the Somali Compact will be 
on the basis of Somaliland being a de jure part of a federal Somali Republic but with the aim 
of maintaining Somaliland’s success as a de facto state which appears to ignore the role of 
self-determination in Somaliland’s current functioning as a de facto state. 
6.2.1.1 Somali Compact and Gender 
Continuing the discussion of human rights issues that are frequently raised by the 
international community,
22
 an example of a human rights issue which the international human 
rights system engages with through interaction under the Somali Compact, rather than 
engagement by reference to support for the government of the Somali Republic’s efforts to 
protect it, is the issue of gender. The Somali Compact states that responsibilities for women’s 
rights should ensure security policies include “a zero tolerance on gender-based violence, 
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particularly sexual violence and exploitation, and other forms of abuse”.
23
 Support in relation 
to gender is also provided under the Somali Compact for the participation of women in 
politics and dialogue.
24
  The Somali Compact identifies the protection of women’s rights is 
the responsibility of state institutions. However, due to the unclear status of Somaliland and 
separate Somaliland Arrangement it is unclear whether Somaliland institutions would be 
included as part of the state under the Somali Compact.  
The Somali Compact states that UN representatives and donors, through the Somali Compact, 
are “to ensure effective coordination of gender efforts across sectors”.
25
 The Somali Compact 
seeks “to address contributing factors perpetuating gender inequality through strategic 
priorities, under all PSGs”.
26
 This includes improved political and decision making 
participation, access to justice, protection from sexual and gender based violence, economic 
empowerment and access to health and education services.
27
 The Somali Compact also aims 
to “take action to support….expanding gender responsive basic health, nutrition, water and 
sanitation and hygiene, and social work, to all regions within federal and regional 
government service delivery frameworks”.
28
 However, the authorities with responsibility to 
uphold the human rights obligations, that the international community are trying to assist the 
implementation of, are not identified and whether those responsibilities that will be supported 
apply across Somalia or just in territory controlled by Somali Republic are not made clear. 
This is of particular significance to the reference to ‘all regions within federal and regional 
government service delivery frameworks’.
29
 This indicates but does not make clear there 
maybe public authorities within regional government service delivery frameworks outside 
federal frameworks which UN representatives
30
 and donors would support under the Somali 
Compact.
31
 Therefore, although the aim of engagement on gender and human rights is 
addressed under the Somali Compact, the status and/or role of Somaliland in relation to that 
aim is unclear. 
6.2.2 Somaliland Arrangement 
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The Peace and Stability Goals of the Somaliland Arrangement (“PSGs”) address problems, 
issues and requirements for solutions that are relevant to how the exercise of self-
determination in Somaliland may impact engagement with the international human rights 
system. The Somaliland Arrangement, in contrast to the Somali Compact, refers to 
supporting human rights protection within a Somaliland legal system. This is a contradiction 
to the idea of international engagement in relation to human rights maintaining a state 
encompassing all of Somalia as discussed in the Somali Compact. The “Matrix of 
Somaliland’s peace and statebuilding goals”
32
 also states “[t]he capacity of [Somaliland] 
parliamentarians to consult with and represent their constituencies on issues of public 
concern”
33
is to be scaled up
34
 which is again a contradiction to the aim of the Somali 
Compact of enhancing a federal Somalia as those parliamentarians represent their 
constituencies in a Parliament that claims Somaliland is a state. 
The first PSG for inclusive politics in the Somaliland Arrangement also states that in building 
a stable and democratic Somaliland there is a need for “state-level governance systems to 
ensure accountability and deepen bottom-up inclusivity, especially among women, youth, 
marginalized communities and underrepresented regions of Somaliland”.
35
 The Somaliland 
Arrangement also “emphasised the importance of continued consultations across the country 
to seek the views of civil society, academics, women, youth, vulnerable groups such as 
refugees and IDPs, private sector and local administrations”.
36
 The reference to different 
groups highlights that engagement by  the international human rights system in Somaliland 
may not rely on public bodies alone but could also be with civil society as well. The reference 
to “state-level governance systems”, again adds to the confusion as to the basis of 
engagement. This is because under the Somaliland Arrangement state-level accountability for 
human rights issues can only be referring to the Somaliland authority which claims 
Somaliland statehood which again runs counter to the human rights aims of the Somali 
Compact of strengthening human rights protection within a federal Somalia. 
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The first PSG of inclusive politics in the Somaliland Arrangement also highlights in Priority 
1 “gaps in representation; and developing mechanisms for judicial and public oversight”.
37
 
The third PSG for justice did state that there were “challenges to the establishment of a fair, 
transparent, efficient and credible system”
38
 and refers to a Justice Sector Reform Strategy as 
being “in line with the Somaliland development plan”.
39
 The third PSG also highlighted that 
such a reform strategy would require “specialized, high-quality technical support”.
40
 Such 
reforms would enhance external self-determination by further securing a separate justice 
sector that would interact with the international human rights system separately from a 
federal government of the Somali Republic, as has been suggested, with “Capacity 




There are issues that cut across all PSGs of the Somaliland Arrangement, as there are with the 
Somali Compact, an example of this type of issue is gender. The Somaliland Arrangement 
states that “[g]ender mainstreaming will be built into projects, programming and sector 
strategies and progress in this area will be assessed as a specific theme through the joint aid 
coordination and monitoring mechanisms”.
42
 Gender issues are inherent to aid provided 
within the New Deal framework.
 43
 Therefore, although the Somaliland Arrangement 
considers engagement in Somaliland in relation to human rights and other issues, as 
interaction in an individual territorial entity, engagement is still linked to interactions in 
Somalia as a whole so engagement in relation to human rights is still over shadowed by 
Somaliland as de jure part of Somalia. 
6.3 The UN Human Rights Council 
Engagement between the Human Rights Council (“the HRC”) and governments and 
authorities in Somalia in relation to human rights issues, that fall under the purview of the 
HRC and which may affect the territory of Somaliland, focuses on the Somali Republic as 
being the federal government of the territory of Somalia and the de jure government of 
Somaliland. As per discussions in the previous chapters regarding trade and international 
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relations, the HRC demonstrates an intent, when addressing human rights issues, to maintain 
the territorial integrity and unity of a federal Somalia. This is even the case when discussing 
Somali stakeholders which include local stakeholders in Somaliland. This is expected from a 
point of view of officially adhering to international legal principles around statehood and 
sovereignty. However, it is not consistent with interactions by other sections of the UN
44
 that 
blur the status conferred on Somaliland. 
The HRC’s approach to affirming the maintenance of a unified Somalia has been 
demonstrated in statements that the assessment of assistance and support for human rights in 
Somalia is on the basis that “respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence and unity of Somalia”
45
 would be reaffirmed. The HRC, also reiterates its 
support of a federal Somalia under the governments of the Somali Republic in promoting its 
support for human rights protection in Somalia.
46
 The HRC has supported a federal 
government of Somalia’s decision to establish a Directorate General for Human and Minority 
Rights and Rule of Law within the Office of the Prime Minister and acknowledged that it 
would play a role in holding the governments of the Somali Republic to account with regard 
to human rights obligations.
47
 The HRC has not identified how Somaliland fits into those 
obligations in that it has not referred to the government of the Somali Republic being held to 
account for human rights obligations in Somaliland. 
The HRC has hinted at some form of engagement with Somaliland bodies with meetings 
being held to explore how all stakeholders could “work more effectively on the realisation of 
human rights in Somalia”
48
 which suggests the possibility of working with local Somaliland 
bodies and authorities. The HRC has also discussed subnational levels in Somalia but this 
was for the purpose of the implementation of human rights under the Road Map and 
facilitation of its effectiveness.
49
 This adds to the confusion as the Road Map links to the 
Somali Compact and the Somaliland Arrangement and their contrasting approaches to 
Somaliland’s self-determination. Therefore, a preparedness to work with all stakeholders and 
sub-state levels in Somalia and links to the Road Map and external self-determination 
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acknowledged in the Somaliland Arrangement and the confused status given to Somaliland 
within these agreements demonstrate a potential recognition by the HRC, not of statehood but 
of the exercise of  self-determination in Somaliland beyond that of a de jure federal state of a 
federal Somalia as the government of the Somali Republic claims it to be. 
6.4 Independent Expert on human rights in Somalia 
The Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia (“The Independent 
Expert”) is a specific procedure country mandate for Somalia. Unlike the HRC the 
Independent Expert does address Somaliland as having human rights issues that are distinct 
from the rest of Somalia. As such, engagement by the Independent Expert in Somaliland 
demonstrates that direct interaction between Somaliland and the international human rights 
community is possible but does not help clarify what status if any this infers upon 
Somaliland’s exercise of self-determination or its relationship with the international human 
rights system in general. This is because although the Independent Expert addresses 
Somaliland’s human rights issues as being distinct from the rest of Somalia those distinct 
Somaliland issues are still approached within the context of Somaliland being part of 
Somalia
50
 and/or encourages the strengthening of federal Somalia.
51
 Therefore, the approach 
is consistent with regard to acknowledging the sovereignty of Somalia but is unclear as to the 
status of the form of self-determination the Independent Expert regards Somaliland as 
exercising. 
The Independent Expert has stated serious concerns about hostilities in the Sool, Sanaag and 
Cayn region of Somaliland/Somalia and in discussions about Sool Sanaag and Cayn the 
Independent Expert refers to reports by local non-governmental organisations in Somaliland 
and the UNPOS Human Rights Unit in Hargeisa.
52
 The Independent Expert has urged the UN 
and international community to monitor the matter in order to reach a negotiated settlement
53
 
and also urged the Somaliland authorities and non-state parties not to escalate violence and 
peacefully settle their dispute. The Independent Expert has urged the parties to comply with 
international standards prescribed in the Basic Principles of the Use of Force and Firearms by 
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Law Enforcement Officials, not military governance rules.
54
 Through this engagement the 
Independent Expert is interacting with the Somaliland authority and not the government of 
the Somali Republic. The rules that the Independent Expert encouraged the Somaliland 
authority to be upheld are those of internal law enforcement that apply to the public authority 
of a state and not external military governance which may apply to a non-state actor 
suggesting a view on the part of the Independent Expert that Somaliland is the relevant de 
facto state authority. The issues are also discussed in a Somaliland specific section of a report 
on Somalia as a whole both simultaneously accepting the de facto role of Somaliland as a 
state and Somaliland’s status as a de jure part of a federal Somalia. 
Further confusion as to the status of the form of self-determination exercised by Somaliland 
and the basis of engagement between the Independent Expert and Somaliland is shown by the 
Independent Expert’s concern for politicians, community leaders and businessmen being 
arrested in Somaliland after visiting Mogadishu. The Independent Expert said it limits 
freedom of movement, expression and political participation and urged the Somaliland 
authority to abide by national and international law
55
 which would indicate the Independent’s 
Experts understanding that Somaliland is a territorial unit of Somalia and thus subject to 
national law of the Somali Republic but also that it exercises a level of authority which 
entails responsibility for international standards that apply to states. In contrast to this the 
Independent Expert has commented on the extensions of tenure of a Somaliland 
Parliament
56
encouraged the Somaliland authorities to secure the right to freedom of 
expression and opinion as expressed in the Somaliland Constitution.
57
 
The Independent Expert has engaged with human rights in Somaliland through visits to 
Hargeysa
58
 and meeting with Somaliland civil society organisations and politicians, whose 
official titles such as Speaker of the Somaliland Parliament, were used and reference to 
Presidential elections used.
59
 Reference to human rights issues in Somaliland have also been 
dealt with in separate sections on an equal footing to the Somali Republic and not on the 
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same basis as Puntland.
60
 Recommendations are also made to comply with the Somaliland 
Constitution (which declares Somaliland independence.
61
  
In commenting on the procedure of the Somaliland Parliament the Independent Expert is 
acknowledging an institution which claims Somaliland is a sovereign independent state. In 
asserting the relevance of the Somaliland Constitution, the Independent Expert is asserting 
obligations for international human rights standards contained within a document created by 
Somaliland with no contribution from the government of the Somali Republic, the parent 
state, and a document which claims Somaliland self-determination as a sovereign state. 
Although the Independent Expert’s acknowledgement of the Somaliland Parliament and 
assertion of responsibilities on the part of Somaliland arising from the Somaliland 
Constitution may not be official recognition by the UN of Somaliland statehood it is 
acknowledgment by a UN body of the separate identity of Somaliland and the responsibility 
of the Somaliland authority for the human rights obligations a state should uphold. 
Engagement through direct interaction by the Independent Expert in Somaliland also does not 
help clarify the basis upon which the international human rights system engages with 
Somaliland. The Independent Expert has travelled to Somaliland
62
 and met with Ministers 
and senior officials of Somaliland
63
 but has also met the Vice-president,
64
 Ministers and 
senior officials of Puntland.
65
 In compiling reports, the Independent Expert has visited 
Ministers of the Somali Republic
66
in relation to work of the Somali Republic’s Parliamentary 
Human Rights Committee as preparation for the Road Map but not Somaliland and 
Puntland.
67
 Therefore, although Somaliland has been engaged with separately from the 
Somali Republic, engagement has been at the same time as the Independent Expert’s 
engagement with Puntland separate from the government of the Somali Republic which does 
not claim independence and accepts that it is a de jure part of a federal Somalia. Therefore, it 
could be seen as evidence of the acknowledgement of Somaliland being part of the same 
federal structure as Puntland claims to be.    
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Examples of the international human rights system’s engagement with Puntland are a relevant 
contrast to the references to and interaction with Somaliland by the Independent Expert. The 
establishment of a human rights commission by both Somaliland and Puntland separate from 
a central human rights commission of the government of the Somali Republic has also been 
encouraged.
68
The Independent Expert has urged Puntland authorities, not the government of 
the Somali Republic, to treat alleged perpetrators of terrorism “in accordance with 
international human rights standards relating to due process and fair trial”.
69
 The Independent 
Expert has also written to the President of Puntland condemning the execution of civilians by 
a military court and referenced article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights that guarantees a full and fair trial.
70
 It does not state the basis on which those 
international human rights standards maybe responsibilities of the Puntland authorities but it 
does suggest an acknowledgement of the application of international human rights standards 
by sub-state authority in Somalia.  
The “Human rights situation in Somaliland”
 71
 has been considered as an issue in its own 
right separate from the rest of Somalia. However, the “Human rights situation in Puntland",
72
 
which claims to be part of federal Somalia,
 
and the “Human rights situation in the regions of 
Sool, Sanaag and Cayn”,
73
 which do not have a clear political or legal identity of their own 
and which have been the subject of armed conflict between Somaliland and Puntland forces, 
have also been considered in their own sections. Reference to Somaliland has also been made 
within thematic sections regarding forced displacement,
74
 protection of children
75
 and 
freedom of expression (also for Puntland)
76
 which adds to the confusion as to what 
Somaliland’s status is considered to be by the international human rights system. Such 
acknowledgement by the international human rights system, of the separate human rights 
issues in Somaliland and other territories and the exercising of internal self-determination 
within Somalia by authorities separate from the governments of the Somali Republic, is not 
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necessarily evidence of the international human rights system acknowledging the exercise of 
external self-determination by Somaliland.  
The head of UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the UN Secretary General’s 
Special Representative for Somalia has visited Puntland and both upheld successes by the 
Puntland authority and emerging Somali states however this was done while confirming a 
process of establishing a more united federal state.
77
 The Independent Expert has met with 
Puntland Government officials but at the same time as other federal member states
78
 and 
specifically refers to this status
79
 which would indicate again an acceptance by the 
international human rights system of the exercise of internal self-determination as claimed by 
Puntland and argued for by the Somali Republic and preparedness to  engage with territorial 
entities exercising this form of self-determination and not the exercise of external self-
determination as claimed by Somaliland.  
Although the reference above to Somaliland and Puntland in relation to human rights 
protection can be distinct from the reference to human rights responsibilities of the 
government of the Somali Republic the overlap between reference to Somaliland and 
Puntland,80 suggests that Somaliland is still considered and treated as a territorial unit of a 
federal Somalia rather than a de facto state. However, this also shows that there is scope for 
interaction by Somaliland with the international human rights system as part of a state of 
Somalia, if Somaliland self-determination is exercised as a “subnational” effort. Rather than a 
de facto state, to promote and protect human rights and to implement recommendations made 
by the Independent Expert.81 
6.4.2 Conclusion to the Independent Expert 
The uncertainty of territorial status in Somalia has consequences as the Independent Expert 
has suggested that “[t]he human rights road map could be developed with the help of 
thematic mandate holders under the special procedures system”.
82
 Without the Somaliland 
authority having a clear status within the international human rights system, it is difficult to 
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see how the Somaliland authority could follow such a recommendation and grant an 
invitation to mandate holders without the government of the Somali Republic agreeing to the 
exercise of such a degree of external self-determination. This is highlighted by the 
Independent Expert advising governments of the Somali Republic to specifically fulfil their 
international human rights commitments
83




A reliance on the governments of the Somali Republic, as being central to international 
engagement in Somalia in relation to human rights, has been demonstrated by the focus on 
human rights, in the context of the Road Map, with governments of the Somali Republic 
informing the Independent Expert that a significant contribution would be made to the Somali 
Republic’s national human rights agenda for Somalia through the Road Maps overall six-
pillar policy.85 Such commitments by governments of the Somali Republic to protect human 
rights have been based on co-ordination and promotion from central Mogadishu based 
governments.86 However, neither the commitments of the governments of the Somali 
Republic nor the Road Map have made it clear to what extent human rights protection in 
Somaliland is to be covered by the Somali Republic’s national agenda for Somalia. 
Engagement by the Independent Expert, under the auspices of the Road Map, has also been 
unclear as to the extent of the intended geographic impact of its advice. Such as, 
recommendations that the Federal Government of the Somali Republic accede and/or ratify 
international and regional human rights instruments
87
 and funding of the civilian institutions 
of governance, such as the courts, ministries and regional States.
88
Although advice is on the 
basis of governments of Somalia and not all Somali authorities, the Independent Expert has 
proposed that governments of the Somali Republic “delineate authorities responsible for 
implementing activities”.89   
6.5 UN Security Council 
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Engagement from the UN Security Council in relation to human rights issues that may affect 
Somaliland have addressed Somalia as a whole and not Somaliland and the Somali Republic 
as separate entities. UN Security Council Resolutions have referenced an intent to help “build 




 rights and concerns about “violations of human 
rights”
92
 but these resolutions have only referred to a federal Somalia and not Somaliland or 
Puntland. However, the sources or information upon which the UN Security Council’s 
considerations are based are analysis by other UN human rights agencies in Somaliland. 
Although this is not direct interaction in Somaliland by the UN Security Council itself, these 
various bodies through which the UN Security Council engages with human rights issues in 
Somalia do consider Somaliland but not in a way that clarifies the basis upon which the 
exercise of self-determination in Somaliland impacts its engagement with the international 
human rights system.  
The Special Representative for Somalia has met the President of Somaliland but this was in 
relation to UN “engagement in support of peace, stability and progress for the people 
Somaliland”
93
rather than promotion of increased  external self-determination in Somaliland. 
The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (“SEMG”) and the various human rights 
Special Rapporteurs, have also discussed human rights issues in Somaliland as being distinct 
from the Somali Republic such as concerns about human rights arising from armed disputes 
in Sool and Sanaag.
94
 This does not amount to recognition of Somaliland statehood but is 
acknowledgment of the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland the acknowledged form 
of which is unclear.  
6.6 UN Secretary General 
UNSC Report of the Secretary General on Somalia
95
 has referred to ‘Somaliland’ throughout 
as if to indicate at all times a non-agreed status. This intent is further affirmed by the lack of 
‘’ when referring to Puntland. Despite this qualification to Somaliland’s name Reports of the 
UN Secretary General have referred to conduct of ‘Somaliland’ police, treatment of 
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 Reports of the Secretary General on Somalia, the UNHCR, the 
Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights and the UN Secretary-General have 
frequently used a significant amount of evidence from the United Nations Political Office for 
Somalia (“UNPOS”) Human Rights Unit which had an office in Hargeisa and other special 
procedures.
97
 As such reports have noted concerns about human rights under the governments 
of the Somali Republic and the Somaliland authority
98
 and the Puntland Government.
99
 
Engagement with human rights in Somaliland and Puntland has been on an equal basis but 
separate from the Somali Republic.
100
 Reports of the Secretary General on Somalia have also 
referenced Somaliland
101
 when looking at connections with UN agencies and technical 
assistance provided.
102
 However, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative (SRSG) 
on Sexual Violence in Conflict has visited the Somali Republic 
103
 but has not visited 
Somaliland. The SRSG for Somalia has referred to Northern Somalia and not Somaliland 
when expressing concern at violence in the Sool region.
104
  
As well as the limits to Somaliland’s engagement with the international human rights system 
through UN Secretary General bodies, this engagement again demonstrates a lack of 
consistency in engagement with Somaliland and thus a lack of clarity as to the status of 
Somaliland’s exercise of self-determination and the human rights responsibilities for 
international human rights standards of public bodies in Somaliland, that arise from it.  
6.7 Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights 
Both the Working Group and the human rights Special Rapporteurs do not directly visit 
Somaliland as they do with the Somali Republic. As per the UN Security Council, 
information is fed into the Working Group and the Special Rapporteurs from other UN 
agencies (several non-humanitarian specific agencies deal with Somaliland directly) which do 
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engage with human rights issues in the Somali Republic and Somaliland directly, if not with 
the Somaliland actors directly. 
In the report of the OHCHR Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of 
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the rights of peoples to self-
determination, the Working Group refers to human rights problems in Somaliland
105
 but it did 
not visit Somaliland.
106
 The Minister for Justice for the government of the Somali Republic 
has sought technical assistance from the OHCHR to develop a comprehensive media law that 
was compliant with human rights standards.
107
 The OHCHR has urged the government of the 
Somali Republic to review a draft media law and the composition of the regulatory body that 
would oversee it “[f]ollowing a request from the National Union of Somali Journalists”.
108
 
Direct engagement in relation to legal protection of human rights such as this has not been 
received by Somaliland authorities.  
6.7.1 Universal Periodic Review 
No open invitation has been extended to Special Procedures by the governments of the 
Somali Republic but country visits have been made under various special procedures.
 109
 The 
government of the Somali Republic has extended standing invitations, including: 
- The Special Rapporteur on the right of food 
- The Special Rapporteur on the right to highest attainable standard of physical 
mental health. 
- The Special Rapporteur on the right to safe drinking water and sanitation 
- The Special Rapporteur on the rights to education 
- The special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences 
- The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons. 
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- The Special Rapporteur on the adverse effects of the movement and dumping of 
toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights. 
The governments of the Somali Republic have tried to implement Universal Periodic Review 
(“UPR”) recommendations with a UPR Task Force
110
 but without a clear basis as to the 
extent of the territorial responsibilities of the Somali Republic it is unclear how such 
engagement through the UPR and implementation by governments of the Somali Republic 
will impact engagement between Somaliland and the international human rights system. An 
example of this is the grave concern about media legislation in Somalia, expressed by The 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression.
111
 As no reference was made to Somaliland, it is unclear as to what is the extent 
of ‘Somalia’, to which the legislation should be applied and about which the Special 
Rapporteur is expressing concerns.  
Abnormalities as to responsibilities for the protection and breach of human rights in Somalia 
have been acknowledged under the UPR as it has been stated in a report that the UPR process 
in Somalia differs from the standard UPR process in that the governments of the Somali 
Republic have to deal with human rights violations which are not of their own making 
because the control does not extend “to areas in which the abuses take place”.
112
 This also 
acknowledges the Somali Republic’s lack of control across all the territory in Somalia it 
claims to have responsibility for whilst also still acknowledging its de jure responsibility for 
human rights in Somalia, highlighting the gap in application of human rights responsibilities 
which arises from the lack of a form of self-determination agreed by the Somali Republic. 
Under the UPR, organisations from Somaliland civil society do submit evidence for 
consideration, but the Somaliland authorities do not form part of the delegation from 
Somalia, whereas the governments of the Somali Republic and the Puntland authority do113 
and no mention of Somaliland is made at all in some reports.
114
 This is another example 
similar to the Independent Expert of the formal procedures upholding the de jure status of 
Somaliland as being part of Somalia. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women has 
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not spoken to Somaliland officials but has spoken with Puntland officials.115 This 
demonstrates the importance of the parent states non-opposition to the exercise of self-
determination. As such, direct interaction with Somalia under the UPR is with representatives 
of the Somali Government and Somali organisations that do not dispute a unified Somalia 
and not with Somaliland based organisations.  
6.8 Conclusion 
The inconsistency in the relations between the international human rights system and the 
Somaliland authority reflects the inconsistency in relations between international 
organisations, individual states and the Somaliland authority in relation to trade, logistics and 
a host of other non-human rights issues. As with these other areas of relations, a consistency 
in engagement between Somaliland and the international human rights system has been 
impeded by not having an agreed arrangement between the Somali Republic and Somaliland. 
Engagement between Somaliland and the international human rights system is mostly 
consistent with Somaliland being a de jure part of the state of Somalia. However, many of the 
international actors within the international human rights system reference or report on 
Somaliland as a part of Somalia but identify it as separately administered and as exercising 
responsibility for international human rights standards even though such responsibilities of 
the Somaliland authorities for international human rights obligations applicable in Somaliland 
have not been agreed between the Somali Republic and the Somaliland authority. 
International efforts in relation to human rights under the Somali Compact/Somaliland 
Arrangement and those of UN bodies have also engaged directly with Somaliland authorities 
as exercising a level of self-determination that has not been agreed by the government of the 
Somali Republic but is not recognition of the statehood Somaliland claims.  
Whilst Somaliland is recognised as part of Somalia under international law the extent of the 
engagement by the international community with the protection of human rights 
acknowledges human rights issues distinct to Somaliland and falling within the 
responsibilities of the Somaliland authority. Consistent engagement by the international 
human rights system with these issues will depend on an agreed arrangement for the exercise 
of self-determination in Somaliland between the Somaliland authority and the government of 
the Somali Republic. As such, when considering the impact of the exercise of self-
determination by Somaliland, the lack of certainty arising from Somaliland’s unrecognised 
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independence could mean that engagement may still be improved by an arrangement that 










7.1 Thesis argument 
The research question of the thesis, as set out in the introduction, was how constitutional 
arrangements for the exercise of self-determination by the territory of Somaliland could 
impact Somaliland’s engagement with the international human rights system. The 
explanation of the historical background to the formation of Somalia in chapter one 
demonstrates the focus of the current debates, regarding the exercise of self-determination by 
Somaliland on a federal Somalia and a sovereign Somaliland state, has had an emotive 
impact. The emotional focus on a Somaliland state is one of the consequences of the Siad 
Barre regime’s persecution of the Isaaq clan, which is a minority clan in Somalia but a 
majority in Somaliland. The focus on a federal Somalia is a result of maintaining the 
territorial integrity of Somalia after the assertion of regional self-determination in Somalia in 
the absence of a strong central government of the Somali Republic. 
Chapter two built on the effects of the historical background on the exercise of self-
determination identified in chapter one by analysing the relationship between the Somaliland 
human rights system and international human rights. This analysis demonstrated that there is 
a human rights system in Somaliland separate from the Somali Republic which the 
international human rights system can engage with, if the constitutional arrangement for 
Somaliland’s self-determination were established and agreed with the Somali Republic, as the 
parent state. The chapter also explored human rights problems in Somaliland, such as with 
women’s rights, refugees and IDPs and the free expression of the media and demonstrated 
that there are problems that may impede engagement with the international human rights 
system even if an arrangement for Somaliland’s self-determination was clear and agreed.  
Chapter three continued the discussion of the issues that impact the exercise of self-
determination that chapters one and two contributed to and building on the historical 
circumstances to self-determination in Somaliland and the separate human rights system in 
Somaliland, chapter three demonstrated that Somaliland claims to exercise self-determination 
as a state and that the spectrum of self-determination is broader than the two dominant sides 
of the current debate. Although Somaliland claims to exercise self-determination as an 
independent state, Somaliland is a de jure part of Somalia and does not exercise a level of 




jure government of Somalia. This demonstrates that the starting point for consideration of the 
impact of different arrangements for the self-determination of Somaliland is that Somaliland 
currently exercises self-determination as a de facto state and a de jure part of Somalia. Thus, 
this is also the starting point from which an assessment of how the exercise of self-
determination by Somaliland may impact engagement with the international human rights 
system can be made.  
The chapter discussed that self-determination is a spectrum that must remain open to new 
aspects.
1
 The level of self-determination Somaliland exercises on this spectrum is impacted 
by the stability of the Somaliland authority’s governance in Somaliland but the formal model 
discussed when assessing the broader spectrum of self-determination is not as important as 
the agreement to the exercise of self-determination by the government of the Somali 
Republic. The focus of the debate on the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland on the 
two opposing positions of a sovereign independent Somaliland state and a federal Somalia 
which has resulted from the history of Somalia, limit the scope for reaching an agreement on 
the self-determination of Somaliland. This restriction of the arguments for the self-
determination of Somaliland has led to a lack of agreement from the Somali Republic to an 
arrangement. Consideration of the impact of the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland 
and thus what is required from an agreed arrangement, may widen the scope for reaching 
such a possible agreement.  
The analysis of the international community’s engagement with Somaliland in chapter four 
demonstrated that the basis upon which the international community engages with the 
exercise of self-determination in Somaliland in relation to a range of issues including 
economic, trade, military and a range of other areas is inconsistent. This was demonstrated by 
the responsibilities Somaliland was encouraged to meet and the overlaps with and deviations 
from, the international community’s engagement with Puntland which claims to exercise self-
determination as an autonomous region of a federal Somalia rather than as a state, as claimed 
by Somaliland. The inconsistent approach to engagement with Somaliland taken by various 
actors within the international community has arisen due to political self-interest and 
diplomatic concerns regarding the territorial integrity of Somalia and broader political 
interests that would arise from acknowledging Somaliland statehood. Of particular 
importance are the power dynamics between states in the Horn of Africa, due to the effect the 
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agreement of such states has on reducing concerns of the wider international community of 
appearing imperialist in their approach to Somaliland statehood. Thus, the importance of the 
parent state’s agreement to the exercise of self-determination, as demonstrated in chapter 
three, was again highlighted in chapter four due to the domino effect on acceptance of 
Somaliland’s status by the Horn of Africa region, Africa and globally. 
The lack of consistency in the status given to Somaliland by the international community in 
relation to non-human rights issues as illustrated in chapter four and the absence of an 
agreement from the Somali Republic in relation to the exercise of self-determination by 
Somaliland has led to inconsistencies as to international responsibilities in Somaliland. Such 
inconsistencies were demonstrated by the responsibility for human rights in Somaliland 
claimed and inferred by the conduct of different actors in chapter five. Chapter five also 
reaffirmed the importance of the agreement of the Somali Republic to the exercise of self-
determination by Somaliland on the impact an arrangement for the exercise of self-
determination may have on responsibility for human rights protection in Somaliland. 
The inconsistent status given by the international community to the exercise of self-
determination in Somaliland in trade economic and other matters as demonstrated in Chapter 
4 and the unclear human rights obligations and responsibility for them, as set out in Chapter 
5, were shown to impact engagement between the international human rights system and 
Somaliland in chapter six. This engagement has inconsistencies between generally 
recognising Somaliland as a de jure part of Somalia under the Somali Republic despite the 
government of the Somali Republic not having a presence and providing support for a 
Somaliland human rights system that is identifiably separate from the federal structure of the 
Somali Republic. The inconsistencies in engagement between the international human rights 
system and Somaliland reaffirmed the argument throughout this thesis that the lack of an 
agreement with the government of the Somali Republic as to how self-determination is 
exercised in Somaliland is of central importance to the impact of a constitutional arrangement 
for the exercise of self-determination on engagement between the international human rights 
system and Somaliland. 
7.2 Where Next and Broader questions 
The thesis has identified there is a human rights system in Somaliland with which the 




Somaliland was agreed with the Somali Republic. Debates around self-determination in 
Somaliland have been shown to focus on the two opposing positions of a sovereign 
Somaliland and federal Somalia as a result of Somalia’s recent history. This has resulted in an 
inconsistent approach from the international community to the exercise of self-determination 
by Somaliland due to the international community’s diplomatic concerns regarding the 
weakening of Somalia’s territorial integrity and broader political interests. The inconsistent 
approach of the international community to engagement with Somaliland has had the impact 
of increasing uncertainty as to responsibility for international human rights in Somaliland. 
This in turn has resulted in engagement between the international human rights system and 
Somaliland that is not always consistent with Somaliland being a de jure part of Somalia. 
Consideration of the exercise of self-determination by Somaliland beyond a federal Somalia 
and a sovereign Somaliland to include a level of self-determination that enables a degree of 
external self-determination that could take advantage of the stability of governance in 
Somaliland which was also agreed to by the government of the Somali Republic, as the 
recognised government of Somalia, may enable greater engagement between Somaliland and 
the international human rights system.  
This thesis links in with other areas of research on self-determination and Somaliland 
regarding the right to self-determination in Somaliland and what constitutional arrangements 
would lead to stability in Somalia. This wider research, along with the analysis in this thesis 
of the current status of the exercise of self-determination in Somaliland and the importance of 
the parent state’s agreement might be used to explore different potential political models. 
This exploration could assess how different constitutional models could accommodate 
aspects of the exercise of external self-determination, which this thesis identifies as necessary 
for engagement with the separate human rights system in Somaliland, to a level Somaliland 
has exercised as a de facto state. Such analysis would also need to assess what is acceptable 
to the central de jure government of the Somali Republic and would satisfy the emotive 
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Somalia has ratified or acceded to;
2
 
Human Rights Conventions 
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination3 
 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights4  
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights5  




 Convention on Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 




 The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol8  




 International Court of Justice 
 Convention on the Rights of the Child10 




International Labour Organisation Conventions 
 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention  
 Medical Examination of Young Persons (Sea) Convention  
 Workmen's Compensation (Accidents) Convention  
 Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention  
 Seamen's Articles of Agreement Convention  
 Repatriation of Seamen Convention  
                                                          
2
 Amnesty International, Report, In The Line of Fire Somalia’s Children Under Attack (2011)  
<http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/amnesty_international_in_the_line_of_fire.p










 HRC, ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of the annex to Human Rights Council 
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10
  UNICEF Press Release, Government of Somalia signs instrument of ratification of UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (January 2015) <https://www.unicef.org/media/media_78732.html> accessed 20 April 2016  
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 Forced Labour Convention  
 Underground Work (Women) Convention  
 Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Convention 
 Contracts of Employment (Indigenous Workers) Convention  
 Penal Sanctions (Indigenous Workers) Convention  
 Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention  
 Protection of Wages Convention  
 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention12  
The Government of Somali Republic has deposited with the International Labour 
Organisations the instruments of ratification for the following International Labour 
Organisation conventions:  
 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 
(No. 87)  
 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)  
 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) 
Humanitarian Law 
 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field  
 Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949  
 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War  
Somali has signed but not ratified 
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Optional Protocol on Children in Armed 
Conflict  
 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
and its Optional Protocol  
 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol13  
 the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment  
 the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance  








  Amnesty International (n2) 
14








 The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights  
 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal16 
 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of Children17 
 Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities18 
Somalia has not signed or ratified  
 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women  
 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  
 The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families  
 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three 
Additional Protocols aiming to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially women and children, the smuggling of migrants, and the illicit 
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms and ammunition 
 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol  
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977  
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 




 It should also immediately sign and ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on 




                                                          
15
  Amnesty International, Somalia: Human rights agenda for the post-transition Somali government. Public 
Statement, AFR 52/007/2013 (2013) 
<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Human%20Rights%20Agenda%20for%20the%20Post-
Transition%20Somali%20Government.pdf> Accessed March 2014 
16
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  Diplomat New Network, Efforts to improve human rights in Somalia (19 August 2014), 
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